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CONFIDENTIAL.

(9923.)

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PART I.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS

OF

ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA.

[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 9907.]

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CONFIDENTIAL

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Asiatic Turkey and Arabia.

Part I.

[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 9907.]

[17] No. 1.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 2, 1911.)

(No. 927.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 27, 1910.

WITH reference to Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 538 of the 3rd August, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jeddah, reporting on the state of affairs in the Assyr, where an insurrection appears to have broken out, the communications with the coast being cut, and the Turkish garrison of Abha is said to be blockaded by the insurgent Arabs.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Consul Monahan to Mr. Marling.

(No. 64.)

Sir, *Jeddah, December* 13, 1910.

WITH reference to despatches Nos. 35 of the 18th June and 41 of the 14th July, 1910, from this consulate, I have the honour to report that communications for at least the last two months have been cut between Abha, the chief town of Assyr, and Kunfudah, the port of that province, and that according to rumours current here, the Turkish garrison of Abha, said to be nearly 2,000 men, has been blockaded during the whole of that time by Sheikh Idrisee's insurgents. It is further rumoured that large reinforcements are arriving from Constantinople.

I have, &c.
J. H. MONAHAN.

[18] No. 2.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 2, 1911.)

(No. 928.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 28, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 898 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, reporting further on the Kurdish disturbances at Khuyt.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Consul McGregor to Mr. Marling.

(No. 98.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, December* 18, 1910.

WITH reference to Mr. Safrastian's telegram of the 12th instant, reporting a fight which had taken place a few days previously at Khuyt between Kurds and gendarmes in consequence of the refusal of the former to supply recruits, I have the honour to communicate, for your information, the following supplementary details from a private letter received to-day from Mr. Safrastian:—

"Some ten days ago twenty zaptiés were sent to Khuyt to collect the Kurdish recruits of the Belekli tribe (sub-tribe of Shego) and to make certain enquiries as regards the whereabouts of Kurdish criminals who killed two soldiers in July last. The Kurds refused to deliver the recruits, and as the zaptiés undertook to employ force, they were surprised on the 11th by a band of armed brigands. Six gendarmes are reported as killed and the rest fled, spreading consternation in the town.

"This aggression has made a very painful impression. Owing to Bairam I saw some higher officials this morning, and they were so ashamed that they did not even like to talk about the matter.

"Ismail Hakki Bey, who was on a tour of inspection at Mush, left that town at once on receipt of the news. He is expected to reach here to-night, and a punitive expedition is being prepared, and details will be settled after the arrival of the acting vali."

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

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[23] No. 3.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 2, 1911.)

(No. 933.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 27, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Diarbekir, reporting the arrival at Jezireh of two grandsons of the late Bederkhan Pasha.

It may be that the benevolent attitude adopted by the local authorities to Bedri Bey and his brother is the result of a wish on the part of the Committee of Union and Progress to use the tribesmen for aggressive purposes near the Persian frontier, while the recent decision to transform the Hamidieh regiments into "tribal light cavalry" seems to point to an intention of the Ottoman Government ultimately to utilise the military material of the Kurdish and other tribes on somewhat the same lines as the ex-Sultan, *i.e.*, as a counterfoil to Russian Cossacks.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 53.)

Sir, *Diarbekir, November* 29, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to report, for your Excellency's information, that two grandsons of the late Bederkhan Pasha, Bedri Bey and a younger brother, arrived here towards the end of last August as the guests of Feizi Effendi, the deputy for Diarbekir. After a few days stay they proceeded to Jezireh, formerly the residence of their family, and now the residence of a kaïmakam and capital of a kaza. The object of their visit is ostensibly to lay claim to the property owned by their grandfather, who was exiled to Constantinople and dispossessed of his "derébeylik" of Bohtan some sixty-five years ago.

From information recently to hand, it appears that Bedri Bey and his brother were welcomed on arrival at Jezireh by the kaïmakam, who expressed the hope that the necessary formalities for the transfer of the konak to them would be accomplished by

next spring. The konak, or government house, is built on the site of the late Bederkhan Pasha's castle. The chiefs of the Bohtan Kurdish tribes, for the most part descendants of the servants of the late Bederkhan Pasha, are rallying to his grandsons, who, I am assured, are acting with the knowledge of the Government and with the approval of the Committee of Union and Progress. The Government apparently wishes to be able to direct the movements of the Bohtan Kurds in certain eventualities. The Bohtan territory, over which the late Bederkhan Pasha held sway, adjoins the Persian frontier; it is situated mainly in the Bitlis vilayet, although it includes parts of the vilayets of Van, Diarbekir, and Mosul. In the old days, Bederkhan Pasha could muster 120,000 fighting men, and it is stated that his grandsons can now command the loyalty of from 50,000 to 60,000 Kurds.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

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[25] No. 4.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 2, 1911.)

(No. 935.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 27, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, in continuation of my telegram No. 258 of the 11th instant, further information now received from His Majesty's consular officers at Damascus and Jerusalem regarding the Arab attacks on the Hedjaz Railway and on Kerak.

The accounts given in these despatches in general confirm the earliest reports published in the Constantinople press, which has, however, endeavoured subsequently to minimise the seriousness of these incidents, whereas the information contained in my telegram No. 264 of to-day's date shows that the insurrection is spreading all down the railway.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

Consul Devey to Mr. Marling.

Sir, *Damascus, December* 13, 1910.

DURING the last two weeks I regret to report very serious troubles have taken place in the districts south of Damascus, being gravest incidents that have occurred since the inception of the Hejaz Railway.

It would seem that the Majiali Arabs were very discontented three weeks ago, in respect of non-payment of the annual subsidy (2,500*l.* or thereabouts) paid, for guarding or seeing that no harm came to the Hedjaz Railway between Amman and Maan by the Government, as they had sent to Damascus a delegation to ask for some settlement, or at least some arrangement in this respect, a month ago, and these few Bedouins were dismissed contemptuously. Their revenge was promptly taken by attacking first the station of Katrane, where the master and two others were killed, upsetting a train, and burning and destroying it completely, and cutting the line in two places for a considerable distance—several kilometres, it is believed; they are then believed to have destroyed two or three stations of the neighbourhood, viz.: Lubin, Djiza, Katrane, El Hassa, at respectively 250, 261, 327, 379 kilom. from Damascus.

Of course all telegraph wires being cut, it is extremely difficult to get information, and unfortunately almost all the transport cars and waggons being beyond or at Maan, there is great difficulty in conveying troops to Amman, whence, with Salt on the west, the disturbed area commences. At the same time, as a concerted movement, Bedouins, and Druzes in revolt made a combined attack on the town and old fortress of Kerak, and massacred the mutessarif, Seifi Bey Cadi, nefus-mamuri, and some other employés, besides the major in command, with two or three officers and about seventeen soldiers. But there are later rumours that the castle of Kerak was bombarded, from which one may deduce that soldiers must have returned with guns and in the hope of relieving the chief commanding officer, who was not in Kerak at the time of the massacre.

The number of the insurrectionists have been guessed to be 1,500 or again 15,000; probably they number about 6,000, in view of the extent of country.

I have, &c.

G. P. DEVEY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

Acting Consul Morgan to Mr. Marling.

(No. 69.)

Sir, *Jerusalem, December* 16, 1910.

AT the outbreak of the rising in Kerak a party of Americans were in that town under the charge of the Rev. Mr. Forder, a missionary. Mr. Forder, who resides in Jerusalem, has worked and lived among the Bedouins east of Jordan for many years, is well known to them, and much respected by them. Indeed, it is due to their friendliness towards him and his thorough knowledge of Arabic characters and language that the party were enabled to return to Jerusalem in safety. His narrative of what took place at Kerak may not be devoid of interest.

Mr. Forder and party arrived at Kerak on Sunday, the 4th December, and dined that night with the mutessarif and sheikh of the district, a member of the Mejelleh family—a notable family in Kerak. About daybreak on the Monday they were awakened by a noise of firing and shouting in the street and learned that the town had been invaded by Bedouins, who were killing and looting in the town. The Bedouins of the quarter in which Forder's party were—at the north of the town, while the castle is to the south—assured them that they had nothing to fear and set a guard over them to protect them. So they remained till Tuesday morning, continually hearing firing. On Tuesday morning the friendly Bedouins suggested that they should leave the town and try to make their way to Jerusalem. They accordingly did so and the whole party left Kerak with their muleteers and animals, some seventeen in all. They were provided with an escort of five or six men by the sheikh of the Kerak district before mentioned. It may be mentioned that on Monday a large body of Bedouins came to the quarter, in which the party were, to attack the house of the Turkish officer second in command of the garrison. Although his house was next door to Forder's lodging and was looted and burnt, the party were not molested. It happened that the officer had escaped before the arrival of the Bedouins and, unknown to Forder, was hidden in the cistern of Forder's lodging. The Bedouins got some word of this and came to ask Forder for information. On his assuring them on oath that the officer was not in his house, the Bedouins forbade anyone to enter and search and left the quarter.

Forder and party, having left Kerak, travelled one day's journey towards the south of the Dead Sea escorted by the friendly Bedouins and met with no adventures. A messenger then arrived from Kerak and asked that Forder should accompany him back to Kerak as the sheikh wished to confer with him. Forder accordingly went back to Kerak alone and arrived on Thursday, the 8th December. He was well received by the sheikh and learnt many details of the fighting.

The cause of the uprising was—

1. The decision of the Turkish Government to take a census of the people.
2. To enforce military service among the Bedouins.
3. To carry out a disarmament of the tribesmen.

That the Bedouins had been discontented at these measures had been known for some time, and all plans had been concerted for an outbreak when it would be seen that these measures were to be put into execution.

For the purpose of taking the census and enrolling recruits Kerak district was divided into eight parts, to each of which forty soldiers and one or two cannon were sent. The sheikh assured Forder that the mutessarif had sent round orders that five girls from each clan were to be sent to Kerak for the Turkish officials and soldiers. This order decided the Bedouins. The chiefs pretended to be willing to obey, but pointed out that, to obviate all difficulties, it would be better to divide Kerak district into sixteen parts and send forty soldiers to each. This was done some two or three days before the outbreak. When the soldiers were so disposed, the Bedouins rose on Sunday, the 4th December, and massacred them all. Only four or five escaped and some four or five were kept in each company to work the cannon. The original plan was to enter Kerak on Monday morning at 9 A.M., when the soldiers would be out of

the castle exercising on the parade ground, and so massacre the soldiers and take possession of the castle. Carried away by excitement the Bedouins burst into the town before the time and made for the castle. They were, however, unable to take it, and up to the time that Forder left, viz., Friday, the 9th December, the castle was still held by the soldiers, some 250 in number. The Bedouins sacked and burnt the Government buildings and looted the Treasury. They burnt all the houses of the Turkish officials, the mosque, and in general everything that savoured of the Turkish Government. They killed all Turkish officials, their wives and children, and all outsiders (such as shopkeepers from Damascus, Gaza, &c.), whether Moslem, Jew, or Christian, except Forder's party. The Kerak Moslems and Christians were spared. The mutessarif's house was near the castle. He attempted to reach the castle by night disguised as a woman, but was caught and his throat was cut.

The affair was carried out by local Bedouins, but had been concerted for weeks beforehand with the desert Bedouins, who were all encamped on the day of the outbreak at some 25 miles from Kerak and who kept pouring into the town for days. They tore up the Hedjaz line between Maan and Amman, cut the telegraph wires and massacred as many Turks as they could find.

Forder left on Friday with a letter from the sheikh to a friendly tribe living near the Dead Sea, rejoined his party and with an escort of seven or eight continued his journey. Unfortunately, they fell in with a band of some thirty robbers belonging to the Attowney tribe, who drove off the escort and compelled the party to accompany them. At nightfall the party were forced to hand over their guns and money and a plan was made at night, but overheard by Forder, to take the party in a direction away from the Dead Sea and murder them. It so happened that an Arab had fallen in with the party on the road and was accompanying them when the robbers came up. He was allowed to go on his way. He accordingly went to the camp of the Bedouins for whom Forder had a letter and informed them of the party's plight. These Bedouins set out in the morning and came up with Forder and his company and rescued them, but the robbers got off with their booty. Forder and his party subsequently passed south of the Dead Sea and reached Hebron and so arrived in Jerusalem.

Very little reliable news has come in from that region since Forder's return. The Mutessarif of Jerusalem says that a detachment from the army near Damascus reached Kerak two days ago, but considering that the line is torn up and that the Bedouins are waiting in thousands for the army from the north it is hardly likely. Yesterday Kerak could be seen burning from Jerusalem, but whether for purification of the town or for some other reasons is unknown. Madeba was menaced, but so far as can be known both it and Salt are safe.

The authorities here and in Hebron are doing all they can to prevent news of the affair being known. They are turning back refugees at the Jordan and keep publishing telegrams announcing the arrival of troops in Kerak. This is a wise precaution, for a little encouragement might bring about an anti-Christian uprising of fanatical Moslems in Hebron and here. As regards the Bedouin outbreak, it is purely anti-Turkish. The Kerak Christians were spared by them. Madeba, which is wholly Christian, has not been attacked. The enrolment of Bedouin recruits (this has only been attempted east of the Jordan, the less nomadic Bedouins living west of the Jordan not having been called on to serve), the taking of the census and the proposed disarmament were the aggravating factors.

Forder has presented a claim for some 20*l.* taken from him by Sheikh Swalim-ibn-Ali, chief of the Attowney Arabs, living in Ghor-es-Safieh. I intend communicating the claim to the local authorities.

The reason why Mr. Forder was summoned to Kerak after his departure on Thursday was that the sheikh and the other Bedouin chiefs in Kerak wanted him to promise that he would try and obtain that English protection should be extended to them, and that if possible all the land east of the Jordan should be taken under the jurisdiction of Egypt. Mr. Forder suggested that they should write a letter to that effect and one was written, but when they were asked to seal it they declined to do so, fearing perhaps that it might fall into other hands, and the idea of the letter was abandoned. However, they charged him to deliver the message at the consulate in Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

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[26]

No. 5.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January 2, 1911.*)

(No. 936.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 28, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting on the defeat of the Druses at Kerek and on troubles in the Yemen.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 5.

Major Tyrrell to Mr. Marling.

(No. 76.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 27, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to report that telegrams have been received at the Ministry of War announcing the complete defeat of the Druses at Kerek, and giving their losses at 500 killed and 650 prisoners.

A few days ago I saw the copy of a telegram from the commander of the Vth Ordu, evidently in reply to instructions from Constantinople, to the effect that the Druses were gradually withdrawing from Kerek, with the intention of joining the Bedouins, and that, it being impossible to recall any part of a force of nine battalions which had been sent down to Maan, three battalions which had not hitherto taken an active part in the operations in the Hauran were being sent to Kerek to reinforce the six battalions already there. It is probably this latter force, with the reinforcement mentioned, which has gained the victory now reported.

But in the absence of any reliable information, and in the complete ignorance of the geography of Syria shown by the papers, it is difficult to trace the actual course of recent events; and I had better not attempt to do so until some light has been thrown on them by consular reports from Syria.

I may say that it is generally supposed that Sami Pasha demanded reinforcements; but the only step taken in that direction has been the countermanding of the return home and dismissal of the Smyrna and Adana Redifs (for particulars of the Redifs embodied for service in the Hauran, see my despatch No. 61).

At the beginning of this month, two Khedivial steamers were chartered to transport 10,000 men from Haifa and Beyrout to Mersina and Smyrna, and the Magnesia battalion was actually embarked, and probably landed at Smyrna. But the news of the first outbreak then being received, the chartering of the second steamer was cancelled, and orders were sent for the troops to return to the Hauran.

Rebellion is also reported in Assyr and the Yemen. The military authorities deny the importance of these, and on the 18th instant Izzet Pasha, the C.G.S., told me that there was no intention of reinforcing the troops in these places. But about the 23rd instant a telegram was sent from the Ministry of War to the Aidin vilayet, ordering the dispatch of four Nizam battalions from there for the Yemen.

I do not see any connection between these various troubles—the Druses in the Hauran, the Bedouins on the Hedjaz Railway line, the Arabs in Assyr and the Yemen—except perhaps that all these people meet on common ground when they thus express their dislike of law and order, particularly as interpreted by the present Government, or when they resent some foolish action by overbearing local officials.

But of course the opportunity for suggesting a concerted movement, instigated by British intrigues, is not missed. The Turks are curiously sensitive to British influence on the Red Sea coast, and are always ready to attribute trouble there to British machinations rather than to their own misgovernment; and I have already observed a change of demeanour in Turkish officers whom I see, and I notice a sort of suspicion in their attitude even when discussing subjects quite unconnected with Syria and the Yemen.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Major*,
Military Attaché.

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[28]

No. 6.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January 2, 1911.*)

(No. 938.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 28, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum forwarding a report from the acting British vice-consul at Bitlis on a quarrel between the Mutessarif of Mush and a junior officer of the garrison, which resulted in the dismissal of the former, while the latter, for whose conduct there does not appear to have been the smallest excuse, remains unpunished, he being a leading member of the local Committee of Union and Progress.

It is worth noting that Ismail Hakki Bey, the Acting Vali of Bitlis, and therefore responsible for the dismissal of the mutessarif, was formerly Mutessarif of Ipek, and that it was under his administration that the events occurred that led to operations in Albania last summer. It would almost seem from what Mr. Safrastian says in the last paragraph of his despatch, and from what we know of the general policy of the Committee of Union and Progress that Ismail Hakki Bey is acting on inspiration from the committee and is preparing the way for a campaign in Kurdistan next summer, on the termination of which the Armenians would be treated as were the Bulgars in Macedonia after the Albanian revolt had been crushed.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 6.

Consul McGregor to Mr. Marling.

(No. 97.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, December 18, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, reporting on an incident which occurred about three weeks ago at Mush between the mutessarif of the sanjak and a junior officer of the garrison, who is also a leading member of the local Committee of Union and Progress.

According to Mr. Safrastian's account, the conduct of the lieutenant was so outrageous as to justify doubts as to his sanity, but, owing no doubt to his connection with the committee, he has so far remained unpunished; while the mutessarif, whose only fault appears to have been a perhaps excusable want of energy in asserting himself, has been dismissed.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 6.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

Sir, *Bitlis, December 9, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to report as follows upon a curious incident which happened in Mush about two weeks ago:—

Husni Bey, the Mutessarif of Mush, had ordered a local carpenter some time ago to build a glass case for himself, and the latter on finishing the case was about to carry it to the mutessarif when a certain Musa Kiazim Effendi, a military lieutenant (Mulazim) of the garrison, told the carpenter that he needed such a glass case and that he would buy it. In vain the carpenter informed the lieutenant of the facts; he had but then to inform the mutessarif of the matter, who on receipt of the news of such an impertinent conduct of the officer in question, sent zaptiehs to take the case.

The latter also met the refusal of the lieutenant, who in this lawful action of the mutessarif feeling himself offended, dashed towards the konak where Husni Bey was occupied with daily business and insulted him in a very rough manner. In the meantime the carpenter was beaten by the lieutenant, and as the former went to the police to protest against the mad officer, he was dragged out violently from the police office by the latter and forbidden to state his case. It is reported that something like a panic was created in the town. The mutessarif withdrew at once to his house and submitted his resignation to the acting vali here.

More than two weeks have passed now and yet no news of any punishment for the lieutenant has been received here, and one may say for certain that he never will be punished for such an "exploit," as he is one of the leading members of the local Committee of Union and Progress, whereas the mutessarif is dismissed now on the ground that he does not deserve well his position in retiring to his house under circumstances in which he should have fulfilled his duty as mutessarif by upholding the authority of the civil Government.

A rumour is just in circulation to the effect that a military major has been appointed as mutessarif for Mush. Some time ago Ismail Hakki Bey, the acting vali, told me that he liked to appoint military officers for the higher civil posts, as the latter are well disciplined and capable of quick action. The Kaimakam of Susoon is already a military captain, and if the above rumour proves to be true and the disreputable conduct of Lieutenant Musa Kiazim as described above is considered to be discipline, there is ground to fear that the government of this province is rapidly drifting into a military dictatorship into the hands of a few irresponsible and inexperienced officers.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

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[29] No. 7.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2, 1911.)

(No. 939.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 28, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 865 of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith, in translation, a further extract from the report of Ismail Hakki Bey Babanzade, the deputy for Bagdad, on the state of affairs in Mesopotamia, which was published in the committee organ, the "Tanin," of the 26th instant.

I propose to take an early opportunity of calling the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to this publication as a proof of the anti-British sentiment that animates the Committee of Union and Progress, and of its existence in the Mesopotamian vilayets.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 7.

Translation of part of an Article on Bussorah by Ismail Hakki, Deputy for Bagdad, which appeared in the "Tanin" of December 26, 1910.

IN these parts there is no place so unhealthy, and, at the same time, so important, both commercially and politically, as Bussorah. Whatever may be said to the contrary, the political balance of Irak has shifted to Bussorah during the last thirty years. At Ashar, the first thing that strikes the eye is five or six fairly big steamers, but all fly the English flag. At whatever part of Bussorah you look, a thousand different things connected with England will immediately strike your attention, and you will feel how deep the claws of English influence have sunk into our country's flesh. The very "hammals" (street porters) adapt to their own dialect the naval and other technical terms which have been Arabicised from the English, and decline and conjugate them.

Through Sheikh Kazzal, who holds sway in the part of Persia which extends from Kuweit and Mohammerah to the left bank of the Shatt-el-Arab, England is practically squeezing the sanjak of Bussorah with a hand of iron, and, by exercising an increasing pressure, she is striving to catch it in a fowler's net; to such an extent (according to a rumour which I have not been able thoroughly to examine) that she has even begun to confer British nationality or protection upon tribes both in the Mohammerah district —at Badr, for instance—and in the Bussorah district. As her influence, however, is stronger in Persian territory, the rumour is of more weight for that part. In either case, the harm to the Ottoman Empire is evident, for the protected tribes on the further side of the Shatt-el-Arab both can, and continually do, pass over to the Ottoman side, and, under the encouragement of the protection they have obtained, give rise to all sorts of difficulties.

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[250] No. 8.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3, 1911.)

(No. 941.)
Sir, *Pera, December 29, 1910.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me yesterday that the recent incident at Hodeidah, which formed the subject of my despatch No. 901 of the 14th instant, was about to be settled by the dispatch of a joint Turco-Italian commission to collect evidence and establish the facts in the case on the spot. His Excellency was confident that the result of the enquiry would be to prove that the Italian sambouk had been engaged in smuggling, and he thought that the Italian Ambassador was privately of the same opinion.

Yesterday's Constantinople papers published telegrams from Hodeidah stating that the Mutessarif of Hodeidah had been dismissed, and that the local Committee of Union and Progress had entertained the Italian consul at a banquet; Rifaat Pasha however assured me that the natural inference that the dismissal of the governor had been caused by the Italian incident was not a correct one, as the Mutessarif had been removed for quite different reasons. As a matter of fact the Mutessarif, I am informed, was locally much disliked, and was recalled in deference to popular clamour, but it seems fairly evident, in spite of Rifaat Pasha's denials, that at all events the Hodeidah Committee of Union and Progress recognised the Italian incident as having contributed to that end.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[294] No. 9.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers to Foreign Office.—(Received January 3.)

3, *Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, January 2, 1911.*

Sir,

WITH further reference to the subject of the demolition of our premises and factory at Bagdad by the local Turkish Government, we have the honour to report that we have just received a telegram from our agents in Bagdad to the effect that the local Government have decided upon a fresh and very serious encroachment upon our property. Not satisfied with demolishing that portion of our enclosure and buildings which faces the main road, they now propose to take this road diagonally through our property in order to avoid the cost of compensating the owners of other buildings aligning the road. Our agents are forwarding to us by post a plan showing the nature of this fresh expropriation, which they report involves the cession of a further 400 square metres of land.

In the absence of all hope of obtaining justice locally, we would invite the serious attention of His Majesty's Government to the extraordinary state of affairs prevailing in Bagdad, and appeal to them for protection.

Our agents telegraph that the work of demolishing our premises facing the present road was almost completed on the 23rd ultimo.

The advice of His Majesty's consul-general in Bagdad containing the valuation approved by himself as compensation for the expropriations which we have previously reported to you must have reached the embassy at Constantinople by this time. We would request that a telegram may be sent to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires in Constantinople instructing him to demand immediate payment of this sum by the Central Government, in order to supply us with funds for commencing the work of reconstruction, and also to insist that no fresh scheme such as that of running the road diagonally through our property shall be executed until the full amount of the assessment of compensation for the previous expropriations had been paid to us by the Central Government, and until ample time has been given us for the consideration of the effect upon our property of the new proposal.

We have, &c.
LYNCH BROTHERS.

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[330] No. 10.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4, 1911.)

(No. 944.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 30, 1910.*

IN reply to your despatch No. 349 of the 21st ultimo, I have the honour to report that the commercial attaché to this embassy has, under my instructions, been enquiring what is the present state of the negotiations proceeding between Mr. Chester and the Turkish Government for a concession for a railway and mining rights in Asia Minor, and from Mr. Weakley's report enclosed herewith you will see that there does not appear to be any question for the present of the draft concession being modified in the sense which Mr. D'Arcy suggested in his letter to you of the 14th November. On the other hand, it seems probable that if the concession be given to the Chester group —and the American Embassy has hopes of eventual success—it will include, besides the Arghana copper mine, rights to the oil-fields in the Mosul vilayet, and this will of course *pro tanto* affect the value of the oil concession which D'Arcy desires to obtain. The Chester group, however, obtain no rights in the Bagdad and Bussorah vilayets.

Mr. D'Arcy's agents in Constantinople are, so far as I can ascertain, taking little or no action at present; and, indeed, inasmuch as Mr. D'Arcy has, in their view, no strictly legal rights, nor even preferential rights, to the oil concession, it is difficult to see how they can actively intervene to prevent the value of that concession being diminished by the grant of another concession which the Turkish Government consider to offer greater advantages to the country. Mr. D'Arcy has merely a moral claim in consideration of the long negotiations and verbal assurances made before the Chester scheme came on the tapis, and it would be too much to expect that the Turkish Government should on their account sacrifice the very great benefits which the Chester project promises. Mr. D'Arcy has in fact been outbidden, so to speak, by the Chester group, and it is for him to decide whether he will endeavour to obtain the oil concession by modifying his application so as to offer greater attractions to the Turks than those proffered by the Chester scheme; but until he does so I fear that no representations made either by his agents here or by His Majesty's Embassy will deter the Porte from concluding negotiations with Mr. Chester. There is, of course, always the prospect that the opposition of the Bagdad Railway Company may prevent the Chester scheme from going through, in which case Mr. D'Arcy's moral claims might be insisted on as against other possible competitors.

I have, &c.

CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 10.

Report by Mr. Weakley respecting D'Arcy's Claims to Mosul Petroleum Concession.

MESSRS. GILCHRIST AND WALKER, D'Arcy's agents in Constantinople, whom I have seen, tell me the information they have received from private sources indicates that the Chester scheme of railway construction in Asia Minor is at present being very actively pushed, and seems to have a very fair chance of success. I have also spoken to the chief dragoman of the United States Embassy on the subject, and learn that the embassy has very sanguine hopes of the concession being obtained by American capitalists, but it is thought that the German opposition to the granting of the concession will still be very strong.

Messrs. Gilchrist and Walker inform me that some modifications in the draft convention have been recently made by the Council of Ministers, especially as regards the mining rights which form a prominent part of the project. It appears the Council of Ministers have not been willing to give Chester the monopoly of all the mines to be found on either side of the projected railway; they have decided that, with the exception of the copper mines at Arghana (Diarbekir), which is a Government monopoly, and the oil-fields at Mosul, Chester's group will enjoy no special privilege over any mines, and that the mining regulations will have to be adhered to and respected in regard to any mines Chester and his associates may discover and wish to work. The rights to the Arghana copper mine, as well as those to the oil-fields in the Mosul district, will be given to Chester.

This decision seems to have been definitely come to owing to the Ministry of

Mines having pressed the Porte for instructions regarding the issue of prospecting licences ("permis de recherches") in the districts through which the Chester railway will pass; prospecting licences for petroleum were granted some time ago to several persons at Mosul by the local authorities, and the holders of these permits applied to the Mining Department for their confirmation. At the same time applications continued to be received by the department for licences to prospect for petroleum in the Bagdad province, and, in view of the Chester proposals, the department was obliged to apply to the Porte requesting that it might be officially informed of the *tracé* of the Chester railway, and in what districts and for what kinds of mines and minerals was the department at liberty to grant prospecting permits. In reply, the Porte said that the *tracé* of the line had not been settled, but the Ministry was free to grant "permis de recherches" for all kinds of mines in the districts mentioned in the Chester negotiations, except petroleum. In consequence the licences issued by the Mosul authorities have not been confirmed, and the applications received from Bagdad have been refused.

All this points to the decided intention of the Government to exclude D'Arcy's proposals for the concession of the petroleum fields in the Mosul province, and to ignore whatever claims he may have established towards obtaining the concession. Messrs. Gilchrist and Walker admit that D'Arcy cannot be said to have any strictly legal rights ("droits acquis") or even preferential rights to the concession, for these can only be obtained through a "permis de recherches," firman, or official contract, none of which is in D'Arcy's possession. In this respect D'Arcy's rights are in no way inferior to Chester's. It is, however, contended that D'Arcy has certain moral rights which ought not to be overlooked. Negotiations for obtaining the concession were entered into with the Civil List some seven years ago by Mr. D'Arcy's representative, Mr. Nicols, when that department had the control of all petroleum fields in Turkey. The proposals put forward had been taken into serious consideration and negotiations had reached a very advanced stage, and the matter had been taken up by His Majesty's Ambassador, who on several occasions spoke both to the Grand Vizier and to the Sultan, and had received assurances that every consideration would be given to the proposals put forward by D'Arcy. On the promulgation of the constitution in 1908, the control of the petroleum fields was transferred to the Ministry of Mines, and consequently Mr. Nicols has continued his negotiations with that department ever since.

Glasgow's proposals made last year for building railways in the interior from Yumurtalik to Diarbekir and Mosul, on the condition that all the rights to mines found within a certain radius on either side of the line were granted, found favour with the Government and the Senate, the latter issuing a decree in August 1909 authorising the Public Works Department to negotiate for the construction of railways on the terms proposed by Glasgow. Glasgow's scheme—which has now become Chester's scheme—comprises all deposits of petroleum found near the line of railway, and especially said to exist in the Mosul district. D'Arcy's negotiations and prospects have naturally been affected by this American scheme, and Messrs. Gilchrist and Walker are of the opinion that something should be done to protect, not D'Arcy's legal, but the moral rights which he has undoubtedly acquired after so many years of negotiation. It must be borne in mind that the ex-Grand Vizier, Hussein Hilmi Pasha, urged D'Arcy, through Mr. Nicols, to take up the railway scheme in conjunction with the petroleum concession, but D'Arcy declined.

E. W.

December 28, 1910.

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[294] No. 11.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January 4, 1911.*

BAGDAD demolitions. My telegram No. 345 of the 31st December.

Messrs. Lynch have heard from their Bagdad agent that it is proposed by the municipality to run road across their property. Could you press for payment of compensation for previous demolitions before the carrying out of this fresh encroachment, which would involve expropriation from a further 400 square metres of land?

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[550] No. 12.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, January 5, 1911.*

BAGDAD expropriations.

For the law asked for in your telegram No. 345, please refer to Young's "Corps de Droit ottoman," vol. vi, pp. 126–131. The protest put in by Lynch was disregarded by the local authorities, but in spite of my advice telegraphed to His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad on the 16th November, he did not follow it up by legal proceedings.

Mr. Lorimer reports that articles 3 and 14 of the law have been violated, the demolition having been carried out without any decision from the competent court. I have telegraphed to him that Lynch ought to take legal action based on his original protest, and have suggested that he might lay a sequester on a sum adequate to cover his claim on the Bagdad Municipal Loan, which is on the verge of conclusion.

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[595] No. 13.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Earl of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India dated the 15th December, 1910, relative to the Sheikh of Koweit's property at Fadaghia.

India Office, January 5, 1911.

Enclosure 1 in No. 13.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Bushire, December 4, 1910.*

WITH reference to my letter dated the 12th August, 1910, on the subject of the registration of Sheikh Mubarak's Fadaghia property, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the translation of a letter or telegram purporting to be addressed by the Inspector of Registration, Constantinople, to the Superintendent of Registration, Bussorah, a copy of which has come into Sheikh Mubarak's hands.

2. The letter is of interest as it quotes in detail the Vali of Bussorah's telegram referred to by Captain Shakespear in paragraph 3 of his letter dated the 3rd August, 1910, and it is in the latter connection that the sheikh furnishes us with the copy.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 2 in No. 13.

Inspector of Registration, Constantinople, to Superintendent of Registration, Bussorah.

Office of the Inspector of Registration, 20th Jemadi-el-Aval, 1328.
(Translation.) *25th May, 326 (June 8, 1910).*

THE date grove which the Kaimakam of Koweit, Mubarak-es-Subah, Pasha, wishes to purchase from the notables of Pasha, viz., the Al-Zoheir, necessitated an enquiry. An enquiry was made by the Ministry of Interior and a reply was received from the succeeding vali; and the telegrams and Memorandum received from the Ministry of War contained certain remarks which spoke for themselves. The telegram stated that the date grove which Mubarak-es-Subah, Pasha, wishes to purchase, and which he wishes to register in the name of his four sons, comprises 7,724 donums, and its

value is 48,000 odd Turkish liras; that the greater part of the value has been paid, and the aforesaid Mubarak Pasha wishes to register his four sons in the roll of registered individuals, and wishes, after taking out Turkish passports, to settle the registration in their favour before the formalities for the enlistment of his two sons in the army are observed.

For this reason it is not desirable to delay the registration, and, in view of the reports received, the postponement and delay of the registration are inadvisable, and compliance with the request of Mubarak-es-Subah will lead to enhance his sincerity and friendliness. This is what we understand, and the tone of the communications received is favourable to this course, and it is desirable that compliance should be made in due time. If the said parties are registered in the roll of registered individuals, and took out Turkish passports, and if two of them underwent enlistment, you should execute the registration of the date grove in the names of his sons. An authority has been given by the Ministry of Interior according to their communication and to the proceedings of the special committee of deputies which was formed in connection with this. And the vali and the Office of Registration have been advised as per Memorandum to do the needful and to report the result.

(For Assistant Superintendent of Registration),
MOHAMED RAFIK-BIN-TOWFIK.

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[550] No. 14.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January 6, 1911.*

LYNCH'S Bagdad property. Your telegram No. 1 of the 5th instant.

Messrs. Lynch should apply for injunction to restrain local authorities from further expropriating, and sue municipality for damage on ground that expropriations already carried out are illegal. Pending further explanations, I cannot approve sequester on municipal loan or take responsibility for advising such a course of action, since it is not at all clear how a sequester could be made applicable under the circumstances.

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[770] No. 15.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, January 7, 1911.*

LAWLESSNESS at Bussorah.

With reference to my despatch No. 861 of the 26th November last, I learn from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah that the lawlessness in that town and its neighbourhood has greatly increased of late. There was in particular on the 3rd January the looting of a native bank during an armed attack on the bazaar by daylight, and previously to this a night attack on the house of a Greek merchant under our protection in the European quarter.

I have made representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the situation, with which the local authorities appear unable to cope. On His Majesty's consul making representations to the Vali of Bussorah on behalf of the Greek merchant, the vali replied that the consul's functions were merely commercial, and that he had no right to address him on questions connected with the state of public security. Mr. Crow's further representations merely received an impertinent reply.

As Mr. Crow reports in a telegram received this morning that British lives and property are endangered, I am asking him his views as to the advisability of sending a ship of war to Bussorah. I have also made representations on the subject to Rifaat Pasha.

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[776] No. 16.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, January 7, 1911.*

BAGDAD demolitions.

With reference to your telegram No. 6 of the 7th instant, I now learn from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad that Lynch's manager states that no lawyer in whom he can put any trust would undertake the case, and that owing to their fear of the local authorities no expert advice can be obtained.

I am accordingly making further written and verbal representations at the Porte, hoping to get the matter administratively arranged.

The sequester suggested in my telegram may not be practicable at Bagdad in the existing conditions there, though it constitutes the ordinary procedure in this country.

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[550] No. 17.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, January 7, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 21st ultimo and of the 2nd instant regarding the demolition of part of your premises at Bagdad by the Turkish local authorities.

With regard to the statement in the former of your letters above referred to that, "in accordance with the interview which Mr. H. F. B. Lynch had at the Foreign Office on the 7th December, our agents will take no legal steps at Bagdad unless we hear from you that you desire us to do so," I am to explain that two different categories of action have been taken by the local authorities at Bagdad in regard to your premises. In the first case, alleging that the wall enclosing your grounds was unsafe, they caused it to be destroyed in virtue of municipal regulations. In this instance, the case having been represented to the central Government at Constantinople, it was arranged that legal proceedings should not be taken. The later demolitions, however, purported to be carried out in virtue of the Expropriation Law, a translation of which will be found in Young's "Corps de Droit ottoman," vol. vi, pp. 127 to 131. In regard to these proceedings there was no intention of recommending to you that legal proceedings would be inadvisable.

If your property at Bagdad has been illegally expropriated, and the provisions of the law have not been complied with, it appears to Sir E. Grey, after further consultation with His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, that your firm's remedy is to institute proceedings against the competent Turkish authority (1) for wrongful expropriation which has been already effected, and (2) to restrain any further wrongful expropriation which may be threatened, and that you should lose no time in taking such steps as your own legal advisers may recommend with a view to the commencement of the suggested proceedings.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[777] No. 18.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, January 8, 1911.*

LAWLESSNESS at Bussorah.

Referring to my telegram No. 2 of the 7th January, the Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that reinforcements have been sent from Bagdad to maintain order at Bussorah. I shall therefore await a further report, for which I have called from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, before I support the application now received from him for the dispatch of a ship of war, whose presence he considers necessary.

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[778] No. 19.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, January 8, 1911.*

BAGDAD demolitions.

Referring to your telegram No. 5 of the 4th instant, the Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that, though he is very doubtful as to the vali complying with his instructions, he has telegraphed to Bagdad ordering that no further expropriations shall take place until the earlier questions are settled.

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[833] No. 20.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9, 1911.)

(No. 950.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 31, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 935 of the 27th instant, I have the honour to report that Ismail Fazil Pasha, the ex-Vali of Damascus, published in a Damascus paper on the 17th instant a letter in reply to an article which had appeared in the paper two days before, attributing the outbreak at Kerak to the non-payment of their annual subsidy to the Arabs, and to a letter of blame addressed by the vali to the Mutessarif of Kerak, regarding the taking of conscripts.

His Excellency denied that the reasons were as alleged, and stated that the Bani Sakh Arabs, from whom the subsidy was withdrawn, took no part in the rising, and that the real cause of the rebellion was the division of troops who were engaged in taking a census of the population into small parties, and the neglect of the Commander of Kerak to take the necessary precautions in such circumstances.

Ismail Fazil Pasha added that the letter of blame addressed by him to the mutessarif only contained an observation in regard to the latter's irregular method of carrying on official correspondence, *i.e.*, directly with Constantinople, instead of through the vilayet, and could consequently in no way have affected the Arab tribes.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[835] No. 21.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 1, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 935 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Damascus, reporting on the relief of Kerek.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 21.

Consul Devey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 66.)
Sir, *Damascus, December 20, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 59 of the 13th instant, it now appears that Kerek was duly relieved by Sami Pasha's troops, and the Mutessarif Shakir Pasha with several Government functionaries and other people, in all about 270 souls, were found safe in the fortress.

No sisters of charity have been killed, but one woman and one child are missing from the town.

The railway is believed to have been completely repaired a few days ago, and the usual trains are beginning to run again to and from Medina.

I have, &c.
G. P. DEVEY.

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[836] No. 22.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 2, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 879 of the 7th ultimo, I have the honour to report that, according to a telegram received on the 31st ultimo from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, the Mishri family, apparently alarmed for the safety of their property at Fedaghin, have on several occasions intimated to Mr. Crow their desire to sell their lands to a British subject, and in reply to their request for his assistance, Mr. Crow has answered that he does not know of any one desirous of acquiring the property.

Mr. Crow's answer appears to me to be a judicious one in the circumstances.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[839] No. 23.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 3, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting on the military operations in Syria.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 23.

Major Tyrrell to Mr. Marling.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 2, 1911.*

IN the light of reports recently received from His Majesty's consuls at Damascus and Jerusalem and as a result of various conversations and enquiries, I have the honour to submit a further report, in continuation of my No. 76, in the hopes of somewhat elucidating the course of recent events in Syria.

The expedition against the Druses of the Hauran, decided on early in August, had been progressing slowly, and, according to official statements and to such scanty reports as are allowed to appear in the papers, satisfactorily. Authentic information of the events, and even of the number of the troops employed, has been entirely lacking. But that the troops were on the whole successful may be inferred from the fact that 3,000 or 4,000 Druse recruits have been taken and sent to Beirout and Acre for shipment.

About a month ago, the garbled and inconsequent reports in the papers seemed to point to severe fighting at a place called Kerek and to a check of the Government forces. Rumours were also heard that things were by no means going so well in the Hauran as was pretended, and that the losses of the troops were much more severe than had ever been admitted.

About the 10th December news was received of an attack on the town of Kerak, situated between the Dead Sea and the Hedjaz Railway, and more than 100 miles away from the scene of operations in the Hauran.

Now, the fighting at Kerek began towards the end of November, whereas it is now established that the attack on Kerak occurred early on the 5th December. Since the latter affair, however, the word "Kerek" seems to have been applied equally to both places, and the news from the two theatres to have been mixed together in a most confusing manner.

I think that the two places, with the events of each, must be kept quite distinct. Mr. Graves, the "Times" correspondent here, says that the Kerek where the hard fighting with the Druses has been is also called Kunut (? Kunawat). To avoid confusion with Kerak, I shall allude to it in future by that name.

The military authorities deny absolutely that there has been any fighting in the Hauran lately, and say that the expedition had achieved its object, and that the Druse

question was completely settled before the Bedouin attack on Kerak took place. I find this incredible, as the press reports cannot have been entirely without foundation, and they certainly show that fighting was in progress before the Kerak incident, and has been going on since, which is also borne out by the official telegrams alluded to in my No. 76.

I think it is now fairly clear that the Government, believing the Druse resistance to be practically at an end, had extended the operations of conscription and disarmament to various Syrian towns outside the Hauran and among the Bedouins east of the Jordan. Then came the Druse stand at Kunut, which it has taken the troops nearly a month to overcome; and while this was going on came the outbreak in Syria.

Dealing with this latter event, Mr. Devey ascribes the attack on Kerak to Bedouins and Druses; but the circumstantial narrative forwarded by Mr. Morgan makes no mention of Druses whatever, and from this account it appears to have been a premeditated scheme concerted between the sedentary Arabs of the Kerak province and the nomadic tribes to the east. While the former are said to have attacked and massacred the Turkish officials in various towns throughout the province, the latter attacked the line of the Hedjaz Railway. They seem to have begun at Katrane, where they destroyed the station and killed the employés. From there they appear to have spread in either direction, employing the same procedure at most of the stations between Lebben (250 kilom. from Damascus) and Maan. Later advices report the line cut as far as Tebuk.

Mr. Devey, who gives the line Ammon-Salt as the northern limit of this revolt, ascribes it to the discontent arising from the non-payment of the annual subsidy to the tribes for keeping the railway line open, a reason which has also been given to me by Turkish officers. Mr. Morgan says that the Arabs were driven to this outbreak by the idea that the Government were about to apply generally the measures for taking a census, enforcing conscription, and disarming the inhabitants, which had already been applied in the Hauran.

A very marked feature of this outbreak has been that it was directed entirely against Turks, people in any way connected with the Government, and outsiders. Christian inhabitants have been unmolested.

The aspirations of the Sheikh of Kerak and his coadjutors towards British protection and inclusion in Egyptian jurisdiction, as reported in the final paragraph of Mr. Morgan's despatch, are worth noting.

All is vague as regards the military measures taken. Kerak, where a small garrison held out in the citadel, was relieved about the 14th December, and, as indicated by the telegram mentioned in my No. 76, a relieving force has been sent down to Maan. This force was taken from the Hauran, and, according to the papers, was railed to Deraa, where it assembled about the 20th instant, and whence it was to march down the line. The arrival of a relieving force at Maan has already been announced, but this news must be regarded as doubtful. The calling out of redif battalions from various Syrian towns has been reported in the papers, but the military authorities deny that any redifs have been called out, and it is not unlikely that this report arose from the concentration of Nizam battalions which had been detached to the towns mentioned for employment on disarmament work, &c.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

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[841] No. 24.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Pera, January 3, 1911.*

WITH reference to Sir Gerard Lowther's despatch No. 819 of the 8th November last, I have the honour to report that I have now received a *note verbale* from the Sublime Porte, stating that they are unable to comply with the Embassy's request for refund of duty on Messrs. Lyndi's new steamer, as exemption from duty in such cases could only be granted in virtue of a special law.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[847] No. 25.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 13. Confidential.)

Sir, *Pera, January 4, 1911.*

RUMOURS have lately appeared in the European press of a joint rising of Seyyid Idris and the Imam Yahia, of Yemen. Though a certain amount of fighting would appear to have taken place between the adherents of the latter and the local Turkish forces, the above rumours are exaggerated. Seyyid Idris has not apparently actually taken the field, but his attitude has been such that the Ottoman garrison at Idlai are unable to operate outside that town. The reason for the assumption of this hostile attitude by Seyyid Idris is the non-fulfilment of the promises made to him last year. He has sent two emissaries to Constantinople ostensibly to give the central authorities a further chance of redeeming their word, and I have the honour to enclose translation of the communication to the Minister of the Interior of which these two gentlemen were the bearers. I have reason to believe the document to be genuine. His demands practically amount to autonomy based on the Sheri law, which was supposed to be in force in Yemen during Abdul Hamid's reign. He would restrict the Turkish military occupation to the coast towns, Sanaa, and some other specified garrison towns. There seems little doubt that the present central Government does not intend to accede to these demands and that it is playing with the Arab chiefs until it gains time and feels strong enough, financially and otherwise, to enforce disarmament and other "reforms" in Yemen. While parleying with Seyyid Idris's agents here, the authorities have sent General Said Pasha, who has had considerable experience in Yemen, to replace Suleiman Pasha, the Governor of Assyr, and to endeavour to induce Seyyid Idris not to break the peace.

We are accustomed to any outbreak in the Yemen being attributed to British and Italian intrigue, but Seyyid Idris's letter shows the real cause to be the failure of the Turkish Government to keep their engagements with the tribes.

I have, &c.

CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 25.

Translation of Turkish version of last letter (in Arabic), sent to the Minister of the Interior on November 27, 1910, by Seyyid Muhammad-bin-Ali-bin-Idris, by the intermediary of Seyyid Salih and Ahmed-bin-Muhammad-al-Mujahid.

I KNOW that your Excellency is far-sighted and bent on bettering the Empire. Now, every wise man admits that to bring the affairs of the Yemen into a prosperous condition would be to save the Empire from a great embarrassment. In order to protect their freedom and their honour, the people of the Yemen have sacrificed all they possessed and for years have shed their blood in war and strife. While I was in Egypt I heard of these painful events and unceasing wars, and I wept with emotion. The blood of both parties is pure and faithful. There is no religious law which allows the shedding of the blood of one of the children of Islam, and from the point of view of justice and equity, Islam makes no distinction between Moslems and Jews, Christians and heathen. It is a great duty, incumbent on every Moslem, to defend his rights and his honour. It is our duty to be faithful to our non-Moslem subjects and to those to whom we are bound by treaty, and yet we wrongfully shed the blood of our brothers in the faith. I have repeatedly informed you that I did not come here to quarrel and fight; it is as a result of the entreaties and requests of the people that I have taken on myself this heavy burden.

I have repeatedly urged the Ottoman Government to put the provisions of the Sheri law into practice and to give up tyranny and oppression. I have proposed that the work on which I am to be employed should be assigned to me. I do not seek any worldly profit; I simply wanted to be a means of good in desiring to save the poor of the Yemen—who, naked, hungry, and helpless, await death—from the hand of oppression and tyranny. In a short space of time I have won the allegiance of the tribes and have entered into treaty and agreement with them. Imam Yahya, too, offered me, and is still offering, his services. My influence has extended to the Hedjaz

and Irak. I desired to do the Government a good turn, and intended to rouse the affection of the people towards it. Unfortunately, I have been unable to convince the Government of the sincerity of my intentions; my efforts have gone for naught, and I am brought into shame and contempt in the eyes of the tribes. Had it not been for my entreaties and prayers, the Yemen would long ago have been in flames from end to end. Said Pasha and Suleiman Pasha assured me, both in your name and in that of the Minister of War, that my proposal had been accepted and would be acted upon. You know that it is not right to go back on these assurances and undertakings which were made to me officially. I am not afraid of the Turkish Government; I studied the matter from all points and tried to improve our mutual relations. There is no difference between the vali you have sent and the old ones. His maintenance and employment of the old officials show that his sole object is the perpetuation of abuses. Let that suffice. We will admit that formerly the country was under a reign of despotism and self-interest, which had forgotten the idea of justice. Now you are in a régime of justice and constitutionalism. What have you done up to the present? Have you made any attempt to do such good as will make people forget the tyranny and oppression of the Turks? No! Your arrogance is maintained, and is even increasing. Although God commands believers to be brothers, you attack the possessions and honour of the Arabs. Your constitution is a meaningless phrase. We have found out who are the instigators; the truth cannot be concealed.

My last proposal, then, is this: The Sheri law must be enforced from Assyr to San'aa, and from San'aa to Ta'azz and Hodeidah; you must consent to the inspection and control of all the Sheri (religious) and civil judges; all the old officials must be changed; the troops must be stationed in San'aa itself and in a few coast towns and forts to be selected, and the military leaders must not interfere in matters touching the civil administration and the collection of taxes; the Government taxes must be collected by commissions composed of persons elected by chiefs and notables and paid into the local treasury, and the laws must be modified to allow the balance of the Yemen taxes to be paid into the treasury when the sums due for education and for the Sheri judges and other officials have been paid. The maintenance of peace and order in the country and the punishment of criminals and brigands must be handed over to a police commission composed of local men, and the officers shall be men of well-known honour, integrity, and piety. If the employment of non-local men be permitted, the practice must be to employ them in places to be decided upon. I will wait one month from this date for an impartial commission to be sent by the Sublime Porte to decide upon these proposals and other reforms, and will not give ear to my deputies; but I am compelled to tell you, with the greatest regret and sorrow, that if you do not vouchsafe a reply within that time, I shall go back on all the undertakings I have entered into in order to become free in my every act and circumstance.

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[849] No. 26.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Pera, January 4, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose translation of two articles recently published in the "Tanin" by Ismail Hakki Bey, deputy for Bagdad, giving his views as to the policy Young Turkey should pursue in Mesopotamia.

One of Ismail Hakki Bey's brothers, Hamdi Bey, resides at Bagdad and is one of the leaders of the local branch of the committee, while a second brother, Hikmet Bey, is on the staff of Reouf Pasha, the Ottoman commissioner in Egypt. He is one of the committee "experts" on foreign affairs and their specialist on matters connected with the Arabian peninsula, Egypt, &c. Last year he was at one time the committee candidate for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but, perhaps fortunately for Young Turkey, has not yet been appointed to that post. His ideas, as shown in these two articles, are both crude and violent. He advocates disarmament on the same lines as in Albania, Macedonia, and Syria, the prevention of arms smuggling by sending Turkish ships to the Persian Gulf, and the "cutting off of the poisonous trade by putting an end once and for all to the seditious existence of Koweit or by at least blockading it by land and by sea." The first of the latter two alternatives would seem to mean that Turkey should militarily occupy Koweit by a *coup de main*.

Ismail Hakki Bey and his friends are no doubt animated by the best of intentions, but past experience of Albania, Macedonia and the Hauran leads us to expect they will

act with haste, rigour and violence. The inevitable result will be a disaffected Arab population and, as it is well to lay the blame anywhere except in the proper place, *i.e.*, the wrong policy of the Committee of Union and Progress, their disaffection is to be set down to English intrigues and machinations aimed at transferring the caliphate to some Arab centre under British influence.

The committee, imitating the French Revolution in its hunting down and destruction of aristocrats, evidently intends meting out a similar treatment to the Arab sheikhs. Ismail Hakki Bey would "punish the principal sheikhs on the spot"—probably by court-martialling and hanging some of them; would exile, in virtue of the arbitrary decisions of secret courts-martial, the bulk of the sheikhs of the second degree; and would reduce the small sheikhs to the position of headmen and the tribesmen to that of Egyptian fellaheen. By applying the military steam-roller he would complete the levelling-down process within a year, so as to defeat the fell designs of foreigners who have interests in Mesopotamia and are looking on it "with hungry eyes." Ismail Hakki Bey further talks of the "political meaning, impossible to conceal, in the importation into Irak of so many arms of English manufacture," but conveniently ignores that the distributing centres are Jibuti and Muscat rather than Koweit, that England has gone to enormous trouble and expenditure to stop the arms traffic, and that she even risked a conflict with France in her attempt to check arms-running at Muscat, while he has evidently little notion of the extreme difficulty of preventing smuggling along the Al Hasa and El Katr coast-line, not to mention the Shatt-el-Arab, Khor Abdulla, &c.

The frequent mentions of "'English,' 'Englishmen,' and 'English arms'" are calculated to poison the minds of the Turkish public and convey the impression of Great Britain's hostile designs on Mesopotamia. He is evidently desirous of focussing public attention on Koweit and Mohammerah. His account of, and the inferences he draws from, the encounter between the forces of Sheikh Mubarek and Sa'adoun Pasha may be described as fantastic. That the result of his propaganda on the subject of Koweit has been effective is shown by the Grand Vizier's remarks on that question to Sir Henry Babington Smith, and there seems little doubt that he and his committee friends intend creating a "Koweit question." Hakki Pasha's remark that "articles in the press must not be taken too seriously," cannot itself be taken too seriously. For Ismail Hakki Bey's articles have been published with the consent and approval of Hussein Jahid Bey, Javid Bey, Minister of Finance, and others such whose influence under a Committee Government is greater than that of the Grand Vizier.

Ismail Hakki Bey's remarks about Mohammerah are interesting and instructive, as showing the committee point of view in such matters. He would induce Young Persia to allow Young Turkey to dispatch troops to punish and "level" Sheikh Khazal, the "rebel against Persia." The value of his assurance that the Turkish troops would not remain at Mohammerah may be gauged by the prolonged stay of the Ottoman forces that years ago occupied Passova and other districts in the neighbourhood of Urumia.

His plan of "extirpating all the sheikh's interests" in the Bussorah region, of seizing his property and repressing his agents with the greatest severity, while Persia will not protest and England cannot, opens up a very unpleasant vista of rather serious friction between us and the Committee Government of Young Turkey.

I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's consular officers at Bagdad and Bussorah, with instructions to the latter to inform His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah of its contents.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 26.

Extract from the "Tanin" of December 24, 1910.

THE "Tanin," of the 24th December contains a long article by Ismail Hakki, deputy for Bagdad, on the "Causes of Unrest in Irak." After speaking of the manner in which that part of the Empire was neglected for centuries, and of the venality of the officials, whose sole aim was to fill their own pockets, he continues:—

"It was not only through the weakness of the army and the confusion prevailing in the Government that the tribes became so daring. The uninterrupted importation of arms from Koweit reinforced them and increased their boldness. The erroneous, self-

seeking policy adopted by most of the Valis of Bussorah under the old régime not only caused a blaze in Irak, but also set fire to the Koweit question, which tends to disturb even our foreign relations, and the terrible effects of which have increased daily during the last seven or eight years.

"The first thing to do is to strengthen the army—a step which is now being taken. Not only must the VIth Army Corps be kept there permanently, but we ought also to send there a well-organised punitive force.

"Again, as all the brigands have gathered along the banks of the rivers, it is essential that armoured gun-boats should be sent, both to keep order on the rivers and to transport troops.

"For a long time our expeditions have attacked loyal tribes, while brigands have been allowed to return to their tribes. Justice and policy demand that punishment should be meted out to the real offenders; for innocent tribes, seeing that they are punished anyhow, take to brigandage when opportunity offers.

"Arms must be collected, and the arms traffic stopped; but this policy must be applied to all the tribes, or its effect will be nil. Many of the tribes are willing to give up their arms, if the Government will protect their lives, property, and rights; but so long as their neighbours are armed they are compelled to carry weapons in self-defence.

"To prevent the importation of arms our ships must always be present to stop the smuggling in the Gulf of Bussorah, and the poisonous trade must be cut off either by putting an end altogether to the rebellious life of Koweit, or by at least blockading it by sea and land.

"It goes without saying that, as all these measures do not come within the scope of the existing laws, martial law ought to be proclaimed in a few sanjaks which are hot-beds of sedition. But let me not be misunderstood. There is no comparison possible between town life and the life of the Bedouin in Irak. The town populations are quiet and obedient, and can be governed by the ordinary laws; but the tribes are beyond the application of, say, the Criminal Code. It would be mistaken policy to proclaim martial law unnecessarily in the towns, for it would irritate the very people whose hearts we need to win; whereas the townsfolk are strongly in favour of the severe punishment of the tribes.

"If there is any opposition to the proposal for military expeditions I would repeat that the present state of affairs cannot go on. In winter Irak is more favourable to military movements than Anatolia. In a year the VIth Army Corps will be able to carry out its punitive duty; but then it will be too late, for in that one year there may occur events so terrible that not even a century will suffice to obliterate their effects.

"The moral and economic importance of the Hauran to the Empire cannot be compared with that of Irak. In the first place, there is political meaning impossible to conceal in the importation into Irak of so many arms of English manufacture. Secondly, a continuous influence is exercised from the Persian Gulf to Irak by way of the Tigris and the Euphrates. It is true that there is freedom of trade; but let us think of the political effects, for people who are watching their opportunity, of attacks made on the life and property of a friendly Government in the course of freedom of trade.

"A few months ago an English engineer travelling by way of the Tigris to Hindieh was stopped by a brigand and ordered to pay toll. He had nothing less than a Turkish lira, and the brigand had no change; but the latter—honest fellow!—gave the Englishman thirty or forty bullets as change, with the advice that they should be shown to Nazim Pasha.

"Now, it may be that not every Englishman or every engineer passing that way will be as well acquainted with the local custom. Perhaps he will say: 'What is this toll? I shan't pay,' and will eventually 'eat' a bullet. I do not wish to speak here of the diplomatic difficulties which might arise from the difficulty experienced in punishing the murderer.

"As to the financial side of the question, let me only say that however much the expedition costs it will, if successful, pay for itself many times over in regular payment of taxes, &c.

"In order that the punishments may have proper effect, the measures taken must be fixed and adapted to individuals. With regard to the sheikhs, who are as influential as princes or as an Indian rajah, when the worst have been punished on the spot, the minor offenders, when their past crimes have been brought to light by courts-martial, might perhaps be sent with honour to one of the islands in the Mediterranean. Sheikhs of the second degree might receive a lighter punishment, for instance; it

should suffice to prevent their returning to Irak for a certain length of time. As to the small sheikhs, they will naturally sink to the level of a small Government official, to that of a moukhtar. The tribes are accustomed to rally round great names, and every sheikh of note is a centre of attraction. Now this attraction must be broken for the sake of the salvation of the Empire. There used to be tribes and sheikhs in Egypt, now there are only fellaheen. In Irak, too, we must put an end to the present system and leave only fellaheen.

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"If the policy pursued by the old régime is continued, rest assured that we shall lose Irak, which is in a worse state than the Yemen; for foreigners who have interests there are looking on Irak with hungry eyes."

Enclosure 2 in No. 26.

Extract from the "Tanin" of December 28, 1910.

THE following is a very slightly abridged translation of an article by Ismaïl Hakki, Deputy for Bagdad, which appeared in the "Tanin," of the 28th December, 1910:—

"THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF BUSSORAH: KOWEIT—MOHAMMERAH.

"At present there is no order in Bussorah, in the sense in which a civilized person understands the word 'order.' The state of affairs which had gone on for years has been changed for a few months by the zeal of the strong hand of discipline; but if the administration of Bussorah goes on as at present, and if a few wasps' nests which surround the neighbourhood and are extending their poisonous influence to Bussorah itself are not completely destroyed, the brigandage in and around the town will continue until stopped by the firm and ruthless hand of a foreigner.

"The few months of discipline and order which we have spoken of with praise and thankfulness are only a temporary and superficial expedient against a chronic disease. If we seek the seed of the trouble which will destroy Bussorah, we shall find it limited chiefly to two spots, Koweit and Mohammerah.

"There is no writer on international law who could define the political position of Koweit. Officially it is a kaza, and the sheikh, Mubarek-as-Sabah, bears a purely Ottoman title, that of Pasha, and at present he flies the Ottoman flag as a sign of allegiance; but there is, nevertheless, a doubt about his position in practice. Until seven or eight years ago Koweit had been Ottoman without doubt or fraud; but pressure was brought to bear upon it by a covetous commandant, and it took refuge with the English, and the correspondence which the Sublime Porte—for what reason we know not—carried on with England gave rise to an embarrassing situation. Now Koweit, from our point of view, is Ottoman territory without doubt; but in consequence of that correspondence the Ottoman troops who were intended to inflict the necessary punishment did not enter Koweit, and the question of letting troops enter it remained in abeyance. Finally, Mubarek-as-Sabah and his subjects being Sunnis, he is in a position which would not allow him to fly the British flag even if he wanted to do so. He lives in a constant state of fear, owing to the fact that he killed his brother and usurped the position of sheikh. The sheikh has a good deal of property, a large part of which is in the Sanjak of Bussorah, and this gives the Ottoman Government a powerful weapon to bring pressure on him whenever necessary, in order to get its words hearkened to and its objects fulfilled. Having realised this the sheikh recently evinced the loyal desire to take out certificates of Ottoman nationality for himself and his sons; but owing to his own fickleness and to the encouragement of the British 'consul' at Koweit, he changed his mind, and simply made the strange proposal to take out certificates of Ottoman nationality for his daughters.

"Now, as to the influence of Mubarek-as-Sabah (who has now become a millionaire), upon the internal state of our country.

"As I have said before the sole depôt of prohibited arms in Irak is Koweit. Moreover, Mubarek Pasha, as is usual in ignorant countries, follows a double-faced policy. In order to show loyalty to England also, he is not content with merely importing rifles and cartridges into the country, but with the object of showing that he is capable by himself of chastising all the tribes he sets currents flowing towards the interior and kills and robs men of the most important tribes.

"Last year this man, having collected from all sides a force of 4,000 horsemen and more than 10,000 Arabs, attacked Sa'adoun Pasha and his men; but rumour says that Sa'adoun Pasha, with about 4,000 men of the Muntefik and Az-Zafir tribes whom he had managed to get together, killed some 4,000 of the enemy and put them to flight. It is worth notice that at that very moment an English officer appeared, photographed the slain, and took pictures of the battle-field. Rumour adds that Mubarek subsequently tried to make out to the English that this rout was a complete victory; but owing to the evidence of the British officer, the English avoided being deceived. ('Responsibility lies on him who relates.')

"On gaining this victory, Sa'adoun Pasha and his subjects went as far as Koweit, and wanted to plunder Mubarek's goods and treasure; but according to his own account he gave up the project in order not to involve the Government in political difficulties. Nevertheless, the men of Mubarek, finding the Az-Zafir tribes alone three or four months ago, revenged themselves by seizing several thousand of their camels and withdrew.

"The tribes attacked and plundered are gathered under Ottoman allegiance, and those who attack them also fly the Ottoman flag. (Whereas a three-starred Ottoman flag had previously waved over Koweit, a flag with one star has recently begun to be used. Mubarek used to explain his use of three stars as a sign of his extraordinary affection for Yildiz [a star] and 'Ottomanism.') The duty of the Government, therefore, is to take the due of the oppressed from the oppressor, and to punish the party which disturbs peace and order. As to the attitude of England, we would ask whether it is just that our hands should be tied in the fulfilment of these duties.

"Even if—to suppose the impossible—Koweit is not ours, what Government is there which would allow a neighbouring State to bring 16,000 troops into her territory and to steal the property of half her subjects? The English Government has taken up the attitude of preventing us from exercising the right of punishment in our own lands; could she wink at such attacks made in her territory or in a neighbouring place? Koweit is not English (and God forbid it ever should be!), so we cannot ask England to punish the sheikh. Are these acts of brigandage to remain for ever unpunished? Is a petty sheikh to have an authority which not even the greatest emperors possess in our time? To protect and defend murder, robbery, and plunder, ill beseems a civilised, constitutional country like England; so we pass over the matter, attributing it to lack of information on the part of the Central British Government, or to the excessive zeal of the local British officials.

"There is another point. Our tribes who suffer these attacks will try, in Arab fashion, to take their revenge to-morrow or the next day, and will surround Koweit and put pressure upon it. Sa'adoun Pasha told me this himself, but added that he had postponed the execution of this project in obedience to the Government's orders. What diplomatic result will this inevitable and reasonable attack have? Will the British Foreign Office be able to object if an oppressor not under their protection falls, in the process of retaliation, into the pit he dug himself? The Foreign Office ought to think of this point now; it is essential to have recourse to diplomatic means in time, in order not to be confronted with a *fait accompli*.

"The Mohammerah question is of a quite different nature and form. Here we are in the presence of one who is openly a Persian subject. About ten years ago the person now called Sheikh Khazal was of no importance: all the power was in the hands of his brother, Sheikh Mazal, who, knowing the tyranny and trickery of his brother, did not favour him at all. Angry at this, Khazal took refuge with a slave named Sultan, making himself out to be in danger, and begging to be saved; and Sultan put an end to Mazal's life with a bullet. The dead man's supporters dispersed, and Sheikh Khazal reigned alone. It is curious that although a murderer cannot inherit from his victim, all the deceased's lands in Ottoman territory were transferred to the new sheikh, *i.e.*, to the murderer. It is true that as the murder took place in foreign territory, the murderer's guilt is not legally established in the eye of the Ottoman Government; but the question raises a very subtle point in private international law. Anyhow, since that time, this sheikh has increased his power and influence daily. On the other hand, as he knows in his conscience that he is guilty of murder, he has raised the slave Sultan to a position of trust, and is compelled to surround himself with guards. He goes nowhere without having forty or fifty armed men with him. His castles and lands in Bussorah, too, are very numerous. During the old régime, and for a while under the new, his representative in Bussorah had almost as much influence as an ambassador. Most of the valis became the sheikh's faithful friends, and as for the officials, he gained some with money and some by threats; so that there is not a whisper in Bussorah to-day

which does not reach Khazal's ears at once. On this account an extraordinary terror reigns in Bussorah. No one dares to speak of the sheikh's misdeeds in any public place, for there are many of the sheikh's spies about, who carry the news to him. And woe to him who has spoken against the sheikh! For in Bussorah the sheikh has bands of men, and very trusted men to whom he pays 70*l.* or 80*l.* a-month, and if these men cannot manage to tear the offender in pieces in the street at night, they bring about his ruin in a very short time by means of all sorts of calumnies, false witnesses, and reports. Against these attacks the valis themselves are impotent. It is a matter of common knowledge that those who made Bussorah a sort of prison for the last vali were men who were taking revenge on behalf of Sheikh Khazal, because the vali had taken certain measures, not against the sheikh, but against his men; upon which the sheikh's creatures in Bussorah laid a thousand different plots, and caused a great difference to arise between the military and gendarmerie on the one side and the vilayet and civil authorities on the other.

"The political and international position of the sheikh is gradually taking on another aspect. Recently he went into the interior to punish certain rebellious tribes, and rumour says that he is going to come to blows with a branch of the famous Bakhtiaris. If he wins, his influence will increase still more; if he is beaten, it is anticipated that great political difficulties will arise, for the British Government has taken the sheikh—if not officially, at least privately—under its protection. I have seen with my own eyes a private communication from the British consul at Bussorah, in which he says: 'As you are aware, from events in Persia, the Sheikh of Mohammerah is under British protection'; whereas, in our eyes, Sheikh Khazal and his tribes are Persian subjects, and it would, naturally, be impermissible for either ourselves or Persia to allow any act or circumstance which might disturb the *status quo*. It is strongly suspected that if Sheikh Khazal were defeated, England would openly declare a protectorate over the Sheikh of Mohammerah and even actually take over the policing of the whole of Shiraz and Persian Arabia, urging lack of security and danger to her commerce as an excuse. When Russia has established troops in the north of Persia on the pretext of restoring order, it will, of course, be impossible for England to remain with arms folded in the south.

"As an instance of the increasing favour shown by England to the sheikh we may note the fact that last week he was given the Order of the Star of India with the attendant ceremonial and special pomp. A major belonging to the British army was specially sent with the Order, and the sheikh, acting exactly like a rajah, gave the Order a salute of guns.

"The results of this state of affairs fall on us in a terrible shower. In our opinion none of these acts of protection is official. If once we hear that they are official, we must protest with all our might and prevent them by all possible means. Persia has been divided, it is true, into English and Russian spheres of influence; but both parties have undertaken to safeguard the territorial integrity of Persia.

"Now a declaration of protection and an act of interference in the internal order of Persia would be diametrically opposed to the maintenance of its territorial integrity. In the second place, the Gulf of Bussorah and the Shiraz and Hamadan districts were considered as a neutral zone when the division into spheres of influence took place, and the effect of the Anglo-Russian agreement on those parts must be considered nil; so that in acting in that fashion the British Government would be acting contrary to agreement not only towards Turkey, Persia, and the other Powers, but also with regard to Russia. Thirdly, the Anglo-Russian agreement was not confirmed by Persia or any other interested Power, and was not communicated, I think, to the Ottoman Government; so that from our point of view it is officially non-existent. Therefore, the question of safeguarding those Ottoman rights which are injured at Mohammerah, and of extinguishing the fire of revolt which runs in an unceasing stream from Mohammerah into Ottoman territory is a private matter between the Ottoman and Persian Governments. The Russian Government's confirmation of the clause in the agreement, by which British rights in the Persian Gulf are to be safeguarded cannot affect any third party—cannot therefore bind the Ottoman Government—and the safeguarding of British rights cannot possibly mean the trampling underfoot of Ottoman rights.

"What steps must the Ottoman Government take to punish this Persian neighbour of hers? There are only two alternatives: either for Ottoman troops to go and put out the fire, or for us to take such defensive measures that when the fire comes it may not burn our land. This needs official diplomatic negotiations with the Persian Government. That Government ought to consent to our troops going and punishing a man who is a rebel against Persia too, and to our presenting Persia with a quiet, submissive country

free from all traces of tyranny and brigandage. We should not do this not merely out of friendship for Persia, but to ensure our internal peace and order; so we should not expect Persia to be grateful. But will Persian diplomatists be able to show sufficient patriotic daring as to consent to such a *fait accompli*? Let them rest assured that our troops have not such habits as not to leave the place they have entered. When we have given our word we will keep it.

"If this measure, which would probably be exposed to diplomatic difficulties, cannot be carried out, then we must have recourse to the second scheme—the defensive. First of all, all the shiekh's interests must be extirpated, and as 'property is a part of life' his lands, property, and goods must be seized and all his men, however high their social position, must be followed up and repressed with the greatest severity. The Persian Government is not so wanting in skill and political knowledge as to complain on behalf of a sheikh who, from its own point of view, is deserving of punishment; and as for England, she has no official legal standing to warrant her opening her mouth to attack us for repressing the sheikh's followers. No attention has ever been paid to the communications in the form of 'advice' made to us by the British consul on behalf of the sheikh's men, and the consul has been told that such communications rested on no right or authority.

"On the other hand, in order that our rights of sovereignty should be manifest on the Shatt-el-Arab, and that those men, of whom half belong to the sheikh, should be prevented from flowing over to the Ottoman side of the river, there must be no lack of our gun-boats and war-ships both on the Shatt-el-Arab and in the Gulf of Bussorah generally. We have to-day many ships which are of no use in Greek waters, but which would play an important rôle in the Persian Gulf and on the Shatt-el-Arab. If these ships are sent we shall need a dock and a repairing yard for them.

"It has been seen, then, that the question of the Gulf of Bussorah and the Shatt-el-Arab is so delicate and urgent as to require that a plan should be drawn up by the civil, military, naval, and foreign department officials combined and carried out by them conjointly. We have shown how terrible the danger is. There is not a moment to lose. Rest assured that neglect and indifference may very shortly put quite a different political aspect on Bussorah and the surrounding parts."

[1074] No. 27.

Euxine and Marmora British Development Syndicate to Sir A. Nicolson.—(Received January 10.)

Finsbury Pavement House, London,
January 7, 1911.

Dear Sir Arthur Nicolson,

YOU may remember that when I recently called on you with regard to this syndicate, and when you kindly said you would write to our embassy in Spain with reference to the concessions we are endeavouring to obtain there, I told you that the syndicate had originally been formed for the purpose of trying to obtain the concession of the Samsoun-Sivas railway from the Turkish Government.

You subsequently were good enough to write and say that you had heard the Turks were going to make this railway themselves. The Turkish Government did announce this as their intention, and then the Russian group with whom we are working took action, and his Excellency M. Anatole de Moltchanoff, who is the leader of that group, proceeded to obtain from his Government a definite promise of their support for our Anglo-Russian group, combined in the syndicate. He went to Constantinople about six weeks ago and saw the Russian Ambassador there, who had previously been supporting a French group represented by a M. Salandrouse de Morny, but on receiving formal instructions from his Government he withdrew this support and transferred it to us. Thereupon the French group immediately left Constantinople, and with the exception of an American group, represented by a Mr. Chester, ours is now the only serious applicant in the field. We are informed that the proposals of the Chester group are not to the liking of the Turks, and that Chester has no chance of getting the business.

With regard to the Turks making it themselves, we are informed that this is pure "blague." They advertised for tenders for the work, but the Government engineer who drew up the conditions of contract deliberately put in such terms that nobody tendered. The day after the tenders were due, an advertisement appeared saying the time was up, and that tenders were going to be examined, and then, in spite of the

fact that there were no tenders, another Government notice appeared soon after, about the 17th December, intimating that the Government engineers were about to leave for the spot. M. de Moltchanoff has just been to London and informed us that the Turks have no intention at all of attempting to make the railway, but that they have a genuine desire that the railway should be made, as so far the Young Turks have absolutely nothing of this sort to show for the three years they have been in office. We are informed that there is, therefore, an excellent chance of our being able to get the concession to build the line if we are well supported by our embassy. We are assured of vigorous support from the Russian Embassy. Unless in the next week or so there are changes in the Turkish Ministry—which are fully expected—and which may make it desirable to delay matters for three or four weeks, I propose to arrive at Constantinople about the 24th January to represent the syndicate and make formal application along with M. de Moltchanoff.

I should be greatly obliged if you would be good enough to instruct the British Embassy to give us all the support possible. It will be an important piece of business, involving about 3,000,000*l.*, and would bring excellent orders to our manufacturers of railway material.

Believe me, &c.
DENBIGH.

[1075] No. 28.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received January 10.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, January 9, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the accumulation of cargo in our hands at Bussorah, referred to in my letter of the 10th November last, still exceeds 3,000 tons.

Our agent telegraphed to us in the beginning of December that the Turkish company had commenced to tow two barges with each of their two largest steamers, and he recommended us to adopt the same practice. He writes to us under date of the 10th December that he went into this question with His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, and that they found nothing in the records which would preclude us from towing two or more barges with each steamer. Our agent sounded the vali privately on the subject, and found that his Excellency was not disposed to place difficulties in the way. His Excellency felt, however, that he required authority from Constantinople, and promised to confirm the need of accelerating the transport of cargo in this way if the Porte referred the matter to him. We understand that His Majesty's consul at Bussorah thereupon (on or about the 7th December) telegraphed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, putting the circumstances of the case before him, and requesting telegraphic instructions from the Porte to the local authorities to put no obstacle in the way. These instructions have not yet been received, and the delay is affecting our interests most prejudicially.

It is essential that we should have the same facility as the Turks of towing two barges with each of our steamers, and we shall be greatly obliged if you will request His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople to press this matter. Our reasons are: —

1. The present accumulation of cargo at Bussorah causes great loss and inconvenience to our customers and hurts trade.

2. If we let the Turks use two barges without claiming equality we have little chance of establishing any such right later, should the practice prove a success.

3. The Turks by using two barges per steamer will be able to increase their carrying capacity by nearly 800 tons per month, which will give them a great superiority over us in future unless we can adopt the same practice.

4. We have elsewhere pointed out that these accumulations, which we are not permitted to deal with, are calculated to tempt competition on the river from other quarters, which would be extremely prejudicial to us, seeing that we are fully qualified to deal with the whole volume of cargo if permitted to do so.

I have, &c.
H. W. MACLEAN,
Secretary.

[46567/10] No. 29.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 14.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 13, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 918, Confidential, of the 20th ultimo, reporting your conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to Anglo-Turkish relations, and I approve the language you used to Rifaat Pasha.

I should wish, however, to point out, in reference to your remarks to his Excellency respecting the Lynch case, that His Majesty's Government do not wish to revive any proposal which might be construed as aiming at obtaining monopolistic rights for Messrs. Lynch, but rather to adopt the line of defending existing British interests from being driven off by other monopolies, such as the Bagdad Railway, in which British interests are not represented.

This should be made clear in any future communications which you may have with Rifaat Pasha on the subject.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[330] No. 30.

Foreign Office to Mr. D'Arcy.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 13, 1911.

WITH further reference to your letter of the 11th November regarding Mr. Chester's negotiations with the Turkish Government for a railway concession in Asiatic Turkey, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that, according to a report received from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, enquiries have been made by the commercial attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, from which it appears that the Chester scheme has been actively pressed lately, and hopes are entertained by the American Embassy that the concession may be obtained by American capitalists, though strong opposition from German interests is anticipated. Certain modifications have, it is understood, been made in the draft convention, especially as regards the mining rights to be conceded. The Council of Ministers is reported to have been unwilling to give the monopoly of all mines on either side of the projected railway to the concessionnaire, and to have decided that, with the exception of the Arghana copper-mines and the oil-fields of the Mosul province, the group is to enjoy no special privileges over any mines, and must be bound by the mining laws and regulations in respect of such as they may discover and wish to work. The group will, however, receive the rights to the Arghana copper-mines and to the Mosul oil-fields. The group does not appear to have obtained rights in the Bagdad and Bussorah vilayets, and there seems to be no question at present of introducing the modifications suggested by you in your letter under reply.

His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople points out in this connection that, in view of the fact that you have no strictly legal or preferential rights to the oil concession, it is difficult to see how you can actively intervene to prevent that concession from being diminished by the grant of part of the rights to be comprised in it to a group which offers terms, in the opinion of the Turkish Government, more advantageous to the country, unless you are able to amend your application in such a manner that it will present greater attractions than the Chester group are able to offer. Until you can do so, Mr. Marling fears that such representations as your agents or His Majesty's Embassy can make will not avail to deter the Turkish Government from concluding negotiations with the American group, or to induce them to sacrifice the undoubted benefits which their scheme promises.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[776] No. 31.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1911.

WITH reference to my letter of the 7th instant on the subject of the demolition of part of your premises by the local authorities at Bagdad, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople has made further representations on this subject, verbally and in writing, to the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[1496] No. 32.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14, 1911.)

(No. 191.)
Sir, *Rome, December* 31, 1910.

IN my immediately preceding despatch I have referred to the irritation manifested in this country at the attitude which has for some time past been observed by the Turkish Government towards Italy. While the lack of cordiality which has arisen in their mutual relations does not seem likely to lead to any very serious consequences, it will undoubtedly tend to make the Italian Government less ready to give satisfaction to Turkish representations in such issues as those which the situation in Crete is liable at any moment to call forth. The Italians consider that the official announcements which have more than once been publicly made, to the effect that their policy is the maintenance of the *status quo* in the East and one of sympathy to the new régime, should have sufficed to eliminate any apprehensions which may have been aroused in the past among Ottomans as to Italian designs in Tripoli, and they resent the continued opposition of the Turkish Government to any Italian enterprise in a province of the Empire in which so many of their countrymen are established, while the facilities which they seek in vain are readily accorded to their rivals and competitors.

The seizure at Midi, in the Red Sea, of a dhow from Massowah sailing under the Italian flag has aroused considerable indignation, as the Italians are persuaded that the Turkish authorities would have hesitated to treat the flag of any other of the great Powers in a similar fashion. This irritation was not diminished by a proposal from the Porte that the question of right should be submitted to arbitration at The Hague. The matter is complicated, I gather from the Secretary-General, by the fact that the Turkish Government have consistently declined to recognise the Italian occupation of Massowah, and therefore incidentally, it seems, do not recognise the right of Massowah dhows to the Italian flag, while no opportunity is lost of trying to establish precedents for the falling into abeyance of the Capitulations. The question of contraband, which has been alleged by the Turkish authorities, still remains to be proved. It appears, however, that this matter is now in a fair way to be settled by the dispatch of joint commissioners to investigate the issue on the spot.

The Secretary-General observed that, however dissatisfied the Italian Government might be with the attitude of the present administration in Turkey, they felt obliged to temporise, and could not give practical effect to their resentment. They had appreciated the fact that Turkey had learned the use of modern political weapons, and they had seen the disastrous effects on commerce of the boycott organised first against Austria and subsequently against Greece. They could not afford to risk the material losses which a stronger attitude might entail, but he gave me to understand that until a more conciliatory disposition was manifested at Constantinople, the Turkish Government must not expect much regard for Ottoman susceptibilities from Italy.

The part which Italy is thus compelled to play is reacting on the position of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who here, as so often in the relations of Italy with Austria, has to pay with his person for the unpopularity of a policy which every one knows in reality to be inevitable.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[1592] No. 33.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received January 14.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, January 13, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo on the subject of our claim for refund of duty on the steamer "Julnar."

In reply I would point out that it would be fatal to British rights and privileges in Turkey if His Majesty's Government were to acquiesce in the contention of the Turkish Government that they are not bound by such a long course of established precedents as those upon which this company rely in the present case, on the ground that these precedents were established under a different form of Government to that which has recently been established in Turkey.

Your despatch suggests that in the case of the "Shushan" and the "Malamir," steamers for use mainly in Persian waters, my board abandoned the claim that a ship in parts remains always a ship and thus impaired the previous precedents. It would have been easy to erect these vessels at Mohammerah in Persian territory, though not equally convenient; and this course would certainly have been followed if any suggestion had occurred to our board or had been brought to their attention that, by erecting these vessels in Bussorah, we should be abandoning or impairing old established British rights upon the Tigris. No such suggestion occurred to my board or was brought to their attention.

If a ship, whether as a whole or in pieces, is brought within the customs cordon of a foreign State, she would presumably be *prima facie* liable to duty. If, again, she were exported from within the customs cordon as the same ship, that is to say without materially altering her nature, it might be held that she was liable to pay such duties as might be applicable to merchandise in transit. If, on the other hand, she were employed upon internal waters upon which the right has been established to ply without payment of duty, we cannot see upon what ground any duty whatever would be leviable upon her.

In conclusion, my board trust that His Majesty's Government realise the seriousness of this question as affecting the interests of the British steamers on the Tigris. In your despatch of the 25th November, you informed us that the Grand Vizier had stated that since the inauguration of the new régime machinery and stores imported in parts, even for Government concerns, have had to pay duty in full, but that fresh legislation might be enacted to allow a refund in such cases. My board is not aware that the Turkish steamer administration on the Tigris has as yet paid any duty upon their materials. We know for a fact that in the case of coal upon which we pay duty they are not paying any duty whatever, and it would surprise us to learn that they were paying duty upon machinery or steamers. If, while this subject is under discussion, it might happen that they paid such duty, they would almost certainly be exempted by subsequent legislation, while it is extremely improbable that the exemption would be made applicable to us. On these grounds, and also having regard to the effect, upon British rights as a whole of navigating the Tigris, of the abandonment of established precedents, my board trust that His Majesty's Government will either insist upon a refund of the duties in the present case as in all previous cases, or will at least direct that a formal protest be lodged at the Porte, so that the question may be raised again when a favourable opportunity arises.

I have, &c.
H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[1624] No. 34.

Sir E. Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1911.

RUSSIAN Government, provided Lamorinis's group retires, think of supporting Anglo-Russian group, in which Euxine-Marmora syndicate are interested, in their application for Samsun-Sivas railway concession, and ask us to join them.

Concessionnaires would only construct line, and hand it over to Turkish Government.

Please consult your Russian colleague and report on prospects of success and advisability of taking action suggested.

[1648] No. 35.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 8, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 928 of the 28th December, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, transmitting a further report on the attack by the Kurds of Khuyt on Turkish gendarmes.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 35.

Consul McGregor to Mr. Marling.

(No. 100.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, December 26, 1910.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 98 of the 18th instant, reporting a recent encounter between the Kurds of Khuyt and a detachment of gendarmes, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, giving a more detailed account of the incident.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 35.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

Sir, *Bitlis, December 16, 1910.*

WITH reference to my telegram of the 12th instant to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople respecting the assault of Khuyt Kurds upon a contingent of zaptiehs, I have the honour to state that the outrage took place under the following circumstances:—

Some twenty zaptiehs were sent a fortnight ago to Taghasor, Kurdish village in Khuyt (sandjak of Bitlis), to collect the Kurdish recruits of the Bekekli tribe (sub-tribe of Shego), and to present some summons to criminals incriminated in the murder of two soldiers in July last, by which the Kurds were required to present themselves at the court in Bitlis.

According to the latest trustworthy intelligence the zaptiehs in question seem to have given no reason whatever of any provocation to Kurds; the latter, however, made a violent assault on the 11th instant upon the zaptiehs, killed three and wounded two of them. (In my above-mentioned telegram, six men were represented as killed, the first news being exaggerated.) The surviving zaptiehs fled here, and informed the authorities of the attack.

Ismail Hakki Bey, the acting vali, who was on a tour of inspection for the last ten days, returned last night from Mush on receipt of the news.

In face of a semi-independent position of the Kurds of Khuyt under the old Government, and the continuation of such a privileged state under the constitutional régime, in face of long series of crimes and outrages perpetrated by these Kurds in the course of the last two years, the unwillingness of the local authorities to bring rebels to justice when they killed two soldiers, carrying off, in the meantime, arrested criminals and military rifles (my despatch of the 12th July last), the Government satisfied itself with an agreement with the criminals, in spite of the fact three battalions of soldiers and artillery were ready in the district to uphold the authority of the Government; when these forces were withdrawn two months afterwards without any action, and the same Kurds consequently raided Armenian villages of Taghavank and Lordentzor in Khuyt (my despatch of the 24th October last), carrying off the proceeds

of harvest and the winter provisions of the latter, and the Government referred the dispute to the courts, the sense of justice of which is becoming more and more doubtful, in face of all these measures of administrative weakness, it is not to be astonished that the Kurds of Khuyt, driven to believe in their own heroism, attack now innocent Government forces on duty, adding thus another disgrace upon the authority of the constitutional régime.

Two companies of soldiers and some artillery have already been forwarded to Khuyt from Mush, and it is understood that the acting vali is willing to grasp this attack as a convenient opportunity for stamping out rebellion and lawlessness so deeply-rooted among the Kurds of Khuyt.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

[1652] No. 36.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 22.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 10, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 261 of the 16th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah respecting the state of affairs in the Yemen and Assyr.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Mr. Marling.

(No. 37/E.)
Sir, *Hodeidah, December 15, 1910.*

I RETURNED here from Camaran on the 9th instant, as the pilgrim season at the lazaretto there had practically come to a close.

On arrival at Hodeidah I found that there were rumours afloat, pointing to pending troubles in the Yemen, in the sense of my telegram dispatched to you yesterday.

The situation in the Yemen and the Assyr districts, in so far as I have been able to ascertain, is as follows:—

Since July last Arab bands have appeared nightly in the mountains round about Sana'a and have fired on the town.

This firing has hitherto been regarded as a signal to the inhabitants of Sana'a that the Imam Seyyid Yahya is about to declare war against the Turks—inviting them to join his standard.

It is commonly believed that a general rising in the mountains will take place after the pilgrimage festivities, but it remains to be seen whether the various sheikhs will make common cause with Seyyid Yahya against the Turks, as has been the case on previous occasions.

The notorious brigand Mikdad, who has been a constant thorn in the side of the Turkish administration in the Anis district, has been deputed by the Imam Yahya to harass the troops stationed in that locality, and to make raids on Djebel Rema.

The latter place has recently lost its chief, Sheikh Mahomed-bin-Ahmed, who in previous revolts has always remained loyal to Ottoman authority, and assisted the military against attacks by Seyyid Yahya's adherents.

Concomitantly with rumours of trouble brewing in the mountains the trend of recent events points to activity on the part of Seyyid Mahomed-el-Idriseo in the Tehema belt of Northern Yemen.

The latter, who had come to terms with Generals Said and Suleiman Pashas in the early part of this year, appears to be dissatisfied at the manner in which he has been treated by the central authorities in Constantinople.

In October last the Pretender in question placed obstacles in the way of the proposed extension of the land telegraph routes along the Yemen littoral, in the furtherance of which scheme he had formerly been induced to promise his support and co-operation. He further refused to deliver up to the Assyr revenue officials the

greater portion of the tithes he had collected on their behalf from the tribesmen in his district.

As soon as Suleiman Pasha learnt of this action of the Pretender Idrisee he immediately summoned the sheikhs of the principal tribes in the vicinity of Abha, the capital of the Assyr sanjak, and detained them there as a guarantee for the behaviour of their clans.

This no doubt precipitated hostilities, as shortly after (*i.e.*, about the 13th November) the Arabs cut all communications between Abha and the sea. Ever since the above town (which is strongly garrisoned, having at least about six battalions of infantry and three batteries of artillery) has been practically under siege. It is, however, well provisioned—possibly for fully twelve months—and has an ample stock of munitions of war.

The seyyid further caused the tribesmen to demolish all the fortified places erected by the Turks along the Assyr littoral, also the telegraph posts in that neighbourhood which had just been put up.

The telegraph line between the ports of Jeezan (some seven hours' distant from the Idrisee's headquarters at Sabyeah) and Midi was then cut at his instigation, and the telegraph officials seized and brought to his stronghold, where they are now under detention.

The Idrisee's lieutenants have since appeared in the Zaidyia and Wayidat districts, warning the inhabitants to prepare for a general rising against the Turks (described by him as the "nasara," *i.e.*, Christians), to take place very shortly.

Hostages have also been taken by him from certain of the influential sheikhs in those localities, as guarantees for their joining the "Idrisee" standard.

A few chieftains, who were disinclined to make common cause with him, have already been imprisoned at Sabyeah.

About a fortnight ago, one, Hadi Hajj, the principal sheikh of the Wayidat clans, was refused recognition in that capacity owing to his declining to deliver the hostages demanded to the agents of Seyyid Idrisee. Fighting followed, resulting in the sheikh being compelled to render hostages. He was then reinstated, with the stipulation that he would place obstacles in the way of the Ottoman authorities pushing up supplies through his territory to the garrisons in the El-Hujjeh and El-Hujjur districts.

Many petty chiefs and headmen of villages in the vicinity of Loheia have been forced to promise their co-operation in the event of a rebellion.

The general expectation here is that an upheaval in the Tehema will take place coincidentally with that in the mountains under the Imam Seyyid Yahya.

In spite of the fact of the latter being a Zeidi, and the Idrisee of the Shafiei sect, it is believed that some secret understanding exists between these respective pretenders.

This is even credited in official circles, as it is a known fact that the authorities have recently been endeavouring to secure the good-will and active co-operation of Seyyid Yahya's rival at Sada, the Dhaiyani, and have supplied him with funds at various times.

Seyyid Mahomed Idrisee has also sent letters to the chiefs of the Zerenicek, Usab-El-Ali, and Zebeed tribes, urging them to bring about risings in their respective spheres of influence, simultaneously with his projected *coup-de-main*.

I learn incidentally that Suleiman Pasha, the governor and commander in the Assyr sanjak, is about to be replaced there by General Seyyid Pasha, who, it will be remembered, was despatched from Constantinople last year with a big force to suppress the rebellion in northern Yemen under Seyyid Mahomed Idrisee, but with whom he misadvisedly came to terms.

With the greatest respect, I have, &c.,

G. A. RICHARDSON.

[1654] No. 37.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 24.)

Pera, January 11, 1911.

Sir,

WHEN I called on Rifaat Pasha on the 28th ultimo, his Excellency told me that he had just received a series of reports from the Vali of Bagdad, which would enable him to send me a reply to the various written communications of the embassy relative to the demolitions and expropriations of the properties of certain British subjects at

Bagdad; but, although, as on previous interviews, his Excellency professed himself anxious to settle these questions to our satisfaction in accordance with law and equity, I thought that I detected in his efforts to explain how difficult it was for the Central Government to exercise any control over Nazim Pasha the consciousness that the reply would be unsatisfactory. I must confess, however, that I was not prepared to receive the note, copy enclosed, which reached me on the 5th instant, and which is in effect, as you will see, a statement that, according to Nazim Pasha, everything in the matter, both of the expropriation and demolition, was carried out according to law. One statement in particular, viz., that the municipality knows nothing of the demolition of the house of Ahmed Ali, is specially disingenuous. A part of the house in question was actually pulled down on the 11th and 12th November, but, as Ahmed Ali is dead, the municipality is pleased to profess ignorance of the matter.

A copy of my reply to this note is also enclosed.

I at once wrote to Rifaat Pasha to ask for an early appointment, and when I saw his Excellency on the 6th instant I told him that I was frankly indignant at receiving such a communication. The Minister of the Interior had promised, and he himself had confirmed the promise, that proper compensation would be paid; yet, in spite of those assurances, he had addressed to me a note which merely showed that the Government were ready to swallow the misrepresentations and falsehoods of a recalcitrant municipality, and that they expected me to do the same. Both he and the Minister of the Interior knew perfectly well that the demolitions had been arbitrary and unjustifiable on the alleged pretext of the insecurity of the buildings, and that, as for the expropriations, there could be no possible doubt that articles 3 and 14 (and perhaps others) of the law had not been fulfilled. His Excellency said that, if this was so, Messrs. Lynch could have recourse to the law, as Turkey was now a constitutional country; to which I retorted that the future of the constitutional régime seemed rather black when the authorities, who should set the example of respect for the law, were the first to violate it, and I requested his Excellency to telegraph to Bagdad to enquire whether the provisions of the two articles I had specified had been complied with.

On returning to the embassy, I found the telegram from Mr. Lorimer (of the substance of which I had the honour to inform you in my telegram No. 3 of the 7th instant), stating that, out of fear of the vali, Messrs. Lynch were unable to find a lawyer willing to act for them. On the 8th I again called on the Minister, and informed him that Messrs. Lynch's agents were unable to have recourse to legal proceedings, as all the better class of lawyers in Bagdad declined to take up the case for fear of offending the local authorities.

At this his Excellency exclaimed, "What, does his tyranny go so far as that?" to which I replied that his Excellency possibly now realised what the state of affairs at Bagdad was. I then asked if he had received a reply from Bagdad as to the fulfilment of articles 3 and 14 of the Expropriation Law. Rifaat Pasha answered that, before putting the question to the vali, he had wished to consult the Turkish text of the law, as it seemed strange that the onus of appealing to the law courts should be laid on the authorities. I said that I had assured myself that the French translation which I had quoted to him was accurate, and that, moreover, the practice in Constantinople was, I was informed, in accordance with it, which his Excellency seemed inclined to doubt.

I then asked his Excellency if he had, as I had requested him to do two days before, telegraphed instructions to the Vali of Bagdad not to proceed with the further expropriations with which Messrs. Lynch's premises were threatened until the pending questions of expropriations and demolitions were settled. His Excellency said that he had so far only asked for a report, but would now do so.

I then told Rifaat Pasha that I could not help noticing that the good-will towards England, of which he had spoken to me only a week or so earlier, seemed to be conspicuous by its absence in this matter, and I must warn him that I was convinced that His Majesty's Government would not let matters rest as they were. If, as his Excellency averred, the Vali of Bagdad was beyond the control of the central authorities, then the compensation had better be paid here. Rifaat Pasha said that there were no funds available from which so considerable a sum as £T. 5,000 could be taken, though, if the amount had been smaller, that course might have been adopted. I said that, although it was not for me to make suggestions, the Bagdad Municipal Loan seemed to me to offer possibilities; but his Excellency did not catch at the idea, and I did not then press it.

On the same day, however, I received a telegram from Mr. Lorimer, stating that he had grounds for believing that the vali was so pressed to get the loan that he would

consent to surrendering even £T. 6,000 to cover the British claims, provided the loan were at once authorised by the Government, and I therefore wrote privately to Rifaat Pasha suggesting that this lever might be used to obtain the requisite sum.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 37.

Note verbale communicated to Mr. Marling by Sublime Porte.

LE Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a eu l'honneur de recevoir les deux notes verbales du 16 août et du 8 octobre derniers, ainsi que les mémoires en langue turque adressés par l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique au sujet de certaines mesures édilitaires prises par les autorités de Bagdad à l'égard d'immeubles appartenant à des sujets anglais.

Ces propriétaires anglais, qui se prétendent injustement lésés par lesdites mesures, seraient, d'après les communications précitées de l'Ambassade Royale :—

1. Le directeur de la Compagnie Lynch et ladite compagnie.
2. L'hoirie d'un certain Ikbal-ul-Devlé, originaire des Indes.
3. Gabriel Tados, sujet britannique.
4. Le nommé Ahmed Ali Khan.
5. Le nommé Mehmed Naky.
(Ces deux derniers d'origine indienne.)

Bien que, d'après l'acte international sous le bénéfice duquel le Gouvernement Impérial avait consenti aux étrangers le droit de posséder des immeubles en Turquie, ces sortes de contestations soient du ressort exclusif des tribunaux ottomans, le Ministère Impérial, par une spéciale déférence envers l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique, a cru devoir interpeller à plusieurs reprises les autorités du vilayet de Bagdad pour s'assurer si les mesures dont il s'agit ont eu réellement le caractère abusif et arbitraire que le consulat général d'Angleterre en cette ville s'est cru fondé à leur attribuer.

Or, il résulte des informations circonstanciées parvenues de Bagdad que :—

1. En ce qui concerne Mr. Stephen Lynch, l'immeuble lui appartenant a été exproprié conformément à la Loi sur les Expropriations, c'est-à-dire, que sauf la partie qui de par ladite loi revient à la voie publique, le reste a été estimé dans les formes et le montant de l'estimation, majoré de 20 pour cent, déposé à la Banque ottomane.

Quant aux six magasins de la compagnie, qui menaçaient ruine, la démolition n'en a été décidée qu'après un rapport de l'ingénieur de la municipalité délibéré en conseil municipal et concluant à l'urgence de cette démolition.

2. Il en a été de même pour l'immeuble de l'hoirie Ikbal-ul-Devlé.

3. Quant à l'immeuble de Gabriel Tados, ce n'est également qu'après une inspection minutieuse de plusieurs ingénieurs civils et militaires, dont un sujet français au service du Gouvernement, que la démolition en a été décidée, les pilotis en bois sur lesquels reposait l'édifice ayant été, avec le temps, complètement rongés par les thermites. Le propriétaire avait été, d'ailleurs, avisé et le consulat informé de cette décision.

4. Pour ce qui est de l'immeuble d'Ahmed Ali Khan, la municipalité de Bagdad n'a pu rien répondre à ce sujet, car elle n'a pas connaissance de la démolition de cet immeuble.

5. Enfin, pour Mehmed Naki, la même commission d'ingénieurs a constaté que 25 mètres de la propriété bâtie de celui-ci menaçaient ruine et a dû en décider la démolition.

Toutes ces opérations d'expropriation et de démolition pour mesure de sécurité publique ont été, d'après l'enquête du vilayet de Bagdad, préparées et exécutées conformément aux lois et règlements en vigueur sur la matière. Les autorités de Bagdad repoussent avec énergie toute assertion contraire, affirmant qu'elles ont exproprié ce qui devait être exproprié et n'ont démoli que ce qui menaçait ruine.

En transmettant le résultat de son enquête à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique, le Ministère Impérial espère qu'elle voudra bien reconnaître qu'il est difficile d'en contester la sincérité et la bonne foi. Il y aurait donc lieu, en toute équité, de faire entendre aux ressortissants anglais susnommés que du moment qu'ils

ont acquis des immeubles en Turquie, ils ont renoncé, par ce fait même et de par le protocole du 7 séfer, 1284, à toutes voies de recours pour contestations et réclamations relatives à ces immeubles, autres que celles, toujours ouvertes, des tribunaux ottomans.

Sublime Porte, le 4 janvier, 1911.

Enclosure 2 in No. 37.

Note verbale communicated to Sublime Porte by Mr. Marling.

HIS Britannic Majesty's Embassy have had the honour to receive the Sublime Porte's *note verbale* of the 4th instant, relative to the expropriation of part of the premises of Messrs. Lynch and to the demolition of other properties belonging to that firm and to other British subjects.

In the above-mentioned note the Sublime Porte states that the expropriation of the property belonging to Messrs. Stephen Lynch was carried out according to the Law of Expropriation. According to the information received by the embassy on the subject, this is not the case, inasmuch as the expropriation was not made in virtue of a decision of the competent tribunal, as provided by articles 3 and 14 of the said law.

As regards the demolitions, as His Majesty's Embassy has already pointed out in previous communications, they were effected by force and without the consent of the proprietors, who took steps to prove to the local authorities that the buildings in question did not threaten collapse. In view of the protestations of the owners, the municipal authorities should have, in accordance with the established usage, had an examination of the buildings carried out by experts appointed by both parties, and, in the event of the failure of these joint experts to agree, article 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure should have been applied.

As regards the statement in the Sublime Porte's *note verbale* of the 4th January, to the effect that the Bagdad municipality had no knowledge of the demolition of the property of Ahmed Ali Khan, this property was, according to the official information which has reached His Majesty's Embassy, demolished on the 11th and 12th November.

His Majesty's Embassy is confident that, in the light of these facts, the Sublime Porte will admit that there has been substantial violation of the law to the serious prejudice of British subjects, and will not fail to take the necessary steps to indemnify them for their losses in accordance with the law.

Pera, January 8, 1911.

[1657] No. 38.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 27. Confidential.)

Sir, *Pera, January* 11, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch, No. 56 of the 7th December last, from Mr. Matthews, His Majesty's vice-consul at Diarbekir, concerning the methods of the Tashnag Armenian revolutionaries and their understanding with the Committee of Union and Progress.

As frequently mentioned in despatches from this embassy, the Committee of Union and Progress, which made a pact with Sandansky and his adherents among the Bulgarians, similarly entered into an unholy alliance with the Tashnag revolutionary extremists among the Armenians, with their head-quarters at Geneva, whose doctrines of social democracy, anti-clericalism, and the internationalism of M. Jaurès are undoubtedly shared by the committee.

The Tashnagists entered into this understanding with the Young Turk Committee shortly after the Adana massacres, and were held by the majority of their countrymen to have done so at the expense of justice to the dead, to obtain which the Patriarch had just resigned. The anti-clerical Tashnags were not sorry to be able to substitute their influence for his political status with the Ottoman Government, and, with the

assistance of the committee government, proceeded to terrorise the Armenian community. The vast majority of the latter, including the moderate revolutionaries, the Hentchagists, chafe under the Tashnag despotism, but have to choose between the latter evil and the risk of massacre. The Tashnagists were believed to have made a secret agreement with the committee that, when Arabia and Albania shall have been "dealt with," a similar policy shall be adopted towards the Kurdish chiefs and their dependents; but if the committee remain in power long enough to carry out this policy, they will probably proceed to disarm and "reform" the Armenians as they did the Bulgarians, with the result that the Tashnags will be disillusioned, as were Sandansky and his followers.

The bulk of the Armenians in Turkey strongly disapprove of the alliance between the Tashnag organisation and those of Russian, Polish, and Jewish anarchists in Russia, working as they do on republican lines.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 28.

Vice-Consul Mattheies to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 56.)
Sir, *Diarbekir, December 7, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that a secondary school, recently opened by the local Tashnagist Committee without the requisite authorisation from the Ministry of Public Instruction, was closed on the 29th ultimo by the Director of Public Instruction. The Tashnagists are somewhat excited over the closing of their school, and have protested to the vali against the action of the Director of Public Instruction. Yesterday the president of the local Tashnagist Committee received a telegram, signed by Feizi Effendi, the local deputy, and by Vartkis, an Armenian revolutionary of Van, who was released from prison on the restoration of the constitution, and who is now at Constantinople, to the effect that steps were being taken to obtain the required authorisation. This telegram shows that there is at least a theoretical understanding between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Tashnagist Committee.

About an hour after sunset on the evening of the 13th ultimo, two respectable and well-to-do merchants, the brothers Kiatibian, were seriously wounded in a street of the Armenian quarter by two men, who opened fire on them with revolvers. Although the assailants were seen running away from the scene of the crime, it has been found impossible to establish their identity. The Kiatibians, who are members of the Armenian Church Council, took an active part a few months ago in obtaining an order from that body forbidding the Tashnagists to hold political meetings in the church. It appears that since that date they have been threatened by individual Tashnagists. The view is held that the Tashnagists are the authors of the crime, although suspicion has recently been directed to a Greek named Yusuf Costin, who has a grievance against the Kiatibians. About six months ago Yusuf Costin was prevented from repairing his house by an order from the municipality, obtained at the instance of the Kiatibians, who feared that the proposed repairs might give their neighbour, Yusuf Costin, a view upon their courtyard. No arrests have been made, and the affair is likely to remain a mystery.

An anonymous postcard, bearing the New York post-mark, was recently received by Mugnerditch Effendi Turpanjian, a local merchant, and probably the wealthiest Christian in this vilayet, informing him that he had been "condemned to death by 648 votes." Although there is nothing to prove the assertion of many local Armenians that the postcard was sent by the Tashnagist Committee of New York, the occurrence has given rise to speculation as to whether the methods of obtaining money, formerly practised by Armenian revolutionary societies, are being reintroduced under the constitution.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[1659]

No. 39.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 30. Confidential.)
Sir, *Pera, January 11, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a translation in French from the Arabic text of what purports to be a proclamation of Seyyid Idris, of Yemen, to the Arab tribes there, calling upon them to prepare for war against the unbeliever, i.e., the Young Turk. I am unable to vouch absolutely for its authenticity, and am forwarding a copy to His Majesty's consul at Hodeidah for his comments.

To-day's "Tanin" announces from official sources that the tribes under the influence of Seyyid Idris have attacked several places; that though these tribes have practically isolated the Turkish forces at Ibla (the head-quarters of the sanjak of Assyr), the garrison, well provided with provisions and ammunition, have been able by sorties to keep the insurgents at bay and even to maintain their communications with the seaport of Confidah.

A telegram of yesterday's date to the Ministry of the Interior announces that the Imam Yahia, at the head of large tribal levies, has reached the vicinity of Sana'a, and that a Turkish force with three batteries of mountain guns is being dispatched against him.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 39.

Proclamation of Seyyid Idris of Yemen.

(Traduction).

QUE le salut de Dieu miséricordieux, sa miséricorde et sa bénédiction soient sur tous nos frères coreligionnaires qui se sont alliés avec nous par l'entremise d'Esseïd Ahmed-bin-Mohammed Kharshani, et particulièrement sur nos frères Halli, Biya, Béni Zeïd, Khidé, Béni Selim, Afef, Béni Shehab, El Djiré, et d'autres qui sont alliés avec nous.

Moi, qui suis Mohammed Esseïd-bin-Ali-bin-Idris, je vous ai envoyé Seïd Ahmed-bin-Mohammed Kharshani en mission pour vous donner des conseils et vous communiquer les ordres pour que vous soyez prêts à la guerre sainte. Comme vous n'ignorez pas, la religion ordonne la guerre sainte. Notre Seigneur, dans le Livre sacré, ordonne, "Si Dieu ne repoussait pas les hommes par leur lutte mutuelle, seraient détruits les chapelles, les lieux de prière, ainsi que les lieux de culte où souvent le nom de Dieu se répète; sans doute Dieu aide ceux qui l'aident." Et il a dit que, "Si Dieu ne repoussait pas les hommes par leur lutte mutuelle, la terre serait troublée; et si ceux à qui nous donnons un pouvoir sur la terre font leurs prières, paient la dixième partie de leur richesse, et ordonnent de faire le bien et empêchent le mal; et le reste est l'affaire de Dieu." Conformément aux prescriptions de ces versets, préparez pour être prêts à la guerre sainte, tout le nécessaire, les munitions, et les provisions. Je vous ordonne donc qu'il est nécessaire de ramasser et d'améliorer aussi vos fusils, pistolets, épées, et poignards, car le Seigneur, dans un autre verset, dit, "Préparez pour eux autant qu'il est en votre pouvoir de la force et des chevaux gras gardés dans l'écurie; ainsi vous intimidez l'ennemi de Dieu, votre ennemi, et d'autres ennemis encore que vous ignorez, mais que Dieu sait. Ce que vous dépensez pour ces préparatifs, pour l'amour de Dieu, vous sera rendu et vous ne serez pas lésés."

O, mes frères coreligionnaires, hâtez-vous à cette guerre sainte et combattez pour que vous puissiez gagner la vie éternelle que Dieu vous a promise. Car non seulement Dieu vous invite, par son Livre sacré, à faire ce devoir, mais il vous a été imposé aussi par la bouche de son Prophète. Donc aucune négligence de votre part pour cette guerre sainte n'est permise. Voici, en confirmation de mes paroles, le verset suivant: "O, fidèles, voulez-vous que je vous enseigne l'intérêt qui vous sauvera des souffrances douloureuses? Vous aurez cet intérêt si vous croyez Dieu et son Prophète et si vous combattez pour l'amour de Dieu avec vos richesses, vos propres personnes, et vos enfants. Ceci sera en votre faveur, parce que Dieu pardonne vos péchés, il vous faut entrer dans des paradis au-dessous desquels des fleuves ruissellent et où vous resterez à jamais, et dans ces paradis terrestres il y a pour vous de belles maisons; c'est un

grand bienfait; il y a encore d'autres maisons que vous aimerez. Il y a l'aide de Dieu et la victoire est proche. Donc, annoncez-les aux fidèles." "O, fidèles, prêtez secours à Dieu, comme Jésus, fils de Marie, a dit à ses disciples, 'Qui sont ceux qui me prêtent secours pour l'amour de Dieu?'" Les disciples ont répondu, "Nous sommes les assistants de Dieu." Quelques-uns des fils d'Israël ont ajouté foi et quelques-uns ont renié. Or, nous avons renforcé contre leurs ennemis les croyants qui sont devenus des saints. Et combattez contre eux jusqu'à ce que le trouble et le discorde disparaissent et la foi soit divine. Si les non-islams cessent le trouble et l'émeute, Dieu voit leurs œuvres; et s'ils abandonnent Dieu, vous savez qu'il est votre Seigneur; et quel beau Seigneur et quel joli aide!

Salut à vous, ô musulmans, et que la miséricorde et le secours de Dieu soient sur vous.

[1661] No. 40.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 32.)
Sir, *Pera, January 11, 1911.*

AS I had the honour to inform you in my telegram No. 2 of the 6th instant, His Majesty's consul at Bussorah has within the last few days reported a noticeable increase of lawlessness in the town and its neighbourhood.

On the 2nd January Mr. Crow reported that the house of a Greek merchant under British protection, situated in the European quarter, had been attacked by a large number of robbers the night before, but the occupants had succeeded in repelling their assailants. The prevailing lawlessness had greatly alarmed the European residents, and Mr. Crow had not been able to induce the authorities to take any effective steps to calm their fears.

He brought the attack on the Greek merchant's house officially by letter to the notice of the vali, and asked his Excellency to afford protection to the European quarter; as nothing was done Mr. Crow sent his dragoman, who only elicited a verbal reply to the effect that neither the consul nor the consulate had the right to address the vali with regard to the safety of the town, and that the British consul was not authorised to write to the vilayet officially on such matters, as he was merely appointed to look after the trading interests of his nationals. His Excellency further refused to put this message into writing.

On the 3rd January an armed attack was made on the bazaar, and the shop of a native banker or money changer openly looted. Upon this incident the bazaar was closed, and subsequently the vali, accompanied by gendarmes and police, set out in his carriage in pursuit of the marauders. His Excellency's efforts were unsuccessful, but he arrested two men from Nejid who had nothing to do with the attack, and had them severely beaten.

The vali's next step was to reply officially to Mr. Crow's representations on behalf of the Greek merchant. His Excellency stated that the present disturbances were only due to the elections at Bussorah; that in Ireland, during the recent general election, eighty to a hundred persons were killed or wounded; that there was no essential difference between these incidents, one being the work of the English and the other the Arab method, but that Turkish consuls in Great Britain were not expected to make these disturbances the subject of representations to the British Government.

Mr. Crow, in reporting this communication to me, observed with justice that it was impertinent; that in acknowledging its receipt to the vali he very properly confined himself to saying that he thought his Excellency was misinformed of the facts of the case, and asked for further investigation.

His Majesty's consul informed me at the same time that the general situation threatened danger to British lives and property, and I thereupon addressed to you my telegram No. 2. I also represented the state of things very seriously to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, while attempting to minimise the seriousness of the disorders, told me, as I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 4 of the 8th instant, that reinforcements had been dispatched from Bagdad to Bussorah for the maintenance of order, and I am now awaiting a report from Mr. Crow as to whether these troops have arrived, and how far their presence had produced the desired effect.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[1662] No. 41.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 33.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 11, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 261 of the 27th ultimo relative to the troubles on the Hedjaz Railway, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's consul at Damascus reports, under date of the 6th instant, the existence of rumours that very serious damage has been done again to the line, and that the tribes are in a state of general turmoil.

The telegraphic reports in this morning's local papers tend to confirm the truth of the intelligence communicated by Mr. Devey.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[1849] No. 42.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, January 16, 1911.*

LAWLESSNESS at Bussorah.

Please refer to my telegram No. 4 on this subject of the 8th instant.

The question of the dispatch of a warship to Bussorah need not, I think, be further considered, as His Majesty's consul now informs me that a force of gendarmes from Bagdad, numbering seventy-one men, arrived at Bussorah on the 10th instant; that a reinforcement of 139 gendarmes is on the way there, having left Bagdad on the 7th; that R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" arrived on the 15th; and that the situation shows improvement.

[1856] No. 43.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, January 16, 1911.*

SAMSUN–SIVAS Railway.

In reply to your telegram No. 13 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to report that I have spoken with the Russian chargé d'affaires on this subject. He says that, as far as he knows, the Lamormix group has not yet definitely withdrawn, and that his embassy has been supporting it energetically. M. Swetchine added privately that he did not feel very hopeful as to their chances of obtaining the concession.

The Turkish Government has resolved, so I am further informed, to build the first 50 kilom. of the line, which have therefore been put up for tender in separate 10-kilom. sections.

[47123] No. 44.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 16, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo respecting the state of affairs brought about by acts of Turkish aggression in the districts adjoining the Persian Gulf. It is suggested that His Majesty's Government should enter into negotiations with the Turkish Government, explaining to them fully their interests and policy in those regions, and that an attempt should be made to effect a general settlement on the lines recommended by His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire in his telegram to the Government of India enclosed in your letter of the 9th December. Failing the success of these negotiations, it is suggested that it would probably be necessary for His Majesty's Government to assert by force their view of what constitutes the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf region.

In the present disposition of the Turkish Government, Sir E. Grey considers it unlikely that they would approach such negotiations as are suggested in a reasonable spirit; and that, in view of the difficulty His Majesty's Government would have in finding a *quid pro quo*, it would be out of the question that the Turkish Government would make the concessions indicated in Colonel Cox's telegram above referred to. In view of the certainty of these negotiations ending in failure and of the serious steps which His Majesty's Government might be forced to take consequent on such failure, Sir E. Grey would deprecate for the present any discussion with the Turkish Government as to affairs of the Persian Gulf unless they should initiate them. The best moment for such negotiations would come when the Turkish Government again approach His Majesty's Government with a view to obtaining their assent to the 4 per cent. increase of the customs duties. It will then be necessary to discuss the question of Koweit in connection with the Bagdad Railway, and by using the customs increase as a lever it may be possible to obtain a satisfactory arrangement about Koweit and other places on the Persian Gulf. Till His Majesty's Government obtain this they can at any rate withold their consent to the increase of customs duties, and, if a breach with Turkey must come, it would be better that it should come on this ground than on the ground of negotiations initiated by His Majesty's Government in regard to the Persian Gulf questions only.

As to removing by force signs of Turkish authority from places where their rights are not admitted, the question must first be considered how the Turkish authorities can be prevented from replacing them once they are removed. Where an island is concerned, no difficulty would arise; but it would be useless to expel a small Turkish force on the mainland from a place which Turkey can reoccupy with a larger force subsequently. Such action might lead to a situation of which the only solution would be a war with Turkey, and the question should be considered as to what should be done in such a case, and what complications in Egypt or India might be involved by war with Turkey. In fact, Sir E. Grey considers that it would not be safe to press matters so far till the naval and military authorities are known to be agreed upon a plan of campaign, and prepared to carry it out in the last resort.

For these reasons Sir E. Grey, though appreciating the inconvenience of the present unsettled and undefined state of affairs, considers that, unless extreme provocation is forthcoming, it would be better to wait till the Turkish Government renew this year their request for the increase of customs dues, and then to open the question of all the points in dispute and to endeavour to secure a reasonable settlement.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[1894] No. 45.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Earl of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 14th January, relative to Abu Musa.

India Office, January 16, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 45.

Government of India to the Earl of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 14, 1911.

PLEASE see your telegram dated the 15th November, 1910, as to Abu Musa.

Reference is invited to telegram dated the 23rd ultimo from resident, Persian Gulf, copy of which was forwarded with letter, dated the 29th ultimo, from the Government of India to the Earl of Crewe. View of resident, that until he is able to prepare reply to German note of the 4th December it would be preferable not to present terms of compromise, has our concurrence. But if it is considered desirable by His Majesty's Government that terms should be offered without waiting for our counter case, detailed proposals of resident as to allocation of damages which may be awarded to Wönckhaus have our support. Question, we submit, should be determined

solely with reference to the interests involved in the action taken by our agent with a view to maintenance of British political predominance in the Gulf, in which policy interest of His Majesty's Government is at least as great as that of Government of India, and not by consideration of responsibility for original interruption of contract or for delay in preparation of counter case. We are prepared to accept adjustment on the basis of the charge being borne in equal shares, which would be an equitable arrangement.

[1897] No. 46.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Earl of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 29th December, 1910, relative to the Abu Musa oxide question.

India Office, January 16, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 46.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bushire, December* 23, 1910.

PLEASE refer to Foreign Department endorsement, dated the 17th November. In January last, when I suggested settlement by compromise, it was in the belief that if the suggestion were adopted the offer would be made at once as a reply to the communication from German Government of the 4th December, 1909, with a view to avoiding the further suspension of the oxide industry, and that counter-evidence from our side would only be utilised in case the German Government should refuse to compromise. After this lapse of time, we can hardly make offer without conveying premature and probably unnecessary impression that the last German rejoinder has embarrassed us, and I should fear that an unreasonable attitude might be assumed by German Government in consequence. It would therefore seem well to consider whether it would not be worth while waiting a little longer until we can see the value of our counter-case, and, if it is sufficiently good, offer both together. If, however, above apprehension is not shared by the Government of India, and if they prefer to make the offer forthwith, I venture to suggest that we should preface it with a frank explanation that the abnormal conditions prevailing in the Gulf—namely, plague at Bushire and disturbances in Shat-el-Arab and at Lingah—have made it impossible for the British representative to place himself out of telegraphic communication, and that, in order to save further delay and suspension of the oxide industry, the present offer of compromise is now made. As regards terms of the compromise, I think that an offer on the lines suggested would meet requirements, but I would mention the following points: First, when the sheikh gives a new concession, he will not be content with a rent of 20*l.* per annum, which is the amount he has hitherto received. It might be left to me to try to arrange better terms for him on the basis of a royalty per ton of oxide exported. Secondly, in the old concession it was not our agent, Abdul Latif, who was a partner, but his son Esa. In the new concession, it would be better that the father's own name should appear, since, as a title-holder and pensioner of Government, we shall have better hold over him. Thirdly, Hassan's contract with the German firm would ordinarily have expired on the 1st June last. I would advise that, if possible, a new contract should be executed omitting the passages conveying a monopoly. Failing that, I would suggest that the monopoly clauses in the old contract be considered operative for a further period equal to period of suspension of contract, and that thereafter a fresh contract should be drawn up in innocuous terms.

Regarding the question of division of cost between His Majesty's Government and Government of India it is beyond my province to offer observations, but I respectfully submit for consideration of Government of India that the fact of the incidence of some delay in the presentation of a reply to a rejoinder which it took the German Government eighteen months to produce under normal conditions in the Gulf cannot fairly be brought into the question. The delay has been due to causes which neither the

Government of India nor its representative could control, and which concern the interests of His Majesty's Government as much as those of the Government of India. The submission of reply to German rejoinder will necessitate my absence in the "Lawrence" for about three weeks out of telegraphic communication between the trucial coast and Lingah. The "Lawrence" has been absent in dock for the past four months, and has not been at my disposal, but she will revert to duty with me at end of the year, and I had arranged, subject to Minister's concurrence, to proceed in her on above duty as soon as admiral leaves the north of the Gulf. Unless I receive instructions to contrary, I shall adhere to this plan.

[2065] No. 47.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, January 18, 1911.*

YEMEN.

With reference to my despatches Nos. 13 and 20 of the 4th and 11th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the situation in the Yemen is reported to be serious, in consequence of the Government's failure to fulfil their promises. It is announced that an expedition of thirty battalions of infantry with necessary artillery and equipment is to be dispatched there.

[1256] No. 48.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January 18, 1911.*

I SHOULD like to know how far the information contained in last paragraph of your telegram No 12 of the 16th January is authentic, and worth communicating to the Russian Government as such.

If Lamornais's group definitely retire you will of course let me know.

[2221] No. 49.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, January 19, 1911.*

HIS Majesty's consul at Hodeidah reports that cholera has broken out among the Yemen pilgrims at Camaran, and it has now made its appearance near Hodeidah.

Large reinforcements are expected at Hodeidah. Communications between that place and Sana, and between Sana and Taiz, are completely interrupted. Armed bands are active in various parts of the vilayet under the Iman Yahya's lieutenants.

In Assyr the condition continues to be restless, the garrison are still besieged; and the new mutessarif has reached Hodeidah, having failed to get to the capital.

[1075] No. 50.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 19, 1911.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a letter from the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company* urging the necessity, in view of the accumulation of cargo at Bussorah, of their steamers being permitted to tow two or more barges each between Bussorah and Bagdad. It would appear from this letter that the question has already been brought to the notice of His Majesty's Embassy.

I request that you will furnish me with a report on this subject, and I authorise you, if you see no objection, to address the Turkish Government in order to obtain for the company the permission desired.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* No. 28.

[2337] No. 51.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, January 20, 1911.*

SAMSOUN–SIVAS Railway.

The Public Works Department confirm the information referred to in your telegram No. 16 of the 18th January.

[2475] No. 52.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 34.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 14, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Damascus reporting further on the attacks on the Hedjaz Railway.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 52.

Consul Devey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 67.)
Sir, *Damascus, December 27, 1910.*

I REGRET to continue to report that the Bedouins (twelve tribes said to be acting in concert) from Mudawara to Tebuk are still harassing those employed on the Hedjaz Railway and the line was again blocked, but trains can to-day, it is said, run to Medina as usual. Last week there was severe fighting between the troops and the Bedouins at Djirouf Derwish, north of Maan, in which the latter suffered severely. It is computed that about 400 of them have been killed since the relief of Kerak.

A new mutessarif has been found for this district in Colonel Naji Bey.

On the 25th instant Fatih Pasha went suddenly to Deraa at the request of Sami Pasha, returning next day.

I have, &c.
G. P. DEVEY.

[2476] No. 53.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 36.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 14, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 27 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to state that I have received a report from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van, in which, after referring to sundry minor causes of friction between the Kurds and Armenians in his district, he informs me that the Turco-Armenian relations are anything but cordial. In fact, in the villages, the Armenians have developed an insolence towards the Turkish officials which will call down trouble on their heads sooner or later. They appear to have no desire, and they make no attempt, to identify themselves with the Turkish Empire, and seem to regard Turkish affairs from quite a detached point of view except where they themselves are directly concerned. In the town of Van, however, the "Armenist" Armenians and the Turks are linked with a common bond of sympathy in their mutual dislike of the vali, but the relations between the "Tashnagist" Armenians (who are working in with the Committee of Union and Progress) and the ordinary Turks are bad. The reason for this last circumstance lies no doubt in the fact that the vali, while carrying out the Young Turk policy, described in my despatch referred to above, went even further, and used the "Tashnagists" to threaten and arrest prominent Turks with whom he was at variance.

The Kurds, on the other hand, remain quiet, and outwardly they have accepted the new conditions, but they appear to be awaiting the turn of events. They openly

vow that they have concealed their rifles for fear of the Government taking them away, and any removal of the restraining influences would probably be the signal for some sort of reactionary movement. The Ashiret Kurds may be divided into two classes:—

1. The chiefs or aghas who obviously chafe at the prohibition to pillage or plunder imposed on them by the constitution, from which they derive no benefits.

2. The poor dependants of these aghas.

These people have not been freed by their constitution from their state of slavery, nor do they wish it, as they are still proud to call themselves the "ghulam" of such and such a chief from whom they have hitherto been accustomed to receive their share of plunder. The constitution has so far been of benefit to them that they exist no longer at the mere caprice of their chiefs, but on the other hand they have to forego their share of the profits of the raids of former days. It may be said, however, that they are content to live peaceably under the protection of the constitutional régime, but any appeal to their religious fanaticism would not fail to rally them to the side of their hereditary chiefs.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[2484] No. 54.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 44.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 17, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2 of the 2nd instant I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, reporting further on the Mishri incident at Fedaghia.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 54.

Consul Crow to Mr. Marling.

(No. 69.)
Sir, *Bussorah, December* 19, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 65 of the 7th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit, for your information, translation of a letter published by the Mishri family in the "Sabah" of the 7th (20th) November last, giving the text of a telegram dispatched by them to the authorities at Constantinople on the 2nd (15th) October, 1910, regarding the robbery of their dates at Fedaghia.

I understand that the general impression at Bussorah is that the fellahs evicted by the Mishri family are the descendants of the original planters of Fedaghia, and that popular feeling is on their side, it being considered that great injustice has been done them by the Mishris in evicting them without any compensation for their labour. It is also reported that some time ago the evicted fellahs appointed a certain Seyyed Selman Effendi as their attorney, to whom they handed their title-deeds, and that the latter now denies having received the documents in question.

The Mishris state that they were compelled to send the telegram referred to above to the Minister of the Interior, as no effective steps were taken by the vali to recover their property.

With reference to the action of the vali in connection with the incident in question, reported to you in my telegram No. 71 of the 25th October last, I am informed that instructions were sent to the vali to take no action locally, as representations were being made on the subject to the Persian Government through the Turkish Embassy at Tehran, and a claim for compensation was being made through that channel. I hear that the vali tendered his resignation in consequence of this reply, but that it was not accepted.

The vali seems very bitter against the Sheikh of Mohammerah, alleging that he or his people connived at the attack on the Mishri property, and informed me recently that he considered the present disturbed state of this vilayet was largely due to the

Sheikh's failure to exert his influence in the interests of peace and order over the Arab tribesmen, his dependents, residing on the Shatt-al-Arab.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's acting consul at Mohammerah.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

Enclosure 2 in No. 54.

Extract from the "Sabah" of November 7 (20), 1910.

(Translation.)

THIS is the telegram which we addressed to high quarters on the 2nd October, 1326. Our receiving no reply shows that we are deprived of justice. We beg you to publish it:—

"Some mischievous peasants, whom we had ejected with the knowledge of the Ottoman Government, accompanied by 3,000 to 4,000 men, friends of Sheikh Khazal, and assisted by the sheikh, came armed by special steamer, and, having cut the telegraph wires, surrounded our date gardens at Fadaghia by land and water and attacked them, and in three days violently plundered and robbed 20,000 batmans of our dates, valued at 12,000 liras, and then returned. No result has yet been obtained from our repeated representations to the local authorities. Besides this, they cut the embankments of the lands and flooded them with water, and what was not affected by the water they cut and destroyed. It ought not to be allowed that lands on which we pay a yearly tax to the Government of 90,000 piastres should be thus left a prey to the avarice of robbers. The Ottoman Government, to which we are proud to be subject, is responsible for the protection of our constitutional rights. If nothing results from this business, we shall be absolutely obliged to sell our lands to others. The sudden destruction of our revenues and our property in this way entails the annihilation of a large family like ourselves. We await speedy relief."

SONS OF MISHRI.

[2485] No. 55.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 45.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 17, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 519 of the 28th July, 1910, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jeddah in regard to the projected Hodeidah–Sana'a Railway.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 55.

Consul Monahan to Mr. Marling.

(No. 65. Confidential.)
Sir, *Jeddah, December* 29, 1910.

WITH reference to Vice-Consul Dr. Richardson's despatch No. 22 of the 20th June, 1910, I have the honour to report what follows.

I learn from my French colleague here that the construction of the Hodeidah–Sana'a line is not likely to be commenced for about another year, if ever, there being a hitch at Constantinople in the negotiations between the French syndicate which has made the survey and the Ottoman Government. I did not clearly understand from him the nature of the hitch, but he spoke of the Ottoman Government now inviting or being about to invite tenders for the construction.

Dr. Richardson writes to me under date the 17th December, 1910, that the engineers who were to have arrived at Hodeidah at the end of last October to proceed with the construction of the line had not yet arrived, and that it was not known when they would arrive. He writes further, under the same date, that some hitch appears to have occurred in the negotiations at Constantinople since the recent failure of the Ottoman Government to raise the well-known loan in Paris, and that he hears

incidentally that German and British syndicates respectively have entered the field of competition, and have submitted tenders on more favourable terms, the French tender being unacceptable as regards both cost of construction and kilometric guarantee, but that his French colleague at Hodeidah thinks the work of construction will soon be taken in hand and the concession secured by the French syndicate.

I have, &c.
J. H. MONAHAN.

[2486] No. 56.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 46. Confidential.)
Sir, *Pera, January 17, 1911.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 13 of the 14th instant, to which I briefly replied in my telegram No. 12 of yesterday, I have the honour to report that I have learnt from the Russian chargé d'affaires that the application of the Russo-French group, represented here by M. Sallandrouze de Lamornaix, to obtain the concession for the Samsoun–Sivas Railway has been consistently and warmly supported by the Russian Embassy, and in his opinion the group could not be considered to have definitely withdrawn. M. Swetchine personally thought that their chances of success were small, but he felt that the Turks regarded any application in which Russian capital was interested for railway construction from the shores of the Black Sea with disfavour, and consequently, when he heard of the Anglo-Russian syndicate through M. Monchanoff he had not attached very much importance to it. M. Monchanoff, he added, was a very wealthy man, and one of the largest shareholders in the Russian Compagnie de Navigation de la Mer Noire.

From other sources I have learnt that as no one had come forward to undertake the construction of the entire railway on the terms desired by the Turkish Government, the Ministry of Public Works had decided to contract for the building of the first 90 kilom. of the line in small sections of 10 kilom. each, and it was announced in the press a day or two ago that a Turkish contractor who had been employed on the Hedjaz Railway had undertaken the first section. It would seem that it is this action of the Public Works Department that has led the Euxine and Marmora syndicate to infer that the Russo-French group has abandoned its efforts to obtain the concession. It is doubtful, however, whether this procedure will be practicable for the entire railway, for although the first 40 or 50 kilom. present no engineering difficulties whatever, the line afterwards enters hilly country, where heavy work necessitating more expensive plant than a native contractor could command will be required. It is also very improbable that Turkish finances could bear the strain of so considerable an undertaking.

In this connection I may mention that Mr. Chandos Stanhope, who is now in Constantinople, has been studying the possibilities of this railway, but he has declined to reveal on whose behalf he is working. He is, however, about to leave Constantinople owing to the state of his health.

(Very confidential.)

I gathered from what M. Swetchine said that he himself is persuaded that the group represented by M. Lamornaix has absolutely no chance of obtaining the concession, but that the Russian Ambassador is of a different opinion, and will on his return actively resume his efforts on their behalf.

To judge from recent articles in the press, there is a strong anti-Russian feeling here at present, and it may well be questioned whether the present Government would care to run counter to it by granting a concession, even for the construction of a railway in the regions in question, to a Russian, or partly Russian, syndicate.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[2490] No. 57.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 50. Secret.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 17, 1911.*

IN my despatches Nos. 14 and 15 of the 4th January I had the honour to submit some remarks on Young Turkey's views as to the policy to be pursued in Southern Mesopotamia, and on the connection in the Turkish mind between the settlement of the Koweit question and the arrangements for completing the terminal section of the Bagdad Railway.

I notice by the Government of India's telegram of the 1st December, enclosed in the India Office's letter of the 9th December, 1910, that the resident at Bushire advocates the necessity "from the local standpoint" of publishing our agreement with Koweit and intimating to the Turkish Government our intention of making it effective, while also eliminating the anomaly of the Turkish flag there, inducing the Turks to confine themselves to Katif and Ojair, and bringing about their withdrawal from El Bida'a, Jinnah, Umkasr, and Babujan.

I would venture to submit that, for the reasons in part set forth in my despatch No. 14 of the 4th January, the time has not yet come for such a drastic treatment of our outstanding difficulties with the Turks at the head of the Persian Gulf. As pointed out in Sir Gerard Lowther's No. 603 of the 22nd August, 1910, and in my No. 14 of the 4th instant, the Turks expect that in return for their making the arrangements we desire concerning the Bagdad–Persian Gulf section of the railway, we shall restore them to complete sovereignty over Koweit. They attach immense importance to the latter point, and, should it ever be deemed expedient to accede to the Turkish desire in the matter, such a solution might be made dependent on their resigning all claims to Bahrein, El Katr, and everything south-east of Ojair. The other assets we possess for bargaining are the "Comet" and the Sepoy guard at the Bagdad consulate-general. But as long as Turkish constitutionalism is a mere travesty of popular institutions and is associated mainly with the state of siege and secret court-martials, any settlement on the above lines, implying as it would the delivery of Koweit to the tender mercies of committee régime, would seem to be excluded.

Should the committee eventually prove unable to establish an orderly Government and the Empire be brought to a state of anarchy, as in Persia, it might become necessary to consider the expediency of openly proclaiming a protectorate over Koweit and its dependencies; but, in the meantime any whisper of our intention to adopt such a course would raise a fierce storm both here and in Central Europe. The recent report in the "Daily Telegraph," which reached here through the "Neue Freie Presse" to the effect that England was about to conclude an arrangement with Germany that the Bagdad Railway should terminate at an "English port" in the Gulf, *i.e.*, Koweit, called forth very angry remarks in the "Tanin." The writer concludes his comments by stating that it is imperative to warn those who are working to establish foreign influence in Mesopotamia, "the oldest and most attached province of the Empire," that their schemes are vain and that "the mention of an English port in the Persian Gulf, to be established to the detriment of Ottoman interests and territorial integrity, is the height of indelicacy.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[2492] No. 58.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 18, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 368 of the 24th December, 1910, transmitting copy of a letter from the Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Company, and asking if there is any objection to giving them the information contained in Mr. Crow's despatch No. 30 of last year.

I see no objection to such a course, and would beg to make the following observations on the company's letter to you of the 9th December, 1910. The company seems to be labouring under a considerable misconception as to the existing system of

government in Turkey, and its views as to rights of foreigners to run non-ocean going steamers on its internal waters. The old régime considered the company's position as an infringement on the Civil List, *i.e.*, the Government's monopoly of navigation on the Tigris, and the present Government, while refraining from attempting to deprive Messrs. Lynch forcibly of their acquired rights, is determined that the right to ply on the two rivers shall be rigidly confined to Ottomans. Just as this embassy finds itself "powerless to prevent the infringement of the *status quo* by the grants of permits to private Ottomans," so any other embassy is equally powerless to obtain for a foreign subject (*e.g.*, a German) the right to navigate under a foreign flag or as a non-Ottoman company. As stipulated in the navigation permit granted to Abdul Kader Pasha El Khedery, such permits "can in no way be transferred to foreigners," implying that foreigners cannot be shareholders or otherwise participate. It is not clear what "declaration" is alluded to in the last paragraph of the company's letter, or from whom it is to be obtained, but, if the advent of German capital in the guise of an Ottoman company is possible, it is equally open to Britishers who show the same adaptability as their German rivals, similarly to evade the provisions of the navigation contracts given to "Ottomans."

His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad recently reported a rumour of the intention of the Turks to withdraw from Messrs. Lynch the privileges of towing barges, and in 1908 the Porte made a formal application to His Majesty's Embassy to the same effect. That privilege, though it has been exercised continuously for some years, as you are aware, was only granted as a temporary measure to enable Messrs. Lynch to work off large accumulations of cargo, and it would therefore seem to be in Messrs. Lynch's interests that there should constantly be an accumulation of goods at Bussorah, for if there were no such congestion the Porte might seek to withdraw the permission.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING

[2493] No. 59.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 53.)
Sir, *Pera, January 17, 1911.*

IN the course of conversation yesterday, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that the protocol for the settlement of the Hodeidah incident which formed the subject of my despatch No. 941 of the 29th ultimo had been finally agreed on between himself and the Italian Embassy, and that it contained a stipulation that in case the delegates of the two Governments could not come to an agreement, the case should be referred to the arbitration of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[2705] No. 60.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 23, 1911.*

FOLLOWING is substance of statement based on telegram from Constantinople correspondent of "Frankfurter Zeitung" which appeared in yesterday morning's paper:—

"Serious incident took place at Dubaya, on the coast of Hadramout. Telegrams from Bussorah report that landing party of British sailors insulted Mahommedan women, and that in ensuing fighting with Turks some British sailors were killed, upon which British man-of-war bombarded Dubaya."

If there is any foundation whatever for this report I should be glad to know the facts of the case.

[2705] No. 61.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin,* reproducing a report which has appeared in the German press to the effect that a British naval force has been landed at Dubaya, on the coast of the Hadramaut.

I am to enquire whether the Earl of Crewe has received any intelligence in this sense, and, if not, I am to suggest that he might see fit to enquire from the Government of India whether there is any foundation for the report.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLETT.

[2705] No. 62.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin,* reproducing a report which has appeared in the German press to the effect that a British naval force has been landed at Dubaya on the coast of the Hadramaut.

I am to enquire whether the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have received any intelligence in this sense.

A similar enquiry has been addressed to the India Office, with a request that the Earl of Crewe will, if necessary, ascertain from the Government of India whether there is any foundation for the report.

[2456] No. 63.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff.

THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Russian Ambassador, and with reference to his Excellency's verbal observations made to Sir A. Nicolson on the 15th instant on the subject of the Turkish concession for the railway from Samsun to Sivas, has the honour to state that, according to a report from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, the Franco-Russian financial group represented by M. Sallandrouze de Lamovnaix, which has hitherto enjoyed the support of the Russian Government, cannot yet be regarded as having abandoned its efforts to obtain the concession.

Mr. Marling also states that as no one had come forward to undertake the construction of the entire railway on the terms desired by the Turkish Government, the Ministry of Public Works had decided to contract for the building of the first 90 kilom. of the line in small sections of 10 kilom. each; and it has been announced in the Turkish press that a Turkish contractor, who had been employed on the Hedjaz railway, had undertaken the first sections. Mr. Marling doubts whether this procedure will be found to be practicable for the whole railway, as after the first 40 or 50 kilom. difficult country is encountered, necessitating the use of more expensive appliances than native contractors can command.

Foreign Office, January 26, 1911.

[3168] No. 64.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 27.)

Sir, *India Office, January 26, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th January regarding the situation created by Turkish aggression in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf.

* No. 60.

In reply I am to say that the Earl of Crewe recognises that circumstances are not so favourable for approaching the Turkish Government as they were when the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs addressed his despatch of the 17th October to Sir G. Lowther, and he accepts Sir E. Grey's view that the communication may be deferred until the Turkish Government renew their request for an increase of the customs duties, assuming that such an application is likely to be made at no very distant date.

As regards the last paragraph but one of your letter, Lord Crewe is not aware what are the views of the naval and military authorities on the subject therein referred to; but he would venture to urge rather strongly, in view of the present situation, that the question of the action to be taken in certain eventualities, both generally and locally in the Persian Gulf, should be considered and decided, either in the Committee of Imperial Defence or otherwise, at the earliest possible date, in order that the Government of India may know what (if anything) is expected of them, and that the diplomacy of His Majesty's Government may not be hindered when a decisive opportunity is offered.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[3430] No. 65.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 59.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 22, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an extract from a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Diarbekir describing the political situation there.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 65.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 60.)
(Extract.) *Diarbekir, December 31, 1910.*

WITH regard to the political situation, the Committee of Union and Progress occupies an apparently stronger position than it did a year ago. Its frankly Pan-Islamic policy and its general want of principle have killed any chance which it may have had in July 1908 of gaining the support of the main body of Christians, while the Moslem notables, who have joined its ranks in self-defence or as a matter of expediency, distrust it utterly. The following paragraphs will throw some light on the policy and position of the committee in this vilayet.

I have it on reliable authority that Hakki Bey, a delegate of the Constantinople Union and Progress Committee, who visited this district about six months ago, stated that the committee's policy was to support the Moslems in all cases against the Christians. He demonstrated the falsity of the view that the constitution had been obtained by the Christians and was designed for their special benefit. He explained that, as there was keen rivalry between certain of the Great Powers, this anti-Christian policy might be pursued with safety.

Feizi Effendi, the local deputy, who made a tour during the summer months in the north of the district (Hani, Hazro, and Lijjeh), told the Kurds that they should not give way to despair, promised that so long as they did nothing very flagrant the Government would close its eyes to the oppression of the Christians, and assured them that Sultan Reshad was as much their father as Abdul Hamid had been.

Very different was the language of a Kurdish sheikh (Sheikh Said-i-Kurdi) who passed through Diarbekir a few weeks ago. Sheikh Said professes to be a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, but his language does not bear out his profession. The gist of his remarks was that the Kurds should sink petty differences and unite in order to be able to make sure that Kurdish opinions would be considered in the treatment of the country. Kurdistan belonged to the Kurds and Armenians, not to the Turks. While he was thoroughly loyal to the constitution, he was convinced that constitutional government could not succeed unless the line which he indicated was followed. During his visit here Sheikh Said was the guest of Mustafa Bey, the

eldest son of the late Jemil Pasha, who was formerly Vali of the Yemen. The sons of Jemil Pasha are the largest landowners in this district, and have been nominal members of the Union and Progress Committee for some time. While in Diarbekir Sheikh Said was besieged by visitors, who came to kiss his hand and receive his blessing, or to listen to his political discussions.

For some months past certain dervishes, followers of Sheikh Khalid, of Kanirawal, have been wandering about the Bisheri district in the usual dervish fashion, singing and begging. As several of them are now in Diarbekir, the following literal translation of a verse from their most popular song will be of interest. The verse which I quote is one of twenty, all of which contain some reference to the fate of the ex-Sultan or to the sins of the Young Turks:—

> "They bound Sultan Hamid, and gave him thirty times thirty strokes:
> "He was delivered into the hand of the Young Turks.
> "O Hurriet (Liberty)! Why did'st thou this?
> "Why madest thou Sultan Hamid a scandal and the religion of Islam of no account?"

It is surprising that such songs should be tolerated. The committee is perhaps of opinion that exhortations such as those given by Hakki Bey and Feizi Effendi are sufficient to show that Islam is in no danger, while the authorities, conscious of their unpopularity, are unwilling to give the Kurds any provocation at present.

In my despatches No. 24 of the 6th July and No. 56 of the 7th instant I referred to the activity of the local Taslmagist Committee. It is difficult to understand how the Nihilistic socialism of the Tashnaks can be made to harmonise with the Pan-Islamic chauvinism of the Young Turks. The explanation given locally is that the Young Turks aim at destroying the historic organisation of the Armenian community by means of the Tashnaks, and that the Tashnaks are prepared to throw over their present allies when the opportune moment arrives. However this may be, the better-class Armenians of Diarbekir are organising themselves with a view to founding a new party, whose principal object will be the defence of the rights and privileges of the community. It is said that this party will be known as the Constitutional Democratic party.

The situation in Diarbekir cannot be described as satisfactory. A spirit of unrest and expectancy prevails, although outwardly everything is tranquil. "There is no government at present" is a phrase frequently heard. In spite of the obscurity of the situation, it is clear that the majority of the Armenian community has made up its mind as to the necessity for resisting the Union and Progress and the Tashnagist Committees, while the Kurds have doubts of the sincerity of Young Turkish overtures to them.

[3431] No. 66.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 60.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 23, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 935 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem, reporting further on the uprising at Kerak.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 66.

Consul Satow to Mr. Marling.

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Jerusalem, January 11, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to submit some further information as to recent events in Kerak, which has been obtained from a native resident in that town, who is described as being worthy of credence.

According to this information the number of soldiers and Turkish officials killed inside and outside the town was about 800, in addition to whom about 100 "strangers" (i.e., people from Damascus and elsewhere) were killed. The losses on the side of the

Bedouins were about 200 killed. Only four Christians (two women, one man, and one child) lost their lives, and that owing to the fact that they failed to keep indoors while the firing was going on.

The Arabs have only repaid about £T. 300 in cash, and have restored twelve mule-loads of loot taken from officials. Apparently the first troops which arrived also did some looting of the Christian houses, but this was stopped by the military commander when complaint was made to him.

It is stated that the majority of the Bedouins are still within 10 miles of the town, where they are lying concealed in broken country. It is thought that they are meditating some further mischief.

The ringleaders in the present rising are the heads of the Mejelleh tribe. Unless these men are deported there will always be a likelihood of further trouble. One act in particular on the part of the Turkish military authorities is likely to provoke keen resentment among the Bedouins. It appears that there is in Kerak a small burial-ground, which has always been considered as a place of peculiar sanctity, in which the leading sheikhs of the Mejelleh family are interred. This burial-ground has been desecrated by the Turks, who, to bury the soldiers who fell, have dug it up and scattered to the wind the bones of its former occupants.

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW.

[3435] No. 67.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 64.)
Sir, *Pera, January 25, 1911.*

AS you will have learnt from my telegram No. 14 of the 19th instant, the troubles in the Yemen have developed to an alarming extent, and the Turkish Government have decided to send an expedition of thirty-one battalions of infantry, five batteries of artillery, and three companies of mountain guns against the Imam Yahya, of the Yemen, and Seyyid Idris, of Assyr.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of an official communiqué to the local press, giving the Government's version of the development of the present rising.

Previous revolts in the Yemen have, as a rule, been due to the tax-gatherer's demands following on a bad harvest, but in the present case this cause is lacking, and it is probable that the real reason is more in the failure of the Government to keep the terms arranged with Seyyid Idris by Said Pasha and Suleiman Pasha. Last autumn the seyyid's emissaries came to Constantinople to try to settle matters with the Government, but their mission had no result.

Fortunately for the Turkish Government, it would seem that both Sana'a, the capital of the Yemen, and Ibha, the seat of administration in Assyr, are well fortified and provisioned to stand a siege of some months, and no doubt in time the very considerable force now being sent to the front, joined with the lack of cohesion among the Arabs, will bring about the temporary pacification of the country, but meanwhile the Turkish troops will certainly suffer heavy losses through disease alone, especially as cholera has been epidemic, since the 15th instant, amongst the drafts of recruits arrived from Constantinople.

You will observe that the Government intend to dispatch several small vessels of war to the Yemen coast to suppress the contraband in arms, and I would venture to suggest the desirability of there being a British ship of war within hail of Aden in case of any incident occurring over dhows under the British flag.

I am sending a copy of the enclosure in this despatch to His Majesty's Resident in Aden for his information.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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* Not printed.

[3439] No. 68.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 68.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 25, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, reporting on the administration of the Smyrna law courts.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 68.

Consul-General Barnham to Mr. Marling.

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Smyrna, January 23, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following remarks respecting the working of the law courts at Smyrna since the promulgation of the constitution:—

While no striking radical change has been effected, there is a decided improvement in the general tone of the courts.

Open barefaced corruption is no longer to be seen, owing to a more vigilant supervision by the Ministry of Justice and to the fact that administrative scandals are now exposed in the public press.

The officials realise more their responsibility, and promotion, which is more rapid than formerly, is sought by displaying industry and capacity rather than by relying solely upon favouritism, as was formerly the case.

The judges and the "naizas," or assistants, are drawn from a better class. The latter were formerly members of local families, ignorant of law, and without even a decent education—men who had local interests to serve by holding the appointment; but now they are required to have passed through the Law School at Constantinople, and the salary attached to the post—formerly a nominal monthly allowance of from 200 to 400 piastres—now ranges from 800 to 1,300 piastres, which is often supplemented to the extent of, say, 400 piastres by extra commissions, such as inspections.

The salaries of the presidents of courts remain unaltered, varying from 2,000 piastres per month in the correctional courts to 4,500 piastres in the Civil Court of Appeal, the president of which court is also styled "adlié memouru," or commissioner of justice, a title which recalls to memory the ancient inspectors of justice, whose office has been abolished.

The number of cases in the correctional court has increased enormously.

This does not by any means show that crime and disorder are on the increase, but is due to the fact that under the old régime many charges were stifled on payment of bribes to the "mustantik," or examining judge.

To meet this increase of business it has been found necessary to form a second correctional court in Smyrna, fully equipped with a separate president and assistant judges, and a fourth "mustantik," or examining judge, has been added to those already existing.

The usual daily list of cases at these correctional courts is not less than thirty, and the dragomans of the foreign consulates find their work much increased.

With respect to the Mixed Commercial Court, the change introduced by the president, Mustafa Mouri Bey, as regards the separation of the foreign assessors by seating them one on his right, the other on his left, has not proved inconvenient as regards our own assessors, who admit that the president gives himself considerable pains to explain to them in French any point of evidence which they have not understood.

This matter was decided by embassy despatch of the 24th June last.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[3440] No. 69.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 69. Confidential.)

Pera, January 25, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose translation of an article in the "Tanin" by Ismail Hakki Bey, commenting on two recent articles in the "Times" concerning the Persian Gulf.

He takes the "Times" to task, and perhaps with some reason, for discussing matters concerning railways in Turkey without mentioning the Ottoman Government.

As regards England's "interference" in Mesopotamia, he would ask His Majesty's Government to declare that "England harbours no hostile thoughts with regard to Irak (Lower Mesopotamia), Bussorah, or any other place proved to be actually, morally, and historically part of Ottoman territory to-day, and that she has no designs of direct or indirect encroachment."

Ismail Hakki, while thus begging the question, calls this method one of "very simple logic." It is a common trait in Turkish character to charge one's opponent with some misdeed which is the creature solely of one's own imagination, and call on the adversary to disclaim it. The "Tanin" was lately most anxious to have a denial from the Russian Embassy of a statement that the Russian Minister of the Interior had ordered the Czar's portrait to be hung in all mosques in Russia. Ismail Hakki would similarly like us to deny that we have any intention of seizing Bussorah.

His history is somewhat at fault when he imagines that England's appearance in the Gulf dates from the suppression of the Indian mutiny, while the impossibility of negotiating with such a claimant is shown by his statement that "if there is any country that has a historical, moral, and real right to the Gulf it is Turkey." As set forth in my despatch No. 603 of the 29th August, 1910, he would base a Turkish claim to Bahrein, Katr, the Trucial Coast, Muscat, and probably Gwadur, on the fact that an Ottoman Admiral sailed up the Persian Gulf in the first half of the sixteenth century.

It would indeed be difficult to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of outstanding difficulties with a Young Turkey "statesman," who professes to believe, and proclaims that "all the tribes (in Mesopotamia) are armed with hundreds of thousands of rifles coming from English factories," while one cannot help wondering what methods the Young Turk Committee, which during the last twenty months has been unable to rule Constantinople without martial law, would apply to the Sheikh of Koweit, and others whose allegiance they claim in those parts.

I have also the honour to enclose translation of an article in to-day's "Tanin," from the pen of Hussein Djahid Bey, on "Turkey and England," commenting on the third leader in the "Times." It is written on the whole in a moderate strain. When he talks of Germany winning a position of friendship in Turkey by coming to the help of the latter, "when none of her friends, not even England, stretched out a hand," he is obviously referring to the recent loan negotiations. In this connection, a devoted adherent of the committee recently expressed his opinion, confidentially, that France and England had rendered Turkey an inestimable service in the matter of the loan by checking reckless military expenditure. Hussein Djahid's reference to martial law in Young Turkey and the "stern measures" to which she has recourse shows that he fails to understand that Young Turkey is still in an abnormal state, and until she can return to a legal and normal state it would be difficult to hand over Sheikh Mubarak to her with the risk of his being court-martialled and hanged. He seems to forget that Ismail Hakki Bey recently advocated in the "Tanin" the dispatch of an Ottoman force to Mohammerah and the application of "stern measures" to Sheikh Khazal.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 69.

Extract from the "Tanin" of January 23, 1911

(Translation.)

THE PERSIAN GULF.

THE day before yesterday Rifaat Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, spoke some reassuring words about the Persian Gulf, which we think it not without interest to reproduce here :—

"As to rumours in the press concerning the Persian Gulf there ought to be no doubt as to the protection and safeguarding of our rights over the Gulf, owing to the maintenance of the most cordial and friendly relations between us and the English Government. If there remain certain questions to be settled they will be solved not by newspaper articles, but by discussion between the two Governments on a basis of mutual good-will."

The "Times" has written two articles this week on the Persian Gulf. The first was indirectly answered by M. Pichon's statement—a statement confirmed yesterday by Rifaat Pasha—that only the Ottoman Government can command the railways in Turkey, and that the right to grant railway concessions belongs to Turkey alone. The statement of Rifaat Pasha quoted above is a reprimand to the "Times" for its article; it shows that the outrageous demands made by the "Times" are at variance with the "mutual good-will between the two Governments."

Our own point of view and that of the "Times" differ on very many points concerning the Persian Gulf. I note that the articles I wrote from Bussorah about the political situation in that place have been misunderstood—perhaps intentionally, and that their importance has been so exaggerated as to open the door to a baseless misunderstanding. What I wanted to show in my letters, which portrayed a foreign influence increasing day by day until it has become a cause of uneasiness to Ottoman interests, was that an officious spirit is being shown not by the English Government, but by its officials in the Persian Gulf. To regard this as an attack on the English Government shows that there exists a defence against this imaginary attack, or rather an attack under the name of a defence. The aim, however, was not to make an accusation against England directly; we only pointed out the necessity for consolidating Ottoman power in those parts. It is always within our rights to strive to consolidate and strengthen our country, and this ought to be considered as a proof not of hostility, but of friendship; for the stronger Ottoman power there becomes and the better order is maintained the more English trade will spread. We cannot conceive that the political influence of England, which subserves the purpose of increasing British trade, should include the idea of entering and invading even Turkey.

On the other hand, the political influence and other interference referred to in our Mesopotamian letters either exist or do not exist; in the former case sincerity and correctness require us first to prove their existence and then to prevent their occurrence and continuance; in the latter the English Government ought to give a clear and open denial, and to declare that England has no hostile thoughts with regard to Irak (Mesopotamia), Bussorah, or any place proved to be actually, morally, and historically part of Ottoman territory to-day, and that she has no aims at direct or indirect encroachment. If that is done we will take back our letters with shame, and we shall be the first to applaud the English Government's friendly declarations.

We are sure that this very simple logic will be well received by English statesmen, and we think the time has come to put an end to the disturbed and vague position in the Persian Gulf, and for the two sides to stretch out to each other a hand of sincerity free from all fraud and deception; for it must be admitted that no important cause of separation between England and Turkey will remain when once the Bussorah nightmare has been laid aside. To come to an understanding would dry up gossip at the source. If action is based on equity we can see no real reason why an understanding should not be come to; only it is necessary that Turkey should not be treated as Central African chiefs or sheikhs on the shores of Hadramaut and Muscat, and therefore that in the negotiations our treaty, historical, and moral rights should be respected.

If this is not done the Persian Gulf will become not a cross-roads—a battle-ground for the interests of the whole of Europe—but a blind alley. To turn this into a cross-roads, to make it a high-road, depends on England's sincerity, and on whether she will

pursue a policy which will give us no cause to hesitate. As Rifaat Pasha's statement shows that this is the case we can afford to wait, as it proves that England is ready to put an end in all sincerity to the reign of jealousy and hesitation.

All politics of our time turn on the pivot of *entente*, which are formed by countries as obstacles to the outbreak of wars. Alliances do not meet the need, as it is impossible for two countries to have common interests on all questions. For a country like Turkey, for instance, which has different interests in each province, and has to follow a different aim in every part, the time has long come to adapt a method of treatment to each part and province. That is why we do not shrink from discussion with England, but, on the contrary, support discussion within the bounds of reason.

We say "within the bounds of reason," because the "Times" article we published cannot of course form a basis of agreement. For instance, the "Times" says, "up to the present both Turkey and Persia have neglected their duty as possessors of the shores of the Persian Gulf. For 100 years that duty has been discharged by England." Now it is not 100 years since the English flag was seen in the Persian Gulf. As a matter of fact, it is half-a-century since the East India Company passed through the danger of decline and death not only in the Persian Gulf, but even in India. What we mean is that when England has not possessed a real sovereignty even in India for half-a-century it is a contradiction of historical facts for the "Times" to consider England as possessor and ruler of the Persian Gulf for the past 100 years. There is no country whose actual sovereignty in the Persian Gulf has lasted longer than that of Turkey, whose flag has waved in that sea since the time of Sultan Suleiman the Lawgiver. It may be that the Ottoman Government's power in those parts has been weakened now and then, but if there is any country which has a historical, moral, and real right to the Gulf it is our own.

The "Times" says: "It appears that Turkey thinks it necessary and sufficient, in order to establish Ottoman sovereignty, to occupy the territories claimed by Ottoman troops." No just person can deny that it is Turkey who has made the greatest military sacrifices on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and has poured out the blood of her soldiers for her sovereignty. England may have carried out a sort of sea-police duty and sacrificed a few men, but we want to weigh the Ottoman blood spilt up to the present moment against the English blood; if the English can prove that they have spilt one-tenth as much blood as we have we will give up our claim.

Moreover, how far has England penetrated from the coast? How far does her actual sovereignty extend in places where ours does not? Does she levy taxes on the people, take men for military service, or form courts of justice in those parts? What has been done in proof of sovereignty? If a comparison be made on these points the balance will, of course, be a hundred times more favourable to Turkey.

But Turkey has also moral rights, rights which it would be suicide for her to give up. England is not in a position to invoke such a right. On the contrary, the feeling of the local population cannot be reconciled with the idea of English sovereignty. Yet the "Times" wants to arrive at a solution of the question by the legal method. The Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit are supposed to be the allies of England. We do not know on what principle of international law such alliances are based. Neither of these sheikhs is independent; they have not even complete internal independence. How, then, can it be imagined that they possess independence in foreign affairs?

The "Times" claims that my letters were mistaken on two points. In the first place, it says that England has striven to prevent the smuggling of arms; and in that way has served Turkey. But I do not find this refutation very strong, for since all the tribes are armed with English weapons, the prevention cannot have been very effective. If anything is certain, it is that hundreds of thousands of rifles came from English factories—a fact which is due to the doubtful position of Koweit. If the Sheikh of Koweit is independent enough to form an alliance, he must have a responsible position, and in that case his land ought not to be an arms depôt. No one ought to deny that if it serves as an arms depôt, the countries that suffer have a right to dry up the source of the trouble.

The other point on which the "Times" tries to refute me is this. It says I have claimed that the English have stirred up the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, whereas the two sheikhs maintain that Turkey has stirred up the other sheikhs to make raids on them and plunder them.

In the first place, I do not remember saying that the two sheikhs had been stirred up against us by England; on the contrary, I maintained that they were abusing their doubtful political position. As to making raids and plundering, what of the raids on Sa'adoun Pasha and the Muntefik tribes? Those acquainted with Bedouin customs

know that the Muntefik tribes will act, not as the result of Ottoman agitation, but by way of retaliation and for revenge.

As to the Ottoman Government stirring up the tribes against those of Koweit and Mohammerah, there is no such thing. Even if there were—to suppose the impossible—how could it concern England? It is true the "Times" says it does concern England, but it is evident that that statement has no relation with either international law or the relations existing with us. But the suggestion proves one thing: that the two sheikhs are tale-bearers. That ought to be a sound reason for defining the position; for while the sheikhs' intrigues have no effect on England, which is 5,000 or 6,000 kilometres away, they bring ruin on Bussorah, which is only two hours distant, and even on the whole of Irak (Mesopotamia).

In this article we have pursued no end but that of the mutual good relations of the two countries concerned. If we are wrong, we beg that we may be refuted; but if we are right (while we are not quite so ingenuous as to ask for that to be admitted), we beg that we may at least not be accused of being ill-disposed towards England.

Enclosure 2 in No. 69.

Extract from the "Tanin" of January 25, 1911.

(Translation.)

TURKEY AND ENGLAND.

BY a strange coincidence, the "Times" published an article on the Persian Gulf the very day we wrote in the "Tanin" on the necessity for an understanding with England. Our point was, that since we want to pursue a sincere and friendly policy towards the Great Powers, we ought to give up our vague and wavering policy and have a sincere exchange of views.

The point that seemed to give us pause in our relations with England at the moment was the rights claimed by England in the Persian Gulf. As we did not clearly grasp her demands on the point, we were of the opinion that England ought to be asked what she wants in the Persian Gulf. We are glad to find that the "Times" article forms a reply to that question, for, as the "Times" says, the English ought to be as little doubtful of the friendly intentions and cordial disposition of the Turks as the Turks should be that England will approach the question with a sentiment of friendship and justice.

We were satisfied that explanations would be given in the "Times" which would lighten the darkness; but unhappily we must admit that the lines we read did not come up to our expectations.

In the "Times" article there is visible a state of nerves and trembling as astonishing as it is painful. We naturally cannot fail to notice the vehement attacks made on us by a paper which is assuring us that we shall always find friendly feelings in the English. If Russia enters into negotiations with Germany without notice to her friends, and if Germany wins a position of friendship in Turkey in a very short time by coming to the help of the Turks at a moment when none of her friends, not even England, stretched out a hand, the fault is not ours, and we ought not to have the consequent annoyance visited on our heads. If there is a party which is responsible for English policy not taking its rightful active part in the affairs of the East, it is not Turkey.

This being the case, it is not right to attribute the aloofness of England and France from Turkish policy and the resumption by Germany of her old friendship with Turkey to our ill-treatment of various Ottoman elements. That is a subterfuge, and an admission that they are not the friends of Turkey. If the Young Turkey Government finds it necessary to proclaim martial law in certain places and has recourse to stern measures, the reason and wisdom of the step is known to the whole world. In these first years the constitutional régime is bound not to wink at any aggressive action; that is necessary for the safeguard of its glory and honour. When we note that the leader of the Egyptian Nationalists, Mohammed Ferid Bey, has just been condemned to six months' imprisonment for writing a preface to a book, we cannot understand how Young Turkey, with its three-year-old constitution, can justly be blamed for not applying the laws of liberty and equality as fully as the English. Hence it is absolutely wrong to say that the Young Turks have resolved to follow a policy of force and severity, tyranny, and oppression, and that, having realised that

they will therefore be debarred from friendship with Liberal Governments, they have inclined towards German policy. We cannot reconcile this view with the weight of such a paper as the "Times." Perhaps speaking the truth openly like this arises from a fault similar to that lack of political ideas which the "Times" finds in us. If these are our only faults, we admit them.

What does England want in the Persian Gulf? It is not very easy to understand that clearly from the "Times" articles. That paper divides English interests in the Persian Gulf into two parts—economic and political. We think we can readily admit the economic interests, for what England wants is that her trade should not be prejudiced to the benefit of her rivals. As we have no intention of favouring one side more than another, it is unthinkable that a difference should arise on that point.

But it is the question of political interests that is hard to understand. The attention of the "Times" has been particularly struck by the articles of the "Tanin," and our brother, Ismail Hakki Bey, about the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit. In this respect, it reminds us that the Sheikh of Mohammerah has no connection with the Ottoman Government. Turkey, however, never made such a claim; the Sheikh of Mohammerah is under Persia. But has that sheikh any connection with England? At least he is our co-religionist. Nevertheless, the Turkish Government claims no right over the Sheikh of Mohammerah; but our right to desire to put a stop to the sheikh's agitation and attacks in Ottoman territory will be generally admitted. Can the Constitutional Government wink at the presence in Bussorah itself of the secret paid agents of the sheikh as the means of carrying out his various aims?

As to Koweit, we do not wish to enter into details, as the most correct method will be to leave the discussion of political questions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Anyhow, our view is that Koweit is Ottoman territory.

As the "Times" opines, we are not quite indifferent to a *fait accompli*; we admit that the English Government may have some rights in the Persian Gulf, and that is why we see the need for sincere and friendly discussion. We do not want England to sacrifice what the "Times" calls "vital interests"; but we do not quite understand the demands underlying the contention that it is impossible for England to desert her "allies and friends, such as the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah," and we beg for an explanation. Moreover, it is necessary to know what is meant by the general phrase "vital interests." However, the things which England regards as vital interests must be based on right and justice. At the same time, we think it would be as contrary to England's real interests as to justice that we should make sacrifices in matters which may be regarded as vital interests for us, too.

[3442] No. 70.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 18. Commercial.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 25, 1911.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 147, Commercial, of the 14th November last instructing me to afford assistance to Messrs. Warbrick and Eady, of the firm of Sir John Jackson, Limited, I have the honour to report that Sir J. Jackson himself, accompanied by Mr. Eady, proceeded recently to Bagdad, and I now learn from His Majesty's resident there that the vali signed a draft agreement providing for the construction of irrigation works in Mesopotamia to be carried on by Sir J. Jackson's firm until the permanent contract is arranged. The vali has moreover expressed the wish that the permanent contract should also be secured by Sir J. Jackson.

This is so far satisfactory, but, if Nazim Pasha's recall is so imminent as the Minister for Foreign Affairs has given both Mr. Marling and myself to understand (see Mr. Marling's despatch No. 15 of the 4th instant and my despatch No. 62 of the 23rd), the position acquired by Sir J. Jackson cannot be considered very secure.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[3617] No. 71.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, January 30, 1911.*

DEBAI incident.

On the publication in the "Yeni Gazeta" of a distorted account of what had occurred at Debai, I ascertained that it had been made up by Talaat Bey, the Minister of the Interior, who gave it to the editor. The latter published it under the impression that it referred to fresh events which had occurred on the Hadramaut coast.

I called the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the matter, and also had it brought to the notice of the editor, who next day published the full version of the incident given by the Bombay correspondent of the "Times," as a denial. As soon as I received your telegram under reply, I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs to arrange for the publication of a fresh *démenti*, in which the true and the false version should be linked together, and this has now been effected by his Excellency.

The Minister of the Interior's object in publishing the distorted version was seemingly to bring discredit on Great Britain among any Mussulman Arabs of pro-English sympathies in the Gulf regions.

[3739] No. 72.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, January 31, 1911.*

BAGDAD demolitions.

His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad reports on the 30th January that Lynch's agent had on that day received notice of expropriation within eight days of land required for a street running through the middle of their property, and that a packed commission had made a preposterous undervaluation, reducing by half a former valuation which in itself was entirely inadequate. Mr. Lorimer reports that he is protesting energetically, but only semi-officially, as in land questions the vilayet do not admit his official interference. He considers that either the vali intends to defy the Constantinople authorities, or else that the latter are playing a double game; and observes that, unless we take a firm attitude immediately, these aggressions will be endless and British protection will become a by-word.

I have been assured by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that fresh and more explicit instructions will be sent on the lines indicated in the telegram No. 5 of the 8th instant from this embassy to the Foreign Office.

[3617] No. 73.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January 31, 1911.*

DEBAI incident. Your telegram No. 20 of the 30th January.

Is the information that story was concocted by Minister of the Interior secret, or may we make use of it?

[3675] No. 74.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 29.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 31, 1911.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's telegram No. 18 of the 26th instant, the Turkish Ambassador was, on the 27th instant, informed by Sir A. Nicolson that the Turkish Government had requested the good offices of His Majesty's Government in the question of the differences between Turkey and Italy. Sir A. Nicolson stated that, in the first place, His Majesty's Government could not give their good offices unless both parties solicited them; and in the second place, he wished to say quite frankly that His

Majesty's Government were not at all disposed to tender their good offices on behalf of Turkey when the Turkish Government permitted a local authority like the Vali of Bagdad to confiscate British property in the most arbitrary manner, and refuse just compensation. He added that there were other matters in which the Turkish Government had by no means shown that friendly disposition which we had a right to expect from them.

Tewfik Pasha said that he had been instructed to speak on the question, and that he would repeat these observations to Rifaat Pasha. He said that both the Guzman incident and the question of the dhow had been satisfactorily settled. Señor Guzman had been expelled, and it had been arranged that two commissioners or experts, one from Turkey and one from Italy, should proceed to the locality and enquire into the dhow question. The Marquis di San Giuliano was now quite satisfied.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1654] No. 75.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 31, 1911.*

I HAVE received Mr. Marling's despatch No. 24 of the 11th January respecting the expropriation and demolition of property at Bagdad belonging to British subjects.

I entirely approve the language used by Mr. Marling to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and your Excellency should inform Rifaat Pasha that His Majesty's Government must insist on the payment of adequate compensation by the Central Government, as the Minister himself admits that they are unable to control the provincial authorities.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2486] No. 76.

Sir A. Nicolson to Lord Denbigh.

Dear Lord Denbigh, *Foreign Office, January 31, 1911.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 7th January, and to my reply of the 14th, you are already aware of the circumstances which prevent us from supporting your syndicate in its efforts to obtain the concession for the Samsun–Sivas Railway unless the Russian Government favour the group with which you co-operate.

Count Benckendorff recently suggested that the Russian and British Embassies should consult together with a view to supporting your group, provided that the syndicate represented by M. Sallandrouze de Lamornaix had retired. From information we have received from Constantinople it appears that M. de Lamornaix' group cannot yet be regarded as having withdrawn, and Sir E. Grey fears that until he learns that the field is clear and the Russian Government consent he will not be able to take any steps at Constantinople on behalf of the Euxine and Marmora Syndicate.

I have, &c.
A. NICOLSON.

[2492] No. 77.

Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 31, 1911.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 9th ultimo, suggesting that the question of the participation of foreign capital in navigation enterprises on the rivers of Mesopotamia should be cleared up, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state that the only permit for navigation with regard to which His Majesty's Government have any detailed information is that granted to Aga Mohammed Jaffar. In this case, it appears, conditions are attached to the permit to the effect that all

shareholders must be Ottoman subjects, and that the steamers are not transferable to foreigners.

His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, to whom your letter has been referred, has observed that your company appears to be under a misconception as to the view taken by the Turkish Government with regard to the rights of foreigners to run non-ocean going steamers on the internal waters of Turkey. The old régime considered your company's position as an infringement on the civil list's rights, *i.e.*, the Government monopoly of navigation on the Tigris. The present Government, while refraining from any attempt to deprive your company forcibly of their acquired rights, is determined that the right to ply on the two rivers shall be rigidly confined to Ottomans. Just as His Majesty's Embassy is powerless to prevent the infringement of the *status quo* by the grant of permits to private Ottomans, so any other foreign embassy is equally powerless to obtain for a foreign subject the right to navigate under a foreign flag or as a non-Ottoman company.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[3849] No. 78.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, February 1, 1911.*

BAGDAD demolitions.

Following refers to my telegram No. 22 of the 1st January:—

Mr. Lorimer has just telegraphed to me that he has been assured by vali that the warning of expropriation was served on Messrs. Lynch by mistake, and that their agent has told him that the municipal authorities had cancelled the notice of expropriation by letter.

[4076] No. 79.

The Earl of Denbigh to Sir A. Nicolson.—(Received February 3.)

Finsbury Pavement House, London,
Dear Sir Arthur Nicolson, *February 2, 1911.*

I AM in receipt of your letter of the 31st January, and, in view of the information we have already received from Constantinople, and which I reported to you, I do not understand the position which you mention.

I am now writing to St. Petersburgh, asking if Sir Gerard Lowther may be definitely informed by the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople whether he is going to support us or the group of M. Sallandrouze.

If, as we have been told, the Russian Ambassador will support us, it does not seem to me to matter very much whether M. Sallandrouze has formally withdrawn or not.

If you hear from Constantinople that M. Sallandrouze will not be supported, I hope you will be kind enough to let me have an early intimation, as I must make arrangements for going to Constantinople the first week in March, and without the promised support of our Ambassador it is no use my going.

I am leaving for Spain, for the annual visit of directors to the Rio Tinto mines, on Wednesday next, and shall be back about the 26th February. If, meanwhile, you will kindly address any letter to me at this office, it will be opened, and the contents telegraphed to me.

It seems to me that there must be a misunderstanding somewhere.

Sincerely yours,
DENBIGH.

[4164] No. 80.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Rome, January 30, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 191 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to report that, in reply to an interpellation in the Chamber of Deputies on the 28th instant with regard to the seizure of an Italian dhow at Hodeidah, the Minister for Foreign Affairs made the following statement:—

An Erythrean dhow took shelter at a place north of Hodeidah. The Turkish authorities suspected her of being engaged in contraband, and, in accordance with existing agreements, an enquiry was held by the Ottoman authorities at Hodeidah, which resulted in the dhow being condemned.

The Italian consul-general, however, considering that this sentence involved a miscarriage of justice, refused to take note of it or to communicate it to the condemned party. It was then arranged that the matter should be laid before a mixed commission; but the Italian Government demanded, and the Turkish Government agreed, that before the commission should begin its labours the sentence passed by the Ottoman authorities should be annulled, and the dhow should be released and allowed to leave Hodeidah. The mixed commission has not yet finished its labours.

The incident is therefore one the importance of which has been greatly exaggerated, and in which the interests and prestige of Italy have been amply protected.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[3613] No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 36.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 4, 1911.*

MR. NICHOLLS called at the Foreign Office a few days ago on behalf of Mr. D'Arcy, and informed Mr. Mallet that the proposed Chester concession for railways in Anatolia would not interfere very materially with the concession which Mr. D'Arcy desires to acquire unless modifications are introduced.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4240] No. 82.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 11. Commercial.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, February 5, 1911.*

MESOPOTAMIAN irrigation (see embassy despatch No. 18, Commercial, of the 25th ultimo).

According to a telegram from Bagdad consulate-general, complications have suddenly arisen in regard to irrigation contract. It appears that the vali had only signed a draft contract, and Mr. Eady was putting it into its final form when Sir William Willcocks intervened and claimed that he himself, as representing the Ministry of Public Works, must sign the final document. He further insists on modifying text drastically in sense unfavourable to Sir J. Jackson, and Mr. Eady will not accept these modifications. Some solution of the difficulty may be found later, but there seems to be no way at present out of the deadlock between the Governor-General and Sir W. Willcocks.

[4279] No. 83.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 70.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 29, 1911.*

WITH reference to Mr. Marling's despatch No. 905 of the 15th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mersina, reporting uneasiness among the Christian population.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 83.

Vice-Consul Keun to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Mersina, January 24, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a few evenings ago a "molah" from the top of a minaret in Adana proclaimed death to the "giaours," which, he said, comprised this time such Turks who, by their ideas of reform in the Turkish Empire, abandoned the old conservative spirit prescribed by the Koran. As a result the "molah" was imprisoned, and the following day was let free on the plea of drunkenness the previous evening.

This proclamation, coupled with the fact that fire-arms (mainly revolvers) and ammunition have been selling freely to Turks in Adana for some time past, considerably frightened the Christian population. Several Armenians interviewed the vali on the matter, who comforted them with the declaration that they should have no fears whatsoever.

That same afternoon the vali drove in the town of Adana in an open carriage as a double manifesto, I dare say, of restoring confidence to the one and of warning the other that the authorities were wide awake to their duty of keeping order.

Yesterday it was noticed in the neighbourhood of the American mission in Adana on several doors of Armenian houses which had not been burnt during the last massacre a red paint mark in the shape of a cross. This greatly impressed a great many Armenians, who applied for refuge to the Jesuits in Adana, but the latter did not deem it necessary to afford same. Subsequently to that, the head of the Jesuit mission came to Mersina and interviewed the French consul, who left for Adana the following afternoon.

The situation in Adana is one of uneasiness as the result of the foregoing. The authorities seem at present ready to repress any sign of disturbance. The prevalent idea of the causes of the unrest created are the personal unpopularity of the vali amongst a large class of Turks in Adana and the feeling of the waning influence of the Committee of Union and Progress.

I have, &c.
FRED. G. KEUN.

[4285] No. 84.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 76.)
Sir, *Pera, January 31, 1911.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 48 of the 19th ultimo on the subject of the request made by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company that permission should be obtained for their steamers to tow two or more barges each between Bussorah and Bagdad in order to deal with the accumulation of cargo at the former place, I have the honour to report that the central authorities whom I approached in the matter are not disposed to grant such permission. I have telegraphed to His Majesty's consul at Bussorah to endeavour to prevail on the vali to request the central Government that permission may be given for two extra barges to be towed, as it is possible that an application from the vali may modify the view at present held here.

As the permission was originally granted temporarily only in order to enable

Messrs. Lynch to work off the accumulation of cargo at Bussorah, it is to their interests that a certain accumulation should continue; but they appear to have contracted for cargo in excess of their carrying capacity on the river.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[4286] No. 85.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 77.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 1, 1911.*

THE detailed valuation of damages inflicted on British subjects at Bagdad, Karbala, and Kadhimain through demolition and expropriations, which His Majesty's consul-general was requested to furnish, in accordance with the instruction conveyed in your despatch No. 314 of the 18th October last, was received at this embassy on the 16th ultimo. But at the same time, Mr. Lorimer telegraphed to ask that these claims should not be pressed for the moment, so as not to prejudice the negotiations which Sir J. Jackson is pursuing with the vali respecting the contract for irrigation works.

The claim was accordingly held up temporarily, but now that Sir J. Jackson has secured his contract, as I had the honour to inform you in my despatch No. 18, Commercial, of the 25th ultimo, I have telegraphed to Mr. Lorimer to say that I propose to put in the claim forthwith.

I enclose a copy of Mr. Lorimer's despatch transmitting his detailed estimates of losses suffered by British subjects. The total amounts to 5,400*l.*, but it may be possible to diminish this amount by some £T. 780, the value of one building and part of another which, Mr. Lorimer telegraphs, are still standing, though the periodical notice for their demolition has expired.

I trust that no further arbitrary acts of this nature will occur at Bagdad until the present claims have been decided, for the Turkish Government have apparently sent categorical instructions to the vali to hold his hand, since the latter has now cancelled the notice of expropriation of Messrs. Lynch's property, as I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 23 of to-day.

I cannot, however, entertain any hope that the Sublime Porte will accept the figures given by Mr. Lorimer without demur, and they will probably insist on a mixed commission examining the claims locally, and, even should an agreement be reached as to the amount equitably due to British subjects, the question of payment will be a further difficulty, as the Central Government at present show no disposition to meet it here, and at Bagdad there are no available funds, until the municipal loan has received parliamentary sanction. Even should it be eventually decided to compensate the victims out of the municipal loan the local authorities will find themselves in a great difficulty in satisfying British claims and ignoring those of Ottoman subjects.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 85.

Consul-General Lorimer to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 68.)
Your Excellency, *Bagdad, December 19, 1910.*

UNDER the instructions conveyed in your Excellency's despatch of the 23rd October, 1910, I have the honour to enclose detailed estimates of the losses lately suffered by British subjects owning house and shop property at Bagdad, Kadhimain, and Karbala, in consequence of the action of the local Turkish authorities. The complexity of the enclosures, which contain references to former correspondence, is regretted, but it is unavoidable.

At Bagdad the compensation to be demanded has been assessed as follows:—

	£T.
Cost of reconstruction	3 117·28½
Value of land	1,115·27
Incidental losses	632·56
Total	4,865·11½

I venture to hope that the value of the land taken, whether exigible or not under the Turkish law, will be demanded of the Turkish Government, for the claim is clearly equitable. In one instance the site was a more important asset than the building (see Enclosure 2 (D)*). It also appears to me that the claim on account of incidental losses is worthy of acceptance.

At Kadhimain the compensation proposed is £T. 89·36, and it is entirely on account of a building destroyed. As the building formed a bridge across a street at some distance above the ground there is no question in this case of loss of site, and no claim has been made on account of incidental losses.

At Karbala the compensation due is estimated by the British vice-consul, a copy of my correspondence with whom is enclosed, at £T. 369½. The vice-consul's report is not so clear as could be wished, but it seems better, as the amounts at stake at Karbala are comparatively small, not to delay the whole case for a second reference to him. The vice-consul's valuation seems to me to be an under-estimate, inasmuch as it does not, except in the case of Haji Mirza Ahmad's shop, include anything on account of loss of ground. If your Excellency, as I respectfully recommend, presses for compensation on account of land as well as on account of buildings, the sum of £T. 76·02 might be claimed under that head and the head of incidental losses at Karbala, which would not be excessive, and would make up the total amount of the Karbala claim to £T. 445·52½. The three persons described by the vice-consul as having waived their rights only did so because they did not think that they could get satisfaction locally, and they should not therefore be now excluded from the list of persons entitled to compensation.

The whole bill, if my proposals are approved, will be as follows:—

	£T.
Bagdad	4,865·11½
Kadhimain	89·36
Karbala	445·52½
Total	5,400·00

I have, &c.
J. C. LORIMER, *I.C.S.*,
Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.

Enclosure 2 in No. 85.

I.

ESTIMATE of Compensation due to British Subjects at Bagdad on account of Wrongful Demolition or Inequitable Expropriation of Immovable Property at Bagdad.

Letter of Series.	Description and Ownership of Property (also ground of Claim).	Estimated cost of Reconstruction.	Estimated value of Land taken.	Estimated incidental Losses.	Total.	Remarks.
		£T.	£T.	£T.	£T.	
A.	Six shops and a boundary-wall belonging to Messrs. Stephen Lynch and Co. (Wrongful demolition; no compensation is tendered)	260·90	207·40	100·00	568·30	A detailed estimate is attached. It was prepared by Mr. P. W. Parry, Messrs. Lynch's representative at Bagdad, and checked by Mr. J. C. Gaskin, commercial assistant in the British political residency, Bagdad. In Mr. Gaskin's opinion Mr. Parry has undervalued the land taken, but it is not for this residency to put forward a claim larger than that which has been presented on behalf of the firm.

* Not reproduced

Letter of Series.	Description and Ownership of Property (also ground of Claim).	Estimated cost of Reconstruction.	Estimated value of Land taken.	Estimated incidental Losses.	Total.	Remarks.
		£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	
B.	Main offices and khan (warehouse) belonging to Messrs. Stephen Lynch and Co. (Inequitable expropriation; only £ T. 423½ is tendered)	1,164·16	248·88	395·00	1,828·04	(See "Remarks" on previous page.) Plans for reconstruction are attached.
C.	House belonging to the estate of the late Nawab Bird - ed - Dowleh. (Wrongful demolition; no compensation is tendered)	346·77	247·05	..	593·82	A detailed estimate is attached. It was prepared by Mr. J. C. Gaskin, who took measurements of the remains of the demolished portion of the house. In my despatch No. 12 of the 5th September, 1910, I spoke of this house as "old and possibly insecure," but Mr. Gaskin, who knew it well, informs me that it was capable of standing for some years more. Eram Bey, the Vali's political secretary, was himself living in it when it was condemned. It was the first house of a British subject to be destroyed, and, unprepared as I was then for unscrupulous action on the part of the local authorities, I did not take the precaution of inspecting it personally.
D.	Shop belonging to Mr. G. Thaddeus. (Wrongful demolition; no compensation is tendered)	29·02	177·74	..	206·76	A detailed estimate was submitted with my despatch No. 62 of the 17th November, 1910. In case the amount shown for ground taken should appear high, I may explain that at Bagdad, as a rule, the annual rent of premises is taken to be 8 per cent. of their capital value. Mr. Thaddeus at present obtains a rent of £ T. 20 a-year (and had been offered not long ago one of £ T. 35) for this shop, which would make its capital value on the principle described £ T. 666, and the capital value of the portion lost (3/100 of the whole) £ T. 199. This figure agrees very closely with that given in the detailed estimate.
E.	House of the late Nawab Ahmed Ali Khan. (Wrongful demolition of part, for which no compensation is tendered; and inequitable expropriation of the remainder, for which only £ T. 80 is tendered)	1,019·91½	148·28	..	1,168·19½	A detailed estimate for a part (amounting to £ T. 887·67½) was submitted with my despatch No. 62 of the 17th November, 1910; a supplementary detailed estimate for the remainder (amounting to £ T. 280·00) is attached. The latter is from measurements by Mr. Gaskin.
F.	House occupied by Nawab Mahommed Taki Khan. (Inequitable expropriation; only £ T. 170 is tendered)	276·52	85·92	137·56	500·00	A detailed estimate from measurements by Mr. Gaskin is attached.
	Total	3,117·28½	115·27	632·56	4,865·11½	

(A.)—Estimate of Compensation due on account of Six Shops and a Boundary Wall belonging to Messrs. Stephen Lynch and Company.

	Cubic (or Square) Metres.	Rate per Metre.	Amount.	Amount.
		R. Ps.	R. Ps.	£ T.
Cost of Reconstructing Shops.				
Foundation built of small bricks and lime mortar (front wall)	20·48	300	6,144·00	
Portion above foundations built of bricks and plaster mortar (front wall)	30·72	440	13,516·80	
Foundation built with small bricks and lime mortar (back wall)	20·48	300	6,144·00	
Portion above foundations built of bricks and plaster mortar (back wall)	46·85	440	20,614·00	
Roofing, including all materials	123·00 (square)	200	24,600·00	
Partition walls	23·79	440	10,467·60	
Excavating foundations	..	..	1,000·00	
Carpenters' wages and wood-work	..	..	5,000·00	
Supervision	..	..	2,170·00	
Cost of Reconstructing Boundary Wall.				
Excavating foundations	..	..	1,000·00	
Foundations	..	..	2,500·00	
Portion above foundations built of small bricks and plaster mortar	55·56	350	19,446·00	
			112,702·10	
R. Ps. 112,702 ÷ 432 = ...	..	..	..	260·90
Value of Land taken.				
45·72 metres × 3·50 metres = 160 square metres at R. Ps. 560 per square metre	..	..	89,600·00	207·40
Incidental Losses.				
	£ T.			
Loss of rent of shops for one year ..	35·00			
Watchmen on premises left open by removal of boundary wall	15·00			
Loss of storage room	50·00			
				100·00
				568·30

(B.)—Estimate of Compensation due on account of Main Offices and Khan (or Warehouse) belonging to Messrs. Stephen Lynch and Company.

	Cubic (or Square) Metres.	Rate per Metre.	Amount.	Amount.
		R. Ps.	R. Ps.	£ T.
Cost of Reconstructing Main Offices and Khan.				
Excavating foundations and sardabs	370·00	8	2,960·00	
Pulling down old walls and clearing away débris ..	..	..	3,700·00	
Foundations built of small bricks and lime mortar (front wall)	109·74	300	32,922·00	
Portion above foundations built of bricks and lime mortar (front wall)	103·11	320	33,001·80	
Portion built of bricks and plaster mortar (front wall)	306·62	440	134,912·80	
Foundations built of small bricks and lime mortar (back wall)	21·31	300	6,393·00	
Portion above foundations built of bricks and lime mortar (back wall)	21·10	320	6,780·80	
Portion built of bricks and plaster mortar ..	73·78	440	32,463·20	
Roofing, including all materials	461·00 (square)	240	110,640·00	
Partition walls	..	..	5,400·00	
Arches to roof of sardab built of bricks and plaster mortar	120·00	440	52,800·00	
Reconstruction at back of building with old materials	..	..	10,800·00	
Carpenters' wages and wood-work (doors, windows, ceilings, &c.)	..	..	54,000·00	
Plastering and whitewashing walls of rooms ..	550·00 (square)	15	7,500·00	
Painting wood-work	..	..	4,320·00	
Supervision	..	..	12,960·00	
			511,556·60	1,184·16
Value of Land taken.				
54·86 metres × 3·50 metres = 192 square metres ..	192·00	560	107,520·00	248·88
Incidental Losses.				
	£ T.			
Rent of temporary premises	75·00			
Expenses of removing office furniture and renewal of fittings	20·00			
Loss of storage room and disturbance of trade owing to removal	300·00			395·00
				1,828·04

(C.)—Estimate of Compensation due on account of House belonging to the Estate of the late Nawab Ikbal-ed-Dowleh.

	Cubic (or Square or Lineal) Metres.	Rate per Metre.	Amount.	Amount.
		G.s.p.	G.s.p.	£ T.
Cost of Reconstruction.				
Excavating foundations	106·00	2	212·00	
Removing débris	..	..	220·00	
Portion of foundations built of bricks and mud ..	53·10	55	2,920·50	
Portion of foundations built of bricks with ash and lime water	53·10	70	3,717·00	
Portion of ground floor walls built of bricks with ash and lime mortar	41·12	70	2,878·40	
Wooden belt above last-mentioned portion ..	59·30	5	296·50	
Portion of ground floor walls built of bricks and mud	88·60	55	4,873·00	
Arches, &c., built of bricks and gypsum mortar ..	21·00	110	2,310·00	
Brick flooring	54·61	8	436·88	
First floor walls built of bricks and mud	67·84	55	3,731·20	
First floor walls built of bricks and mud, wood posts, with brick and gypsum mortar filling	19·10	140	2,674·00	
Plastering rooms and verandah walls	303·76	3¾	1,139·10	
Verandah flooring, including all materials ..	16·95	60	1,017·00	
Wood and glass side of large room	16·00	120	1,920·00	
Ceilings of rooms in wood boarding	54·80	15	822·00	
Roofing, including all materials	91·50	60	5,490·00	
Iron and wood railings	53·90	25	1,347·50	
Twelve windows and doors, each	..	120	1,440·00	
			37,145·08	346·77
Value of Land taken.				
18·30 metres × 4·50 metres = 82·35 square metres at £ T. 3 per square metre	..	..	..	247·05
Total	..	..	..	593·82

(E.)—ESTIMATE of Compensation due on account of part of House of the late Nawab Ahmad Ali Khan (supplementary).

	Cubic (or Square or Lineal) Metres.	Rate per Metre.	Amount.	Amount.
		G.s.p.	G.s.p.	£ T.
Cost of Reconstruction.				
Excavating foundations	93·00	2	186·00	
Removing débris	..	..	190·00	
Portion of foundations built of bricks and mud and lime mortar	69·78	75	5,233·50	
Portion of foundations built of bricks and ash and lime mortar	23·75	80	1,900·00	
Portion of ground floor walls built of bricks and ash and lime mortar	19·03	80	1,522·40	
Wooden belt above foregoing section	21·60 (lineal)	5	108·00	
Portion of ground floor walls built of bricks and mud and gypsum mortar	56·30	80	4,504·00	
Solid masonry roofing of kitchen, coal store, and water tank of bath-room	10·76	110	1,183·60	
Masonry oven and base of cooking range ..	2·00	110	220·00	
First floor walls built of bricks and mud and gypsum mortar	33·28	80	2,662·40	
Projecting balcony with three windows and filling of bricks and gypsum mortar	16·58	62	1,028·00	
Floor of kafishkan, including all materials ..	8·20 (square)	60	492·00	
Roof of first floor, including all materials ..	35·35 (square)	60	2,121·00	
Stairs to kafishkan	0·80	110	88·00	
Verandah, including all materials	7·21 (square)	60	432·60	
Parapet round roof built of brick and gypsum mortar	9·25	110	1,017·50	
Plastering walls of rooms	173·00 (square)	3¾	648·75	
Cost of three windows and four doors	..	..	540·00	
Supervision	..	..	1,080·00	
			25,167·75	232·94
Value of Land taken.				
7·57 metres × 2 metres = 15·14 square metres at 340 g.s.p. per square metre	..	..	5,147·60	47·66
				280·60

(F.)—ESTIMATE of Compensation due on account of the House occupied by Nawab Muhammad Taki Khan.

	Cubic (or Square or Lineal) Metres.	Rate per Metre.	Amount.	Amount.
		G.s.p.	G.s.p.	£ T.
Cost of Reconstruction.				
Excavating foundations	112·00	2	224·00	
Removing débris	..	..	230·00	
Portion of foundations built of bricks with mud and lime mortar	67·19	75	5,039·25	
Portion of foundations built of bricks with ash and lime mortar	44·82	80	3,585·60	
Portion of ground floor walls built of bricks with ash and lime mortar	16·52	80	1,321·60	
Wooden belt above foregoing portion	19·10 (lineal)	5	95·50	
Portion of ground floor walls built of bricks with gypsum mortar	40·44	110	4,448·40	
Arches built of bricks and gypsum mortar ..	3·90	110	429·00	
Facing bricks	121·89 (square)	2½	304·72	
Pointing walls of ground floor	73·38 (square)	3	220·14	
Pavement of courtyard	6·83 (square)	8	54·64	
Marble flooring of sardab	3·34 (square)	25	83·50	
Cornice of north verandah	4·06 (lineal)	8	32·48	
Marble flooring of verandah	7·44 (square)	25	186·00	
Portion of first floor walls built of bricks with gypsum mortar	7·68	110	844·80	
Portion of first floor front wall built of wooden posts filled in with bricks and gypsum mortar	21·35	35	747·25	
Three windows in first floor front wall	3·05	140	427·00	
Two heavy wooden pillars in front verandah ..	..	300	600·00	
Two heavy wooden beams in front verandah ..	..	150	300·00	
Two shahnishins	38·88 (square)	140	5,443·20	
Wood and glass side of rooms	16·00	120	1,920·00	
Wood ceilings of verandah and rooms	21·26 (square)	15	318·90	
Portion of parapet on roof	2·86	140	400·40	
Portion of parapet on roof	4·80	80	384·00	
Roofing, including all materials	21·34 (square)	69	1,460·40	
Wood and iron railings	8·12 (lineal)	27½	223·30	
Supervision	..	..	540·00	
			29,864·08	276·52
Value of Land taken.				
14·32 metres × 2 metres = 28·64 square metres ..	..	324	9,279·36	85·92
Incidental Losses.				
Estimated value of whole premises ..		£ T.	800·00	
Deduct—		£ T.		
Cost of masonry, &c., as above		362·44		
Estimated value of remaining portion of premises ..		300·00		
			662·44	
Estimated depreciation in value of remaining portion	..	..	..	137·56
Total amount of loss to proprietors	..	..	..	500·00

Enclosure 3 in No. 85.

II.

ESTIMATE of Compensation due to a British Subject at Kadhimain on account of wrongful Demolition of Immovable Property.

[Not printed.]

ESTIMATED Compensation due on account of Part of House of Nawab Sajjad Ali Khan at Kadhimain. (Wrongful demolition: no Compensation tendered.)

Particulars.	Cubic (or Square) Metres.	Rate.	Amount.	Amount.
		G.s.p.	G.s.p.	£ T.
Cost of Reconstruction.				
Arch over street built of bricks and gypsum mortar, metres 6·20 × 2·28 × 0·50	7·07	110	777·70	
Boundary wall on further side of street built of bricks and gypsum mortar, metres 6·20 × 7·31 × 0·40	18·13	110	1,994·30	
Two side walls and one partition wall built of wooden posts and filled in with bricks and gypsum mortar, metres 9·12 × 7·31 × 0·20 = 13·33				
Deduct openings of—				
6 windows each 1·20 × 0·70 × 0·20 = 1·00				
6 doors each 1·80 × 1·00 × 0·20 = 2·16				
3·16				
	10·17	140	1,423·80	
Floors of two stories and roof of one story, metres 6·20 × 9·04 × 8·00	56·54 (square)	60	3,392·40	
Parapet of roof built of wooden posts and filled in with bricks and gypsum mortar, metres 12·72 × 2·00 × 0·20	5·09	140	718·60	
Six doors and frames	..	120	720·00	
Six iron barred windows and frames	..	105	630·00	
Total	..	..	9,656·80	89·36

Enclosure 4 in No. 85.

III.

ESTIMATE of Compensation due to British Subjects at Karbala on account of wrongful Demolition of Immovable Property.

[Not printed.]

Enclosure 5 in No. 85.

Consul-General Lorimer to Vice-Consul Mohsin.

(No. 1075.)

Bagdad, December 2, 1910.

Sir,

UNDER orders received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, I have the honour to request that you will immediately prepare a detailed estimate of the losses suffered by British subjects, owners of immovable property at Karbala, through the recent proceedings of the local authorities.

The estimate should be prepared in the form of a statement showing the particulars of each building demolished or expropriated separately. The principal

particulars are measurements and value of the building removed, measurements and value of the site taken, and whether demolition was complete or partial. In each case, it should be noted whether the building was dealt with under the law of buildings or that of expropriation, and whether the legal formalities were observed. If any of the buildings were demolished on the ground of their being in a dangerous condition, it should be stated whether they were really dangerous or not.

At Bagdad, it is an understood principle that the capital value of an immovable property is 33⅓ times its annual rent, and if any similar rule is recognised at Karbala you should apply it to your calculations of the value of building and site together as a check upon their correctness.

The estimates should be drawn up in consultation with the owners or their agents and with any other persons from whom you can obtain useful assistance. They should represent the true market values of the properties, or of the portions of them taken, without over or under valuation.

The following are the owners whose cases you have so far brought to my notice, but there may now be others having cases:—

Haji Mirza Ahmad (Akhbari), two cases.
Haji Zein-ul-Abidin (Akhbari), one case
Muhammad Ali Agha (Dayi), one case.

As you will remember, I instructed you on the 18th October "to take very careful account of the value of British subjects' buildings before they are destroyed, so that we may be in a position to prove the actual loss to British subjects if it should be decided eventually to claim compensation from the municipality." I hope, therefore, that you have all the necessary materials ready to hand, and will be able to send the report now required by return of post without undue haste.

I have, &c.

J. G. LORIMER.

Enclosure 6 in No. 85.

Vice-Consul Mohsin to Consul-General Lorimer.

(No. 233.)

Karbala, December 9, 1910.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1075, dated the 2nd instant, ordering that I should send you a detailed estimate of the losses suffered by British subjects, owners of immovable property at Karbala, through the recent proceedings of the local authorities.

2. In my former reports I stated that the authorities did not act according to any law, nor did they observe the legal formalities except in two cases of British subjects (namely, Ali Hashim and Zein-ul-Abidin), in which notices were given to them to demolish and rebuild at their own expense, and in spite of their urging reasonable excuses they compelled them to carry out their order. The compulsion was done by threats and underhand dealings which forced the owners to either comply or undergo the consequences, which were, perhaps, heavier than the cost of rebuilding their property. Two things, which evidently took the place of legal formalities, however, preceded their operation, viz., a verbal warning to vacate the property during the day and the demolition of the roofing of the bazaar at night, which rendered the places unfit for occupation.

3. British subjects' losses are of two kinds: the first, a loss suffered on account of rebuilding the frontage of their property at their own expense; and the second, which is heavier, includes the first, together with the value of the ground taken in excess of a-quarter, and, in one or two cases, the whole of the property.

4. Sufferers of the first kind, whose properties were partially demolished, are eight persons with 26½ shops, for the rebuilding of which they have spent a sum of about 267½ liras. Of those, three persons with seven shops and 91 liras may be excepted as having waived their rights by giving me a statement to that effect, and the rest are such as they still wish to recover their expenses if possible. The accompanying schedule, marked (A), shows the names and other details of the persons who come under this heading.

5. Sufferers of the second kind are, first, Haji Mirza Ahmad (Akhbari), who owns one-half of a shop, which was 16 feet long by 4 ft. 9 in. wide. Of this the authorities expropriated 7 inches more than a-quarter of the whole, which, according to its rent of

5 liras per annum, is worth 100 liras. The value of the 7 inches is therefore about 4 liras, of which one-half belongs to Mirza Ahmad. The shop was demolished partially.

The other case of Mirza Ahmad is the Bazar piece of the ground in front of his Kaisariyeh which is waked to be given to him on his satisfying the owner of an opposite shop who had lost 50 liras worth of property. The piece of ground in question is 9 ft. 3 in. long by 2 ft. 2 in. wide on one side and 1 ft. 5 in. on the other. Its marked value for any buyer besides the Akhbari, who may convert it into a shop by blocking up the door of the kaisariyeh, is 50 liras, but for the Akhbari himself it is worth nothing. The case is still pending.

6. Secondly, Seyyid Muhammad Kashmeri, who had two shops, each on one side of a wall, facing in different directions. The smaller, which was lately demolished without compensation, was 7 ft. 4 in. long by 2 ft. 2 in. deep on one side and 2 ft. 7 in. on the other, and it fetched a rent of 3 liras per annum. The market value, together with the two columns of wall which stood on both sides of it, was 60 liras. The bigger shop, which I was only partially demolished, and the over expropriation from this shop, which I reported in my letter dated the 15th October, 1910, was given up, so that his actual loss of site was less than a quarter.

7. Thirdly, Agha Davee, whose property was completely demolished. It was a large building 20 metres long by 24 metres wide on the top of an arch, under which people used to frequent. He owned only one-quarter of it; the other three-quarters belonged to a Turkish subject. He bought the place for 80 liras according to his title-deed, because it was mortgaged with him and the original owner refused to pay him the amount. Its market value at the time of its demolition was only 40 liras, and its rent 2 liras per annum. The Government demolished the whole of this building in order to remove the arch and widen the road. The enclosed schedule, marked (B), refers to the losses suffered by the foregoing persons.

8. In estimating the measurements, rents, values, and the losses mentioned in this letter and the accompanying papers, I have, besides my personal knowledge, consulted with the owners of the property and two other experts who had also sufficient information of the Indians' cases. In Karbala the value of an immovable property is generally estimated at twenty times its annual rent, but in some cases this changes a little according to special conditions of the property.

9. Out of all cases mentioned in the enclosed papers not a single one was demolished, whether partially or completely, on the ground of its being old and dangerous. They were, in fact, very strong, and the demolition was made only to improve and widen the road.

10. The statements contain only those cases which have happened up to date; there are of course many other shops, houses, &c., which may come hereafter.

I have, &c.
M. H. MOHSIN.

Enclosure 7 in No. 85.

(A.)—STATEMENT showing the Losses suffered by British Subjects on account of the partial Demolition and the Expropriation of less than a Quarter of their Immovable Property by the recent proceedings of the Municipal Authorities at Karbala.

Name of Owner.	Number and Kind of Property.	Whether a Partner or Sole Owner.	Measurement of Building removed from each.	Value of Building removed from each.	Total of foregoing.	Cost of rebuilding each Property.	Total of foregoing.	Remarks.
				Liras.	Liras.	Liras.	Liras.	
Abdul Majeed..	1 shop	Sole owner ..	2 ft. 6 in. by 8 ft.	4	4	25	25	
Abdul Majeed..	1 shop	Sole owner ..	Removed only to make them even with the other shops	3	3	12	12	These three persons have waived their rights.
Abdul Majeed..	1 shop	Sole owner ..		3	3	15	15	
Seyyid Ali, draper	2 shops	Sole owner ..	2 ft. 6 in. by 4 ft. 9 in. ..	3½	7	8½	17	
Haji Balloo	3 shops	Of which owns one ..	3 ft. 4 in. by 10 ft.	5	5	12	12	
Haji Balloo	1 shop	Sole owner ..	1 ft. 8 in. by 10 ft.	4	4	10	10	
Seyyid Mahommed Sindi and Brothers	21	Partner owning seven	1 ft. 6 in. by 7 ft.	2	14	4½	31½	
Seyyid Mahommed Kashmeri ..	1 shop	Sole owner ..	5 ft. 3 in. by 9 ft. 6 in. ..	6	6	11	11	
Zaen-ul-Abidin	3 shops	Partner owning two	2 ft. 6 in. by 9 ft. 6 in. ..	4	8	17	34	
Zaen-ul-Abidin	1 shop	Sole owner ..	Less than a-quarter ..	2	2	11	11	It was this shop that a side wall was taken from it.
Zaen-ul-Abidin	1 shop	Partner owning one-half	Removed to make even with the others	1½	1½	6	6	This value and the cost mentioned are Zaen-ul-Abidin's share only.
Ali Hashim	1 shop	Sole owner ..	8 ft. by 7 ft. 5 in.	2	2	9	9	
Ali Hashim	1 shop	Sole owner ..	3 ft. by 10 ft.	5	5	20	20	
Ali Hashim	1 shop	Sole owner ..	8 ft. by 7 ft. 1 in.	1½	1½	10	10	
Ali Hashim	1 shop	Sole owner ..	2 ft. 6 in. by 10 ft.	3	3	12	12	
Ali Hashim	1 shop	Sole owner ..	2 ft. 6 in. by 6 ft. 8 in. ..	2	2	10	10	
Ali Hashim	1 shop	Sole owner ..	3 ft. 6 in. by 9 ft. 7 in. ..	5	5	10	10	
Ali Hashim	1 shop	Sole owner ..	2 ft. 6 in. by 9 ft. 7 in. ..	3	3	12	12	
Ghulam Ali	1 shop	Sole owner ..	10 ft. 5 in. by 10 ft. ..	3	3	Not built yet	..	
				Total ..	82	..	207½	

M. H. MOHSIN.

November 10, 1910.

Enclosure 8 in No. 85.

(B.)—STATEMENT showing the Losses suffered by British Subjects on account of the complete Demolition or the Expropriation of more than a Quarter of their Immovable Property by the recent proceedings of the Authorities at Karbala.

Name of Owner.	Number and Kind of Property.	Whether Partner or Sole Owner.	Measurement of the whole Property.	Measurement of Site taken, and how much in excess of a quarter.	Value of the whole Property.	Value of the Excess portion.	Total of preceding Column.	Remarks.
					Liras. 100	Liras. About 4	Liras. 4	
Haji Mirza Ahmad ..	1 shop	Partner in one ..	16 ft. by 4 ft. 9 in. ..	4 ft. 7 in. by 4 ft. 7 in. taken in excess				Only one-half of this belongs to Mirza Ahmad. His other question is the ground in front of his kassariyeh, which is still pending.
				Completely taken ..	60	..	60	
Seyyid Mahommed Kashmeri	1 shop	Sole owner ..	7 ft. 4 in. by 2 ft. 2 in. by 2 ft. 7 in.	Completely taken ..	40	..	40	The measurement is that of the whole property and not of Agha Davee's portion only. The value refers to Agha Davee's one-quarter, which, according to his title-deeds, is 80 lires.
Agha Davee ..	One-quarter of two sik buildings	Sole owner ..	20 metres by 3 metres				104	
				Deduct 2 lires as the share of Mirza Ahmad's portion ..		..	2	
				Total		..	102	

M. H. MOHSIN.

[4306] No. 86.

Mr. Lindley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 14. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, February 1, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 10 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to report that M. Tcharikoff, Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, left Sophia for Vienna a week ago. Before leaving, M. Tcharikoff had long conversations with King Ferdinand and with the French, Roumanian, and Turkish Ministers, and M. Paléologue was kind enough to show me the text of his telegrams which he had addressed to M. Pichon on the subject of his conversation with M. Tcharikoff, during which the interview of the latter with King Ferdinand had been the principal topic of discussion. Considering the very reticent nature of M. Tcharikoff, it is somewhat strange that the French Minister was able to extract so much information out of his Excellency, and I should not feel justified in reporting the impressions of the former had he not thought them of sufficient importance to telegraph to his Government.

In these telegrams M. Paléologue stated that he had gathered from M. Tcharikoff that his Excellency had informed King Ferdinand that Russia was determined to permit no changes in the situation in the Balkans, and that she had given her promise to that effect to Germany. The latter in return had undertaken to prevent any Austrian action, and to endeavour to have Count Aehrenthal removed from his present position before the end of March. In future, Balkan affairs were to be settled between Russia and Germany. M. Paléologue concluded by adding that King Ferdinand's comment on this conversation had been that, *mutatis mutandis*, similar language had been held to him at the time of the Mürzsteg programme, when Russia was contemplating action in Manchuria; His Majesty concluded, therefore, that she was now contemplating a forward policy in Persia.

No mention was made by M. Tcharikoff in his conversation either with King Ferdinand or with M. Paléologue, of the desirability of a rapprochement, much less of an alliance, between Bulgaria and her neighbours; and M. Diamandy, the Roumanian Minister, informed me that he was also struck, in his conversation with M. Tcharikoff, by the absence of any allusion to this subject, and by the optimistic tone of his Excellency as regards the affairs of the Turkish Empire.

Assim Bey, the Turkish Minister, informed me that M. Tcharikoff was quite enthusiastic over the progress of Turkish reform, and had cited innumerable concrete instances which showed both his Excellency's knowledge of the subject and the extraordinary improvement which had taken place in Turkish administration. M. Tcharikoff was evidently persuaded that the existence of a strong and united Turkey was in the interests of Russia, and he only hoped that his views would prevail over the traditional Russian policy of hostility to Turkey.

Assim Bey then turned, as usual, to the subject of Persia, and expressed the view that Turkey should be consulted on all questions affecting that country. Until her interests were frankly admitted, it would be impossible to settle the question satisfactorily. He could not understand the line taken by the "Times" as regards Koweit and the Persian Gulf. The former was Turkish territory, as was also the whole of Arabia, and the veiled insinuations of the "Times" as regards Koweit only encouraged the idea, held by many of his countrymen, but not by himself, that Great Britain was at the bottom of the trouble in the Yemen. In this connection he stated that nearly all the arms in Arabia were of English origin, and that a regular arms traffic was carried on through Aden and Koweit.

I replied that I know little of the international status prevailing in the Gulf, but that my impression was that Great Britain had for many years been in treaty relations with some of the Arab chiefs. As regards the traffic in arms, if other countries, including Turkey, had made a small fraction of the efforts which had been made by His Majesty's Government to put down the traffic, everyone concerned would have been saved an immense expenditure of blood and treasure.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS O. LINDLEY.

P.S.—A copy of this despatch will be sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople by next messenger.

F. O. L.

[3660] No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 37.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 6, 1911.

I REQUEST your Excellency to be so good as to furnish me with a statement showing so far as possible the value of the damage inflicted on the property of British subjects at Bagdad by the local authorities. Your Excellency should also communicate to me whatever further information may subsequently reach you on this subject.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[3435] No. 88.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 6, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Admiralty, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople respecting the rising in the Yemen.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey shares Sir G. Lowther's view as to the advisability of there being a British war-ship in the vicinity of Aden during the present conjuncture, and I am to enquire whether their Lordships could make arrangements accordingly.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[4934] No. 89.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received February 10.)

Sir, *Admiralty, February* 9, 1911.

WITH reference to your letter of the 6th instant, forwarding copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople respecting the rising in the Yemen, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's ship "Proserpine" is under orders to remain in the vicinity of Berbera, which is in wireless catch with Aden.

It is not considered that any further naval arrangements are required.

I am, &c.

O. I. THOMAS.

4908] No. 90.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 10.)

Sir, *India Office, February* 9, 1911.

WITH reference to your letter dated the 8th November last, and correspondence subsequently communicated to your department,* I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to address you regarding the proposal to approach the German Government with a view to effecting a compromise in the matter of the oxide concession at Abu Musa.

2. The Earl of Crewe is disposed to concur in the view of the Government of India, that it would be preferable not to propose a compromise until the German note can be answered in detail. But he would suggest that the precise terms to be offered should be discussed forthwith, and, when that has been done, the Government of India might be asked when their suggestions for the answer to the German Government are likely

* To Government of India (Telegraphic), November 15, 1910; from ditto (Telegraphic), January 14, 1911; Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India, December 28, 1910.

to be received. It could then be finally determined whether to await those suggestions, or to approach the German Government without further delay.

3. As regards the terms of the compromise, Lord Crewe would suggest that they be drafted in the Foreign Office in consultation with this department, and I am to offer the following preliminary observations upon them.

4. The proposal to arrange in the new concession for the payment of a royalty to the sheikh appears worthy of adoption in justice to him. It may also be advisable to specify the particular British tribunal to which should be entrusted the assessment of the damages to be awarded to Messrs. Wönckhaus; and, subject to Sir E. Grey's opinion, Lord Crewe approves the suggestion made in Colonel Cox's minute of the 12th February, 1910, that the High Court of Bombay should be approached with a view to the deputation of a judge for this purpose.

5. The question of a monopoly is more difficult. In the Foreign Office printed minute of the 15th February, 1910, it is pointed out that its withdrawal would involve an alteration of the contract between Hassan and Wönckhaus, dated the 1st June, 1906, and Lord Crewe appreciates the objections to which this course is open. But they are, he thinks, outweighed by the disadvantage of formally ratifying an arrangement which is objectionable in itself, and might hereafter be treated as a precedent in other negotiations between private parties and the trucial or other chiefs. As, therefore, the term of the original contract expired on the 1st June last, he would prefer that, if practicable, a new contract should be executed without the monopoly provision, and with such readjustment of prices as the increased payment by way of royalty to the sheikh might necessitate.

6. With regard to the final paragraph of your letter of the 8th November, Lord Crewe trusts that Sir E. Grey will reconsider the view that the payment of any damages to Messrs. Wönckhaus should devolve solely upon the Government of India. It is true that the action of the resident in prompting the sheikh to cancel the oxide concession was taken without previous application for Sir E. Grey's concurrence. But, though your department was kept fully informed of the course of events (see enclosures in this Office letters of the 25th March, 15th June, and 26th July, 1907), not only was no exception taken to the resident's action, but Sir E. Grey approved the proposals made by the Government of India as a direct result of that action (Foreign Office letter of the 6th August 1907), and the telegram of the 30th August, 1907, to the Government of India authorising the removal of Hassan's workmen from the island was sent with his concurrence. In any case the consideration which should, in Lord Crewe's opinion, determine the question of the apportionment of damages is the object with which the action of the Indian Government was taken. That object, as stated in the Foreign Office printed minute of the 4th February, 1910, was of a political character, viz., to prevent Germany from getting a foothold in Abu Musa, an island which was believed to be suitable for a coaling station. It is evident, therefore, that important Imperial as well as Indian interests were at stake, and Lord Crewe would strongly urge that whatever expenditure may ultimately be incurred should be equally divided between the British and Indian Governments. In this connection, I am to refer to the letter of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, dated the 5th August, 1909, enclosed in your letter dated the 13th August, 1909, wherein the opinion was expressed that the question of the charge of expenditure incurred in regard to places in the Persian Gulf, though not on the Persian littoral, "should be considered on the merits of each individual case."

7. It seems relevant also to observe that the German Government have throughout dealt with the case as one affecting foreign relations between themselves and the Government of His Majesty.

8. As regards the length of time that has been spent in replying to that Government's notes, I am to observe that, from the diversity of the issues raised, an enormous amount of labour has been imposed on all concerned, and especially on the political resident in the Gulf. The German reply to the British memorandum of the 10th July, 1908, was itself dated the 4th December, 1909, nearly a year and a-half after the receipt of the British note.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

[5001] No. 91.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 15. Confidential.)

Rome, February 1, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 11 and 12 of the 28th and 30th ultimo respectively, I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me last night about recent incidents which have arisen between this country and Turkey with great frankness. As regards the seizure of a dhow from Massowah in the neighbourhood of Hodeidah, he said, much criticism had been directed against himself in Italy for not taking a stronger line, but he was bound to acknowledge that little doubt existed in his mind that the dhow in question was, as the Turkish authorities had maintained, engaged in contraband. In the first place, on the Yemen coast contraband trade was the principal occupation of the inhabitants, and, in the second place, the circumstances under which the dhow was apprehended were so suspicious as to be almost conclusive. The investigation of the whole matter by a joint commission was therefore as much as he felt entitled to ask for.

As regards the Tripoli incident, it had a very different colour. It was imperative that some immediate steps should be taken owing to the ferment which the reappearance in Tripoli of the expelled Guzman had created. There was imminent danger of rioting between the native partisans of Guzman, whom he suspected to be a renegade Italian, and the Europeans against whom his libellous writings were directed, and a situation might at any moment have arisen which would have led to very serious consequences. Rifaat Pasha had appreciated the gravity of the position, and had ordered the re-expulsion of Guzman, whom the new vali had allowed to return; but unfortunately the cable communication via Malta with Barbary was interrupted, and, although Rifaat Pasha's instructions had been transmitted by three different routes, they had as yet not heard of their being safely delivered.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

[5148] No. 92.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, February 12, 1911.*

IN continuation of my telegram No. 31 of the 10th instant, His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, telegraphing under yesterday's date, informs me that there is no truth in the newspaper reports of atrocities in the Yemen.

[5200] No. 93.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 78.)

Constantinople, February 2, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, reporting on the measures taken to prevent brigandage in the neighbourhood of Smyrna.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosue in No. 93.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 7.)

Smyrna, January 30, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that, in view of rumours that a revival of brigandage in the neighbourhood of Smyrna may be expected shortly, the commandant of the Aidin Regiment of Gendarmery has established posts on the roads connecting

Smyrna with the villages where most of the Europeans reside, and arranged that the roads shall be patrolled at night by gendarmes both mounted and on foot, and that a force of sixty men shall be held in readiness to be sent in pursuit of brigands should an emergency arise.

It has been also decided to connect the gendarmery guard-houses between the villages and the city by telephone, and residents are to be invited to share in the expense of creating this service on the understanding that they shall be allowed to use it themselves.

It is hoped that these measures will create that atmosphere of security which is so much needed, especially by the residents of Bournabat, who have known no peace of mind since the attempt made in November 1909 to carry off Mr. Eric Paterson.

Nothing has been heard of brigandage in this district since last October, when a band of Greeks passing from Greece to this coast was captured at the Island of Psara.

I have, &c.

HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[5201] No. 94.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 79.)

Constantinople, February 3, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to Mr. Marling's despatch No. 27 of the 11th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, reporting on the organisation and influence of the Committee of Union and Progress in that vilayet.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 94.

Consul McGregor to Mr. Marling.

(No. 3. Confidential.)

Erzeroum, January 21, 1911.

Sir,

THE recent publication in the "Azadamart," a Tashnakist journal appearing at Constantinople, of the political programme supposed to have been adopted at the Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress at Salonica—a document which has doubtless been brought to your notice ere this—affords me an opportunity of submitting a few remarks on the present standing of the committee in this district.

While the committee has adherents in almost every important town its chief centre of activity in this province is Erzeroum, where it possesses a club consisting of nearly 700 members—three or four of whom are Armenians—as well as a school frequented by about 100 Moslem boys.

The leading personality in the club is the Bash Mudir (director) of the Public Debt, Nazim Bey, a Dunmé of Salonica, and a man of considerable intelligence, tolerable education, and thinly veiled chauvinistic opinions, who, in conjunction with Galib Bey, director of the Post Office, may be said to be the moving spirit of the local administration, his ascendency over the vali being notoriously complete. The other members of the club are mainly officials and local notables, whose opinions are of no account, most of them having joined more from motives of expediency than from any zeal for, or clear apprehension of, the aims of the society, as Nazim Bey has himself admitted to me. While non-official members contribute voluntarily, all Government employés pay 2 per cent. of their salaries towards the funds, and any official declining to become a member is treated as a "blackleg." Among the latter is the defterdar, perhaps the one high official of any real capacity for his duties.

As regards the standing of the committee in the estimation of the inhabitants generally, it may be said that, thanks to the efforts made by the younger regimental officers to establish a personal influence over the troops, it is regarded with mingled fear and mistrust by all, both Moslems and Christians; for, although from considerations of policy, it has come to terms with the Tashnaksutiun, the latter, which have never represented more than an unimportant, if noisy, section of the Armenian population, is daily losing its prestige, partly on account of its relations with the committee, and

partly on account of the growing reluctance of the Armenians to subscribe to a society which has, so far, given them no palpable return for their money.

It is difficult to see how, without heavy sacrifices of principle, the committee is to lull the increasing mistrust of the Armenians, and for the moment there is no indication that it is making any progress in that direction; but, on the other hand, it would appear that more marked outward respect for Moslem religious observances, coupled with exemplary repression of any flagrant infringement of traditional usages on the part of officials, is being resorted to in order to reassure the fanatical Moslem populace. As an instance, I may quote the fact that the higher officials and the committee leaders, although in many cases avowedly untrammeled by religious convictions, are now more regular than heretofore in their attendance at mosque, and that an employé in the Post Office who was convicted of having broken his fast during Ramazan was beaten in accordance with a sentence pronounced by the cadi. Another example of the tendency to tolerate even a dangerous fanaticism is afforded by the fact, well known to the authorities, that the burial-place of a Turkish soldier hanged last spring for the murder of several persons, including an Armenian, has now become a regular place of pilgrimage, the earth from the spot being considered an infallible specific against all maladies.

The congress at Salonica was attended by Nazim Bey, and since his return it has become evident that greater activity is being displayed to establish the committee's influence.

Nazim Bey brought with him the sum of £T. 800, which, with a promised donation of £T. 200 from the Sultan, is to be devoted to the building of a school-house; and, on the occasion of a meeting held to afford the members an opportunity of hearing their delegate's report on the proceedings of the congress, the vali made his first appearance at the club and was enrolled as an ordinary member.

I should also mention that Nazim Bey called lately on the Russian consul-general, in whose company I happened to be, and was at some pains to convince us that the unauthorised accounts of the congress published in certain newspapers were "inventés de toutes pièces." Neither of us entered into any discussion on the point, and the conversation was confined to ordinary topics.

As far as I can gather, the appearance in print of the committee's programme has come to the Armenians less as a surprise than as a confirmation of suspicions long entertained respecting the real tendencies of the constitutional régime. The temporising policy of the Government with regard to the agrarian question, as well as the attempts repeatedly made—and repeatedly repulsed—during the last few weeks to disregard the Armenian ecclesiastical authorities as the recognised channel of communication between the Department of Public Instruction and the Armenian schools, would, indeed, seem to justify these apprehensions, and the bishop recently summed up his forebodings by saying to me: "Sous le régime hamidien on torturait les corps, tandis qu'à présent on veut tuer les âmes."

A question which suggests itself, but which cannot at present be answered, is how long the alliance between the Tashnakists and the committee will last. I understand that some of the former are beginning to realise the precariousness of their position between a reactionary Turkish committee and the mass of their fellow-countrymen, who, in this province at least, display no readiness to welcome the anti-clerical and subversive doctrines of the Tashnaksutiun. Another feature in the situation is the revival of the Hinchak organisation, which, although it likewise cannot be considered representative of Armenian opinion, has a much larger following among the rural population than the Tashnaksutiun, and does not seem to be hostile to the national institutions embodied in the Armenian Church. The rivalry between the two societies is on the increase, and the fact that both have now founded clubs at Erzeroum bodes ill for the peace of the community, the majority of which, however, still appears to regard the National Church as the most trustworthy champion of national interests.

With regard to the Kurds, who form the overwhelming majority of the Moslem rural population, I gather that they are altogether beyond the influence of the committee, and are merely watching the course of events with unabated loyalty to their chiefs, and in this connection it is interesting to observe the distinction drawn by many intelligent Armenians between the Kurd and the Turk. The latter is invariably stigmatised as the *fons et origo mali*, while the former is spoken of with something akin to indulgence as an erring but not irretrievably depraved kinsman, with whom, under happier circumstances, it would be quite possible to live on good terms.

In concluding this despatch, I should add that it was intimated to me yesterday on behalf of the Union and Progress Club that a visit from me to their premises would

give much satisfaction. I have, in reply, given it to be understood that, although flattered by the attention, I am precluded, in virtue of my official position, from associating myself in any way with a party organisation.

I have, &c.

P. J. C. McGREGOR.

[5203] No. 95.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 81.)

Sir, *Pera, February 5, 1911.*

THE "Times" of the 28th ultimo printed an article entitled "Turkey and Koweit" from a correspondent, the object of which appeared to be to prove that the Sheikh of Koweit was an independent ruler, and that the suzerainty of Turkey did not extend to Koweit, and that Great Britain possessed a preferential position there.

Whether the publication of this article at this moment, when the deepest suspicions as to our action in the Persian Gulf have been aroused, was judicious is questionable, but in any case the arguments brought forward in the article do not appear to be very convincing, and it has elicited a long reply from the pen of Hussein Djahid, a translation of which I have the honour to enclose.

The article is moderate in tone, and the writer appeals to Lord Curzon's work, "Persia and the Persian Gulf," for evidence in support of his contentions, although in one portion of the article he contests our rights to use the evidence of British officials in support of our claims, while he himself quotes the work of the son of Midhat Pasha in support of the Turkish view.

He cites various passages from the pen of Lord Curzon, which appear from reference to the work to be accurately given, and which are in support of Turkey's claim from Ujair to Fao.

The writer briefly states the nature of the arrangements concluded between the old régime in Turkey and the British Government, and concludes by deprecating a continuance of the *status quo*, and expresses a hope for the definite settlement of the Koweit question by friendly and benevolent discussion.

The general impression here seems to be that the "Times" article instead of strengthening our case rather reveals some of its weak points.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 95.

Extract from the "Tanin" of February 3, 1911.

(Translation.)

Koweit.

BABANZADE ISMAIL HAKKI'S reference to Koweit as a kaimakamlik (Turkish canton), and our statement that in Ottoman eyes Koweit is Ottoman territory, have called forth a long article in the "Times" of the 28th January.

It will be seen that the object of that article is to prove that even Ottoman suzerain rights over Koweit, not to speak of the rights of sovereignty, are doubtful.

As we said before, it is natural for the Ottoman Government to admit that England has certain rights in the Persian Gulf; but it is clear that Turkey could never consent to have indisputable Ottoman rights and interests trampled underfoot.

The Ottoman rights over Koweit belong to this order. Midhat Pasha's memoirs clearly show that during his governor-generalship of Bagdad, Koweit was closely connected with the Ottoman Government as a kaimakamlik with certain privileges and exemptions. Moreover, whereas, until then, Koweit seamen had used some foreign flags, they adopted the Ottoman flag; and the fact that they have lived under it ever since and that Sheikh Mubarak is called to-day a "pasha," a title belonging exclusively to Turkey, is the most decisive evidence that the Ottoman sovereignty has continued without interruption. The acquisition by Koweit of certain privileges and exemptions is no proof that Ottoman sovereignty over Koweit ever lapsed; leaving Koweit out of the question, there are places in all parts of the Ottoman dominions

which have become more or less privileged; and their exceptional position has never meant the lapse of Ottoman sovereign rights.

In examining the nature of the relation between Koweit and the Turkish Government, the "Times" quotes the evidence of certain officers in the service of the Indian Government. This does not appear to us quite in accordance with legal methods. For since England is the plaintiff, it is scarcely right that the witnesses for the plaintiff should be English. Nevertheless, their statements all confirm the relation between Koweit and Turkey, and not one of them contains anything to prove that England has any rights over Koweit; they speak of allowances made to the Sheikh of Koweit and of the duties laid upon him. Are not these all proofs of the existence of Ottoman sovereign rights?

While mentioning these proofs the "Times" claims that not one of them shows that tribute has ever been paid by the Sheikh of Koweit to the Ottoman Government. Now, although we have questioned the right of supporting an English claim by English witnesses, we have such confidence in English sincerity and uprightness that we will call an English witness to establish our rights. We do not doubt that this witness will be accepted with confidence by the "Times," for it is Lord Curzon, late Governor-General of India, and a man famed for his knowledge of the Persian Gulf.

Fifteen years ago Lord Curzon wrote a book entitled "Persia and the Persian Gulf." We will content ourselves with quoting some details about Koweit from pp. 462 and 463 of the second volume.

Lord Curzon says that Ujair Harbour may be taken as the southern boundary of the territory on the El Katif coast of Turkey, and that northwards from that point the influence and sovereignty of the Ottoman Government runs and is established without dispute as far as Fao.

As it is possible that we misconstrue this passage, we reproduce it here in the original:—

"Northwards from that place the Ottoman dominion is established without dispute as far as Fao."

On the question of payment of tribute, to which the "Times" attaches so much importance, Lord Curzon gives evidence in favour of Turkey, he says:—

"Koweit is now considered as dependent on the villayet of Bussorah, and pays its share of tribute to Bussorah."

This passage also we reproduce in English:—

"Koweit now nominally forms part of the villayet of Bussorah, to which it pays tribute."

It is interesting to note that a little earlier in his book Lord Curzon admits that in 1820–21 the British official in the Persian Gulf, being annoyed at some act on the part of the Vali of Bagdad, moved to Koweit, and explains that this proves Koweit to be Ottoman territory, for if Koweit had not been considered as Ottoman territory there would be no meaning in the action of the British official accredited to the Ottoman Government in going and taking up his residence there.

We will not seek any other arguments on this point, for Lord Curzon's words afford a crushing answer to the "Times."

As to the present position of the question, the Indian Government, taking advantage of the weakness and impotence of the new régime, has worked to extend its influence in the Persian Gulf, and has tried to take the Sheikh of Koweit under its protection. Diplomatic correspondence took place on this point between Turkey and England, and ended, if we remember right, in 1901. The old régime preferred, as it always did, to settle the question temporarily; but there is not one of the points which the old régime clearly accepted, or seemed to accept, which could warrant the claim in the "Times" about not deserting our friends and allies in the Persian Gulf; for what England wanted of Turkey in 1901 was not the dispatch of troops to Koweit and to respect the *status quo*, and England undertook not to occupy Koweit or establish a protectorate over Koweit. Finally the Ottoman Government did not even recognise the British official as consul, and gave him no exequatur; in 1904 the Ottoman Government complained of England's sending a political official to Koweit, and thereupon England stated that the person in question was not a political official, but was being sent to the sheikh temporarily to carry out certain negotiations.

This will suffice to show the Ottoman point of view. By treaty and by law Koweit is Ottoman territory, and to-day it lives under the Ottoman flag. England made an undertaking with the Ottoman Government not to claim a right of protection over Koweit; but on the other hand the Ottoman Government consented not to send troops to Koweit and not to disturb the *status quo*.

But the continuance of this state of things will be bad both with regard to the projected Bagdad–Bussorah Railway and to the maintenance of order in Mesopotamia; so we hope that the Koweit question will be definitely settled as the result of friendly and benevolent discussion between Turkey and England. We will respect England's rights in the Persian Gulf, and in return we expect a friendly and law-abiding attitude from England in respecting indisputable Ottoman rights such as those over the Persian Gulf.

[5206] No. 96.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 84.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 7, 1911.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 22 of the 23rd ultimo, I have ascertained from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah that no customs exemption has been granted for the vessels of the Turkish steamer administration since the new régime, the steam-ships "Bagdad" and "Basra," which were imported in 1908, and a small steamer now building for the Euphrates having been subjected to customs duties.

In these circumstances I venture to submit that it would be of no use to press for the remission of customs duties on the steam-ship "Julnar."

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[5210] No. 97.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 88.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 8, 1911.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 77 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a note which I have addressed to the Sublime Porte, informing them of the claims for compensation made by British subjects in consequence of illegal demolitions and expropriations at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 97.

Note Verbale communicated to Sublime Porte by Sir G. Lowther.

HIS Britannic Majesty's Embassy has the honour to state, with reference to the *note verbale* to the Sublime Porte of the 8th January last, that a full report of the estimated losses suffered by British subjects at Bagdad, Kadhimain, and Kerbela, owing to the action of the local Turkish authorities in regard to demolitions and expropriations, has now been received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad.

The total amount of the compensation which His Majesty's consul-general considers, after careful valuation and consultation of expert opinion, due to British subjects is £ T. 5,400, made up as follows:—

	£ T.
Bagdad—	
Cost of reconstruction	3,117·28½
Value of land	1,115·27
Incidental losses	632·56
Kadhimain—	
Cost of reconstruction	89·36
Kerbela—	
Cost of reconstruction	369·50½
Value of land and incidental losses	76·02
Total	5,400·00

His Majesty's Embassy would be glad to receive from the Sublime Porte a definite assurance of the readiness of the Ottoman Government to meet these claims, the justice of which has already been set forth in the *note verbale* from His Majesty's Embassy already referred to.

His Majesty's Embassy will be happy to supply the detailed figures of the sums quoted above for examination by the Sublime Porte, but it is to be noted that the claims now submitted do not go beyond the 19th December last, and His Majesty's Embassy reserve the right to add any further claims for illegal demolitions and expropriations subsequent to that date, should such cases arise.

Pera, February 8, 1911.

[5211] No. 98.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 89.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 7, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 64 of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to report that, according to a telegram of yesterday's date which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, the position in the Yemen is stationary, and but little authentic information can be obtained as to the progress of affairs in that province.

The epidemic of cholera which had broken out among the expeditionary troops, who have recently been reinforced by the arrival of 1,200 regulars, is reported to be decreasing.

On the other hand, the insurgents are said to have taken the heights which command the access to Menekha (about half-way between Hodeidah and Sana'a), so as to intercept the advance of the Turkish forces on the latter place.

A suggestion was made to me by Mr. Vice-Consul Richardson in his telegram that, should I see no objection, an attaché from His Majesty's Residency at Aden might be deputed to follow the Turkish operations against the rebels, but, as such a proposal would raise considerable suspicion, coming from this embassy, and would certainly be rejected by the Porte, I do not propose to mention the matter to the Ottoman Government unless and until other Powers express a desire to send officers to the Yemen, and I have accordingly informed Mr. Richardson that his suggestion cannot be entertained.

I have the honour to enclose a summary of an article in yesterday's "Tanin" by Ismail Hakki Bey, the burden of which is that the various risings against the new régime have only served to prove its strength, and a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, received to-day, reporting on the situation up to the 13th ultimo.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 98.

Summary of Article by Ismail Hakki in the "Tanin" of February 6, 1911.

THE YEMEN AND PUBLIC OPINION ABROAD.

THE "Temps" has been saying that the rising in the Yemen is the result of the policy of severity pursued by the Young Turks. Now every impartial person can testify to the mildness with which the constitutional régime has ruled the country, the Yemen in particular: large arrears of taxes have been wiped out, laws have been applied in accordance with local wishes, and upright officials have replaced the men who were draining the country dry.

Then there are other papers which regard the rising as a sign of weakness on the part of the Government, which they consider to be at the edge of a precipice. They ask what would happen if another revolt broke out elsewhere, say, in Anatolia, or if foreign complications arose. In most of these cases the wish is father to the thought, the idea being to show us an easy prey. However, we can assure those who are sharpening the teeth of covetousness that the three revolts which the Ottoman

Government has been obliged to suppress in one year are a sign, not that the Government is weak, but that it is very vigorous, and their speedy suppression proves what resources the Government possesses. There were many rebellions under the old régime, but they were all against abuses and illegal actions; but now the risings are against constitutionalism and to prevent the Government from becoming strong and well organised. It is natural—nay, inevitable—that a great revolution should cause some reaction.

We trust that the Yemen revolt will be the last futile attempt of those who are pursuing vain aims and imaginings. If those who strive with impure hands to make a breach in the unity of the Ottoman Caliphate are not content with this attempt, and continue their agitation, they will find themselves face to face with a force of steel. One of the lessons we learn from the French revolution is to face internal disasters fearlessly.

As to external troubles, it must be admitted that some people are in despair at seeing the Ottoman Government become really strong. Indeed, we may say that we meet with stronger hostility merely on account of our constitutionalism. When the walls appeared to be collapsing under the old régime, people were content to wait; but they see that waiting is no good now that the walls have been repaired, so they are setting to work with axe and spade.

Thanks be to heaven, however, all that is only bluff. Perhaps part of Europe is girding on its sword to march against us; but political and geographical reasons will compel another part of Europe to throw cold water on the flame; and in this balance the might of our own sword is not without weight.

This article was called forth by the "Allgemeine Zeitung's" answer to those who are publishing nonsense about the situation in our country. In our article we have somewhat developed the optimism shown by that paper.

Enclosure 2 in No. 98.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Mr. Marling.

(No. 3/E.)

Sir, *Hodeidah, January* 13, 1911.

SINCE my despatch No. 37/E of the 15th December last was submitted the situation in this vilayet has become worse, and there appears to be every probability for the necessity in the near future of military operations on a large scale against both the Imam Seyyid Yahya, in the mountains, and the pretender Seyyid Mahomed El-Idrisee, in the Tehama.

About the 25th December news was received here that the notorious Boni Pasha, at one time the principal sheikh in the Zaidyia district, had escaped from Sana'a and had joined the Imam Yahya's standard. It will be recalled that Boni Pasha was responsible for the greater part of the trouble in the Zaidyia and Wayidat districts last winter and was, on the demand of Seyyid Mahomed El-Idrisee, called by the Governor-General to Sana'a, where he has been under detention ever since.

In former Zeidi revolts in the Yemen, Boni Pasha, however unscrupulous, has proved of great assistance to the Turks in repelling incursions into the El-Hujjur district by adherents of the Imam, and also in pushing up supplies and facilitating the movements of troops from Hodeidah in that direction.

It would now appear that he will be entrusted by Seyyid Yahya, with whose assistance he effected his escape from Sana'a, to harass the Turks in the Hujjur kaza.

At the same time other bands have appeared in various quarters in the mountains.

For instance, Seyyid Abdulla-bin-Ibrahim, one of Seyyid Yahya's trusty lieutenants and his principal adviser, who, it might be remembered, conducted the negotiations at Constantinople in 1909 between the Porte and the Imam with reference to the future administration of this province, has, with a strong following, appeared in the Ta'iz district, where he will head the rebellion. The latter area will be familiar ground to him, as he conducted the operations against the Turks there in the revolt of 1905.

At Yerim, one Seyyid Aboo Naib is urging the strong Zeidi element to rise in insurrection, whereas Shereef Abdulla Dhumain, formerly an officer in the Ottoman army in the Yemen, has proceeded to the Anis country to take charge of the rebellious movement there.

The famous Ali Mikdad, whose name is very familiar in the history of the Turkish military operations in the vilayet of Yemen, has, I learn, already arrived

at the outskirts of Djebel Reima and induced the tribesmen to take sides with the Imam Yahya.

The acting kaimakam of the above district has sent an urgent appeal to the Hodeidah authorities for reinforcements, but in the state of affairs existing at present generally throughout the vilayet they find it impossible to comply with his request.

About a week ago news was received here of an engagement between the Turks and Arabs in the Summara mountains near Yerim, in which the former had, amongst other casualties, a major and two junior officers killed, and lost a Maxim, which fell into the hands of the insurgents. Further, that assistance arrived from Sana'a and that the Arabs were put to flight.

This information, however, has not as yet been confirmed. The local authorities admit that some fighting recently took place with the rebels near Suk-el-Khamis, but furnish no details of the result.

The veteran Nasir Mabkoth, who has on several occasions in previous upheavals in this province defeated the Turkish troops in the kaza of El-Hujjeh, has, I also learn, taken the field there once more and is busy engaged mustering the clans.

Telegraphic communication between the Yemen and the outer world has been completely cut off since the beginning of this year. The Hodeidah–Sheik–Said line has been cut by the Zerencek tribesmen near Beit-el-Fakih since November last, and telegrams have been received and dispatched from Hodeidah by the Sana'a–Bab–El-Mandeb line viâ Ta'iz and Mokha up to about a week ago, when the insurgents interrupted communication between Suk-el-Khamis and Sana'a and between the latter and Ta'iz. Since then telegraphic communication has been hopelessly interrupted throughout the vilayet.

The post that left this for Sana'a some eight days ago under a strong convoy has been unable to proceed further than Suk-el-Khamis, owing to the massing of the rebels in great strength between that place and the capital.

It is freely rumoured here that Sana'a is actually invested in the Imam's followers, but the authorities here are remarkably reticent on the subject.

As far as I can ascertain, there are about eight battalions of infantry and nine batteries of field and horse artillery and a number of big guns in the capital, which is well provisioned and has an ample stock of munitions of war.

The situation in the province of Assyr continues to cause the local authorities grave concern.

The capital, Abha, where there is a garrison under the mutessarif, General Suleiman Pasha, is still under siege, and strong Arab bands professing allegiance to the pretender Seyyid Mahomed El-Idrisee are active between the capital and the littoral, as also in the Sabyeah district.

The above-mentioned seyyid, who, it may be recalled, came to an understanding last winter with the Ottoman Government through their representative at Cumfuda, General Seyyid Pasha, has now become dissatisfied owing to the non-execution of the reforms in both the sanjak of Assyr that were promised him, as well as in his sphere of influence generally in the northern half of the Tehama in the Yemen. He (the Seyyid) has become suspicious of the motives of the Ottoman Government with reference to Assyr.

General Seyyid Pasha, referred to above, who has now been nominated Commander and Mutessarif of the Assyr sanjak, reached Cumfuda about three weeks ago, but has not been able to get up to Abha owing to the hostility of the tribesmen in the interior. He (Seyyid Pasha) embarked on board of an Ottoman gun-boat at Cumfuda and proceeded to Geezan with a view to interviewing the Seyyid Idrisee at Sabyeah. An intermediary, a certain Khoja Tewfiq, referred to in my despatch No. 25/E of the 29th November, 1909, was sent to the latter place to arrange a meeting with the pretender, but who, I hear, has declined to receive General Seyyid Pasha before the acceptance of certain preposterous demands made by him.

Amongst the latter are, I am informed, one for the immediate demolition of the Turkish forts and karagols recently established along the Assyr littoral, and another for the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from his (the Idrisee's) sphere of influence, where he undertakes to maintain order and tranquillity with 1,000 Turkish troops which he has asked to be placed at his disposal.

On the 11th instant General Seyyid Pasha arrived here in the Turkish gun-boat "Yozgat," with the object of communicating by telegraph with the central authorities at Constantinople. This however, he now finds is hopelessly impossible from Hodeidah.

The kaimakam of Aboo Arisch has recently reported to the Hodeidah mutessarillik

about the activity and restlessness of the tribesmen in that locality, and similar accounts have reached the same quarter from the Zaidyia kaza.

It is generally expected that thirty-six battalions of regular infantry with proportionate artillery and cavalry units will shortly arrive from Constantinople to establish tranquillity in this vilayet.

Yesterday, Ibrahim Pasha, the newly-appointed Mutessarif of Hodeidah, *vice* Mahir Bey dismissed, arrived here by the Khedevial mail steamer.

It is rumoured that the present Governor-General and Commander-in-chief, General Mahomed Ali Pasha, will be replaced by a senior and more experienced officer.

I have, &c.
G. A. RICHARDSON.

[5214] No. 99.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 92.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 8, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 70 of the 29th January, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mersina, reporting that the nervousness at Adana is now subsiding.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 99.

Vice-Consul Keun to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Mersina, January 28, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2 of the 21st instant, and following the incidents therein related, the Governor-General of Adana, under his signature, published an article in the local paper, the "Aintoli," qualifying these adverts the puerile doings of irresponsible parties, exhorting everybody to quiet and peace, and declaring that the breakers of good order in the town would be severely dealt with.

At the same time, he expressed his astonishment that people among the "thinking classes" should have displayed such lack of "thinking capacity" in this instance by giving these last incidents any other significance than the childish nature they purport. I believe this comment to be a hit at the French, German, American, and Russian consuls, who had gone up to Adana to enquire into the matter.

Adana is perfectly quiet at present, the uneasiness of the population gradually wearing out, and I hear from persons who have lately returned from the interior of this vilayet that thorough good fellowship reigns everywhere.

I have, &c.
F. G. KEUN.

[4076] No. 100.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 40.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 13, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 122 of the 23rd April, 1910, relative to the Samsun–Sivas Railway, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of correspondence on this subject which has passed between Lord Denbigh and this department.*

I request your Excellency to endeavour to ascertain what the situation is with regard to the Russian Government's intentions as to supporting M. de Lamornaix's group at Constantinople. If that group has retired and the Russian Government have no objection, His Majesty's Government are prepared to support the Faxine and Marmora Development Syndicate at Constantinople in their endeavours to obtain the concession for the construction of the railway.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Nos. 27, 56, 76, and 79.

[5567] No. 101.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 12. Commercial.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 14, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 11, Commercial, a report has been received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad stating that the final form of contract with Eady was signed by the vali yesterday.

[5356] No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 46.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 16, 1911.*

THE Turkish Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 8th instant that a Turkish cruiser would cruise in the Red Sea to prevent the importation of arms into Yemen. He was instructed to express the hope that His Majesty's Government would, as on former occasions, give their good offices to assist in the prevention of illicit importation.

Sir A. Nicolson asked Tewfik Pasha to communicate to me a memorandum in writing on this subject, and he expressed the hope that the Turkish cruiser in the course of its operations would be careful not to interfere with any British vessel or boat, as otherwise trouble would ensue.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[6078] No. 103.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, February 19, 1911.*

YEMEN. His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah reports that a force of 4,000 men left Hodeidah on the 7th to relieve Menekha, which is being actively besieged and whose situation is said to be critical. Dr. Richardson adds that there is some anxiety felt for Sana'a, that Ibb is invested, and that Yerim and Anis and Damar have fallen.

[6158] No. 104.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 93.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 10, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van respecting the proceedings of three "inspectors" of the Committee of Union and Progress. Captain Molyneux-Seel's preceding despatch has not been received. I have telegraphed to him, and will forward to you a copy of the despatch as soon as it arrives.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 104.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Mr. Marling.

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Van, January 23, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1, I have the honour to submit herewith further details.

Soon after the date of my previous despatch strained relations arose between Kara Bey and his colleagues. The latter, commencing to doubt the good faith of Kara

Bey on account of his intimacy with my Russian colleague, endeavoured to obtain the surrender into their charge of certain documents, seals, and moneys. Unsuccessful in this, they threatened his life. All three sent telegrams to Constantinople. Kara Bey received a reply confirming him in the charge of the money, documents, &c., and saying that if he could "do nothing" at Van he should return to Constantinople. The acting vali is said also to have received an official telegram directing him to facilitate the immediate return of Kara Bey to Constantinople.

At this stage, Kara Bey, as a Russian subject, sought the protection of the Russian vice-consulate. This was denied him on the grounds of his being a revolutionist. My Russian colleague, however, promised to facilitate his secret escape to Russia, and meanwhile he took refuge with his fellow-revolutionists, the Armenian Tashnakists. A few days later Kara Bey and Abdul Kadir accidentally met in the street, and both drew their revolvers, but were prevented from firing on each other by their respective companions.

During the course of long conversations with my Russian colleague, Kara Bey gave the following information, which, in view of his quarrel with his comrades and his fear for his life, the necessity of his obtaining the assistance of the Russian vice-consul for his escape, and his alleged intention of permanently quitting the arena of Turkish politics, appear worthy of a certain amount of credence.

It would appear then that all three of these "inspectors" are members of a secret Pan-Islamic society, of which Talaat Bey is the president. This society receives annually an allotment of money from the secret fund, and, including other sources, is well supplied with money. For this particular mission Kara Bey received, roughly, 800*l.*, and had orders to proceed with his two companions to Tehran. Thence he was to proceed alone by the Seistan route to India, communicating *en route* with the Pan-Islamic emissaries in Afghanistan. The return journey to be made viâ Cashmere and Turkestan. During the journey to Van the various Kurd tribes have been told to prepare for war with Russia.

Fire-arms and ammunition for use in the interests of Pan-Islamism when the occasion shall arise, after being purchased in Germany, are forwarded to Trebizond, and thence viâ Erzeroum and Bayazid to Tabreez. Here they are divided up and dispatched by three separate routes, two leading into Turkestan, and the third viâ Seistan to Afghanistan and the Indian frontier. The Persian Gulf route is no longer used for this purpose.

Kara Bey is in the possession of many documents extremely compromising in the eyes of the English and Russian Governments, all of which he has shown to my Russian colleague.

One of these commences with the admonition that should any person take these documents from his possession he (the former) should be immediately killed, whether he be a Turkish or a foreign subject, and the papers recovered.

Kara Bey has now, with the aid of the Russian vice-consul, secretly left for Russia, and on arrival in Russian territory will doubtless be relieved of all interesting documents. Hilmi Bey has gone to Serai and Abdul Kadir for the present remains here.

Kara Bey before his departure left a testament with my Russian colleague, in which he explains his reasons of disagreement with his companions and loss of sympathy with Turkish ambitions, declares his intention of remaining quietly in Russia and abstaining from politics, and that should he be killed *en route* to Russia by Kurds or others his murderers will be Hilmi Bey and Abdul Kadir, the object having been to obtain possession of the compromising documents on his person. He ends by making provision for his family in the eventuality of his death.

I have, &c.
L. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[6161] No. 105.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 97.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 13, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 81 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a telegram which was despatched on the 28th ultimo by the Ottoman Embassy in London to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the "Times" article of the 23rd ultimo dealing with British relations with Koweit.

This telegram, which I have procured confidentially, seems to show Tewfik Pasha's anxiety lest the "Times" article should provoke a sharp and polemical rejoinder from the pen of Hussein Jahid, and it probably accounts to a certain extent for the "Tanin's" studiously moderate and reasonable article on the subject.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 105.

Tewfik Pasha to the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.) *London, January 28, 1911.*

THERE is an important article in to-day's "Times" explaining the treaty concluded on the 23rd January, 1899, by Mubarek-as-Sabah, Kaimakam of Koweit with the political officer sent by Lord Curzon, the late Viceroy of India, and showing the reasons for the treaty and what led up to it. The article suffices to show what objects are being aimed at by England in the Persian Gulf and Turkish Irak. I therefore think it my duty to tell you that it is necessary to give such orders as will prevent the "Tanin" and other Turkish papers from raking up such questions by publishing that article in full and will prevent difficulties being raised against the future of the Ottoman Empire and its present affairs; and I would add that the necessary steps should be taken to keep England in a good humour.

[6162] No. 106.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 98.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 14, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 712 of the 7th October last in regard to the murder of a German subject in the neighbourhood of Haiffa, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout, reporting on the trial of the accused, as a result of which one man was condemned to death and the others to different periods of imprisonment.

With regard to the death sentence, which, as you will observe, was only obtained owing to the influence of the German consul-general at Beirout, I understand that there is no appeal properly so-called, but the sentences must be confirmed by the Court of Cassation, which may in the alternative order a new trial. The Chief Prosecutor and the Court of Cassation are not as a rule very ready to endorse death sentences, and in a case of this kind, when it must have been very hard to prove any premeditation, one might expect to see the sentence quashed unless unusual influence is brought to bear. In any case the proceedings in Constantinople will take some time, as I understand that the matter will have to be referred to the Sheikh-ul-Islam, as is generally the case when the capital penalty is imposed.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 106.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Beirout, February 2, 1911.*

WITH reference to Mr. Acting Consul-General Young's No. 39 of the 22nd July on the subject of the murder of a German subject named Fritz Ungar at Haiffa last August, I have the honour to report that after several delays, due first to the non-arrival of members of the court and afterwards to the non-appearance of important witnesses, the trial of the Moslem murderer and his accomplices terminated at Tripoli on the 24th January in the six following sentences: one man was condemned to death, one to fifteen years' imprisonment, one to four years, and three to three years.

It is generally believed that the death penalty would not have been secured had it not been for the active part taken in the proceedings by the German consul at Beirout, under special instructions from Berlin. M. Padel's knowledge of Turkish and the

practical experience gained by him as dragoman at the embassy made him independent of a dragoman both in following the trial in its various stages and in the subsequent deliberations, which were long and serious.

It would appear that the president of the court was reluctant to pass the sentence of death, but he gave way on M. Padel's threatening to refuse to sign the *procès-verbal* unless there was at least one man condemned to death. The judge was given to understand that if he did not comply with the consul's request the matter would be taken up by the German Embassy, and create difficulties between the two countries

I believe that the German Embassy itself was not very keen at first about insisting upon such heavy sentences, but the German colonists at Haiffa and other parts of Palestine have from the beginning clamoured for the condemnation of the murderer through Berlin and the German press.

I have, &c.
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[6163] No. 107.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 99. Secret and Confidential.)
Sir, *Pera, February 13, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose translation of a report recently presented by Ali Riza Pasha, Turkish Commandant at Medina, concerning the alleged separatist tendencies of Sherif Hussein Pasha, the Emir of Mecca. I have reason to suppose that the copy of the report obtained confidentially is genuine, but this can perhaps be checked by the references to Egypt and the Arab "Nahzé" Society. As Seyyid Idris does not possess the qualities required for the legitimate Caliph, it is somewhat difficult to reconcile the statement that he has been sent to Yemen "to claim the Arab Caliphate," with the implication in the report that the Emir of Mecca is also pursuing the same aim.

In connection with the existing unrest in the Arab world and the rising in Yemen, I have the honour to report that Seyyid Ahmed Kubsi, deputy for Sanaa, in the Ottoman Chamber, and cousin of the Imam Yahya, to-day confidentially approached His Majesty's Embassy with the following statements and proposals.

He said the past experience of the Arabs had proved that, while Turkish rule was exacting, oppressive, and unsympathetic, the English in Aden, Egypt, Koweit, and elsewhere had shown that their methods of government were based on justice, were not burdensome, and were favourable to Arab development; that the Arab, if driven to choose, would consequently prefer English protection to the rule of the Turk; that English prestige was high in the Arab world, and especially in the portions of Arabia directly administered by the Turk; that with the advent of the change of Government in Constantinople in July in 1908 the Arabs had hoped for a betterment of their condition, but that the experience of the last two and a-half years, the policy pursued in Albania, Syria, Yemen, and that contemplated in Mesopotamia, &c., had undeceived them; that he himself, finding the Government in Constantinople unreliable, had become an adherent of the committee, and visited head-quarters at Salonica, but failed to meet anyone who inspired confidence; that the committee, and especially men like Ismail Hakki Babanzade, were now committed to the Germans in connection with the Bagdad Railway and Koweit, and that the moment seemed to be approaching when Germany, allied with the Young Turks, some of whom were in her pay, would begin to enter directly into the life of the Arab, and that what with the Hedjaz Railway on one side and the railway terminating in Koweit on the other, the Arabian Peninsula would be hemmed in; that while the Arabs had reason in the past to like England, what they had heard of the Germans made them loth to see German influence supplant that of England in the Arab world; that from the English stand-point, the present moment seemed to him one of crucial importance in her relations with the Arabs, as the waning of her prestige before that of a third Power would have far-reaching consequences, and what happened in the near future would affect the trend of events in the Near East perhaps for generations; that the policy of the Turks in Yemen had brought matters to a crisis, and the Imam and Seyyid Idris, with both of whom he was in communication, were thinking of the future, and hoped that, in the event of their success and the collapse of Turkish power, England would extend her protection to the Arab cause; that the Turks were planning to get rid of the present Emir of Mecca,

Sherif Hussein, whose dealings with Ibn Reshid and Ibn Saoud, though ostensibly intended to strengthen the Turkish position in Nejd, had really undermined their influence there, but that he (Seyyid Ahmed-al-Kubsi) would upset their schemes, himself resign his mandate as deputy, and return to Yemen viâ Aden and Egypt, if he could be assured that England would take an active interest in the present crisis in the Arabian Peninsula. He went on to explain that, speaking with the authority of the Imam, England would not be expected to give altruistic support, and might wish for some *quid pro quo* in addition to protecting her interests by defeating the designs of the Germans and the Turks to oust England from her position in Koweit and the Persian Gulf, and to turn Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saoud against her; that it had been agreed between the Imam and Shafi Arabs of Southern Yemen that if England would help by arms and money, the Aden Protectorate could be extended so as to comprise the districts of Kataba and Taiz (now besieged by the Imam's followers), "provided the English would rule those districts as they ruled Egypt," *i.e.*, with a light hand. He added that England should also conclude an agreement with Ibn Saoud and Ibn Rashid.

Seyyid Ahmed-al-Kubsi was informed, in reply, that, as he must be aware from the proceedings of the Aden delimitation, which he had followed closely, England had no desires of territorial aggrandisement, and that as she was in friendly relations with the Ottoman Government, there could be no question of her supplying arms and money to the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, while the same reason precluded her from entering into an agreement with Ibn Saoud and Ibn Rashid.

He remarked that the Imam was practically independent, had concluded treaties with the Turks and struck his own coinage, while as regards our alleged inability to conclude an agreement with Ibn Saoud and Ibn Rashid, he failed to see the logic of such an objection, in view of the fact that we had made a convention with the Sheikh of Koweit, who had accepted Ottoman supremacy. He added that he had seen with members of the committee a long list of documents written in the past by Sheikh Mubarek-es-Sabah to the Ottoman authorities acknowledging their supremacy, and that it was the intention of the committee, if necessary, to propose referring the question of Koweit to arbitration, probably to The Hague Court. In parting, he added that the Arabs were thoroughly disgusted with the Turks and their Committee Government, that they must work out their own salvation, but that England was throwing away a golden opportunity that might never recur. He had had experience of the Italians who claimed to have an interest in Yemen, and at one time he had received financial assistance from them, but he had found that their policy is "rotten."

He and other Arabs here feel that the present internal crisis, the threatening situation in Albania and Macedonia, and other considerations will lead the committee to abandon any intention of disarming and thoroughly subduing Yemen, and that they may revert to the idea of according a measure of autonomy to that province by partly recognising the acquired position of the Imam, but that should the Turks decide to proceed to extremities the struggle will be protracted and exhausting, especially to the Young Turks.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 107.

Translation of Copy of Report sealed and signed by Ali Riza Pasha, Muhafiz and Commandant of Medina, and dated December 29, 1910 (*January* 11, 1911), *presented to the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of War.*

[The Letter opens with a quotation from the "hadiss," or traditional sayings of the prophet.]

BASING myself on the sacred traditional sayings quoted above, I wish to speak of the disgraceful conduct of Hussein Pasha, Emir of Mecca. The contents of this report ought to be known to persons of prudence and worth, and to take precedence of other State affairs; for the actions of this man of which I shall speak are proved and all irrefutable. The first act of treachery committed by Hussein Pasha against his faith and country, in order to promote certain foreign aims and objects, was to inform the men and sheikhs of the tribes on the route of the "Damascus Mahmil," with the object of getting the safe conduct of the mahmil entrusted to himself, that the presents of

robes of honour and the allowances had been stopped by the Government. This secret act of treachery and contempt was only the beginning; for the action referred to, which opened a door of success for him to guarantee the safety and security of the pilgrim caravans and to bind the tribes to him, has compelled the Government—and will do so still more in the future—to make great sacrifices. The said tribes, annoyed at the discontinuance of the allowances, have been obliged to solicit the Emir's sympathy and to obey his orders; while he, by this fraud and deception, has succeeded in increasing and extending his influence and power and attaining a position of independence. It is easy to understand that when the Bedouins of the Hedjaz are compelled to rise in revolt from time to time, the Government cannot listen to the Sherif of Mecca's application for its influence and help. My past and future statements consist not of complaints about the sherif, but of a warning to high officials; and the reason for this warning is to inform you that we are on the verge of terrible events which will astound learned and ignorant alike. At first I could not believe and imagine that such a man as he, learned and of good family, would be drawn towards England and give himself up to the idea and aim of seizing the Caliphate from the Ottoman Government and succeeding to it himself; so, until my investigations were complete, I regarded him with sympathy and confidence. I therefore remained between confirming and contradicting the horrible rumours which were noised abroad with regard to the Emir, until the curtain was removed and the dawn of truth appeared. The truth of the rumours of these regrettable attempts has been established quite definitely and become common knowledge, so that no doubt is left in my mind as to their truth.

Sherif Hussein Pasha gave occasional proofs of his ill-will towards the Ottoman Government while he was a member of the Council of State. When Ali Bey was recommended for and appointed to the post of Emir of Mecca on the death of 'Avn-ur-Refik Pasha, Hussein Pasha attempted to go to Egypt. As he has extensive lands and property in Egypt, it is natural to expect him to be drawn and attracted towards England; but for a year or two he has been warmly supported in his plans by the members of the Arab "Nahzé" (?) Revolutionary Society, which was formed in Egypt to bring about the Arab Caliphate, which would entail the assassination of Sherif Hussein Pasha himself in Jeddah, and to conclude the lawsuit begun in the second Emirate of Abd-ul-Matlab. That society put forward the sherif as a candidate for the Caliphate; and he was duped by the desire to show the renown and fame, the power and influence he possesses among the tribes scattered about the desert between the Hedjaz and Turkish Irak. I have proofs and evidence in my possession to prove and show, if necessary, that strong and serious efforts are being made to establish the projected Caliphate and to put it under the protection of the British Government. In order to attain this object, the sherif meddles with all the Government departments; he takes no notice of the sheri and the provisions of the sacred law, but insists on the laws and administration of the Government being handed over to him to be used according to his own arbitrary will; and that is why he will not allow any vali or mutafiz to remain in office who will not give in to his opinions and cease to aim at good government. The sherif has become influential, emboldened by the weakness and approval of the Sublime Porte.

The centre of the Arab "Nahzé" (?) Society is in Egypt. This society holds its meetings and deliberations under the presidency of a man named Sheikh Tahir-al-Maghreby, who fled from Damascus and has settled in Egypt. The society has branches in Damascus, Beirout, and other Arab towns. Its programme is drawn up after the fashion of that of the Committee of Union and Progress. All the members are Arabs; some Arab Christians join the society and serve its views. A year or two ago certain evidence was obtained about certain members of the Damascus branch of the society by the late juge d'instruction of Damascus, Selkézadé Kemal Effendi, of Tripoli in Syria; but the moment he began to make investigations he was threatened with death; and, while he was absent at Constantinople, whither he had gone on leave for this business, a decision was given by the reorganisation commission at Damascus, through the influence of the society, removing him from his office, and now he is in misery and is asking to be restored to his post. As a result of the minute investigations carried out by Kemal Effendi, the names of the members of the revolutionary society came to light one by one; but all the reports of the investigations, together with the notes and the entries in the registers, were destroyed and disappeared. My investigations go to confirm and support the work of Kemal Effendi.

Seyyid Idris, who has been sent to the Yemen, was sent by the society to claim the Arab Caliphate. Now, this claim on his part is not opposed to the immunity of Imam Yahya; for, as the religion of the Zeidis of the Yemen requires that an imam

should be appointed, it has been resolved that the imamate of the Zeidis shall be confirmed and maintained if the Arab Caliphate is established; so that Imam Yahya and Seyyid Idris cannot help uniting as deadly enemies of the Ottoman Government in order to attain their objects. If they are both successful, the Arabs of the Hedjaz and Turkish Irak, and even of Syria and Palestine are resolved and prepared immediately to bring about a general rising. That is why I have presented this report to your Excellency, sincerely and without any *arrière-pensée*, so that our statesmen may awaken from the sleep of carelessness and be watchful, and that they may take the necessary steps to bring the ship of State safe to land.

[6185] No. 108.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 101.)
Sir, *Pera, February 14, 1911.*

I TOOK an opportunity of speaking to Rifaat Pasha to-day concerning the articles on Mesopotamian affairs written by Ismail Hakki Bey, and I added that you told me to say that articles such as these, which were teeming with false statements and inferences, could not fail to arouse an unwarrantable anti-British sentiment here. I also said that, in view of the fact that martial law still existed here, it should be easy to control publications of this nature, which could not fail to have an injurious effect. His Excellency replied that he had been much annoyed by the publication of the articles in question. He knew beforehand that they were to be published, and had sent for the author and endeavoured to prevent their appearance. Ismail Hakki, who had just returned from a journey in Mesopotamia, had been so much impressed by the total want of enterprise of everything Turkish in the district, and by the activity shown by foreigners, that he thought he would stir up the patriotism of his countrymen and perhaps rouse them to action by these descriptions. He did not specially wish his observations to apply to the English, but to foreign activity in general. I said it was a pity that he had not said so. Rifaat Pasha proceeded to say that he had thought of inviting the court-martial to suppress the "Tanin" after those publications, but this seemed a useless measure, as the newspapers so treated always appeared on the following day under a new name.

The "Tanin," he went on to say, was an absolutely independent paper over which the Government had no control.

As an evidence of his desire to be agreeable to His Majesty's Government in these matters, his Excellency said that the "Jeune Turc," which was nothing but a blackmailing organ, had recently expressed the intention of publishing a series of violent articles against England. The responsible editor had been sent for and warned, and he understood that these articles would not now appear.

I took the opportunity of calling his Excellency's attention to a violent article which was recently produced in a Bussorah newspaper, the "Reshad," dealt with by Mr. Crow in his despatch No. 2, which will reach you in my despatch No. 104.

His Excellency said that this was more difficult to deal with, as martial law did not obtain in Bussorah, but he made a note of it, and promised to see what could be done.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[6169] No. 109.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 105. Confidential.)
Sir, *Pera, February 15, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van, reporting on the arrival and proceedings of three inspectors of the Committee of Union and Progress—Kara Bey, a Russian subject, who besides his Russian passport was furnished also with Turkish and Persian papers, Hilmi Bey, a well-known terrorist, and Abdul Kadir Effendi.

From Kara Bey's own statements, no less than from the work done by the inspectors at Van, there seems to be no doubt that they were actually entrusted

with a pan-Islamic mission such as we know to form part of the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress, but it would appear from Captain Molyneux-Seel's subsequent despatch (No. 2 of the 23rd January), enclosed in my despatch No. 93 of the 10th instant, that, owing to quarrels with his colleagues, Kara Bey's activity is likely to be limited in the near future, and it is possible that some interesting documents will fall into the hands of the Russian authorities.

It is rather curious to note that some two and a-half months ago, which would probably be about the time when this individual and his friends were starting on their tour, the Minister of the Interior, in talking to a member of this embassy, went out of his way to give the most positive assurances as Minister, as member of the Committee of Union and Progress, and as a private individual, that the rumours of a pan-Islamic propaganda were absolutely unfounded, and when told jokingly that it was difficult for Europeans who had applauded the regeneration under the new régime of "30,000,000 Ottomans" to understand how they had suddenly expanded into or propagated 350,000,000 Mahommedans, Talaat Bey rejoined that these false notions were the work of that "accursed paper, the 'Jeune Turc,' which I ought to have brought before the court-martial long ago."

It is evident that professions from Young Turks such as those of Talaat Bey must be accepted with a degree of scepticism.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 109.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Mr. Marling.

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Van, January 9, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that three inspectors of the Committee of Union and Progress arrived in Van from Constantinople about three weeks ago and are still here. Their names are Kara Bey, a doctor, Hilmi Bey, known as a terrorist, and Abdul Kadir Effendi. The two latter are soldiers, but to comply with the law have temporarily left the army. They have held numerous secret meetings at Van, from which Christian members of the club have been excluded, and have been in communication with the local leaders of the various Armenian political parties.

On the 29th December these inspectors opened a subscription for the building of a school, to bear the name of "The Union and Progress Club School." Both Christian and Mahommedan pupils are to be admitted to the school; subscriptions offered by Christians, however, have not been accepted. Up to the present about 400*l.* has been collected. The Sheikh of Shamsdinan has contributed 100*l.*, Sheikh Jemal, of this town, 70*l.*, and Hussein Pasha, 100*l.*

While giving them all credit for their generosity, these personages are obviously not blind to the advantages that they may expect to gain by placing the committee and the local government under an obligation to them, nor can it be supposed that the committee are unaware of the possible evil effects of accepting a subscription from such a man as Hussein Pasha.

Of these three inspectors, Kara Bey is a person of some celebrity, so though you may probably be aware of his identity and doings, I give the following brief account of his history and recent movements.

Kara Bey was, and is still, a Russian subject, of Persian race and Shiite by religion; he has had a university education at Moscow, and is a qualified medical practitioner. Subsequently at Baku, where he was known by the name of Ali Bey, he was closely associated with Ahmed Agaief, an ardent pan-Islamist, and now the editor of the "Jeune Turc," or under its new title, the "Pays." He was one of the organisers of the Armenian massacres on the Caspian littoral, and was employed by ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid to spread the propaganda of pan-Islamism in the Caucasus. Recently he went to London, and what follows is from his own account. He had an interview with Sir Edward Grey. The English people he found unsympathetic and egotistic. Next he went to Berlin, where he was received by a Minister. From Berlin he went to Constantinople. Ahmed Agaief and he were the joint authors of the telegram to the German Emperor in the name of the Mahommedan peoples. Recently Talaat Bey, who is the intimate friend of Agaief, proposed that the latter and Kara Bey should go

to Van in the quality of inspectors of the committee. Kara Bey accepted, and arrived here with his two colleagues as previously stated.

Some days ago Kara Bey called on my Russian colleague, and they were mutually surprised to find that they had been previously acquainted at St. Petersburgh. In the course of some long conversations Kara Bey expatiated freely on the pan-Islamic policy of the committee. It amounted to this: the two things necessary for Turkey were firstly a strong army, and secondly, the bond between the various Mahommedan races which pan-Islamism would furnish. This policy was not an external one only, but internal also, to combat the inevitable growth in influence and wealth of the Christian sections of the community out of all proportion with that of the Mahommedans, which growth would eventually become a danger to the State.

The plan of campaign for furthering pan-Islamism was, in the first instance, to bring about an understanding between the Persian Shiite and the Turkish Sunnite. This accomplished, Persia would be a bridge for the passage of the propaganda to India, Turkestan, and the Caucasus. The annual pilgrimage to Mecca of Mahommedans from all countries was a means also not neglected, and the Government (he said) allotted a sum of money annually for facilitating the pilgrimages and for the cultivation of pan-Islamism.

Kara Bey told me of his intention to visit India and Afghanistan, and showed me his passport (as a Turkish subject) to India. He said that he had also passports from the Persian and Russian Governments, which was no doubt true. Questioned afterwards by my Russian colleague as to how he had obtained the Turkish passport, he stated that the passport had been given into his hands by Talaat Bey himself. It thus appears that a Turkish Minister, knowing full well this man to be a Russian subject, deliberately furnished him with a passport to proceed to India. Referring to the suspension of the "Jeune Turc," Kara Bey said that Talaat Bey told Agaief that his paper was to be suspended, but that he could bring it out under a new name and continue saying the same things as before. The title-page of the "Pays" is sufficient evidence that no attempt was made to conceal its identity with the "Jeune Turc."

Kara Bey on arrival at Van was naturally thought by the local members of the Union and Progress Club to be a Sunnite, but my Russian colleague lost no time in proclaiming him to be a Shiite, thereby causing him a certain loss of prestige. The Hakim at once withdrew his offer of 20*l.* towards the new school. Kara Bey has now asked for facilities to proceed to Russia, which my Russian colleague has promised to give, of course notifying his Government of the same.

It is difficult to supply at present an altogether satisfactory reason for Kara Bey's extreme frankness; it is hard also to know to what extent his expression of policy with regard to pan-Islamism really represents the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress, or whether he has in fact been supplied (as he says) with funds for carrying on the propaganda in India and other countries. The following facts, however, stand out clear:—

1. Kara Bey is a well-known ardent pan-Islamist, and a former organiser of Armenian massacres.

2. He has been sent here at the instance of the Committee of Union and Progress in the capacity of one of their inspectors.

3. He is known to be a Russian subject by Talaat Bey, and he is in possession of a Turkish passport to India.

My Russian colleague informs me that he has asked his Ambassador to show you a detailed despatch he has furnished on this subject.

It may not perhaps be out of place to here inform you that according to certain sources of information our vali, on visiting Tiflis *en route* for Constantinople, was commissioned by his Government to hold out inducements, in the shape of free grants of land, for the immigration into Turkish territory of the Mussulman population of the province of Tiflis.

I have, &c.
L. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[6521] No. 110.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, February 21, 1911.*

SAMSUN–SIVAS railway. Your despatch No. 40 of the 13th February.

I am informed by M. Sazonow that Russian banks are interested in the group represented at Constantinople by M. Lamornaix; that the group is still trying to secure the concession; and that the Russian Government are giving it their support.

[5206] No. 111.

Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 22, 1911.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 13th ultimo respecting the payment of Turkish customs duties on your vessel the "Julnar," and especially to the sentence in the last paragraph regarding the payment of duty on material of the Turkish Steamer Administration, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that His Majesty's consul at Bussorah has ascertained that no customs exemption has been granted to the vessels of that administration since the establishment of the new régime, the steam-ships "Bagdad" and "Bussorah," which were imported in 1908, and a small vessel now building for the Euphrates having been subjected to the duties.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[6792] No. 112.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received February 23.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London,
Sir, *February 22, 1911.*

AS it would seem that the question of the Bagdad Railway is again becoming prominent, and that in any conversations which may take place between His Majesty's Government and the Porte upon this subject the question of the development of the river communications must also come under discussion, my Board feel it their duty to submit to you the following considerations, which seem to them to be inseparable from the question of the railway:—

It seems evident that the railway cannot be built without either (1) a kilometric guarantee by the Turkish Government, raised by means of increased customs duties, whether or not they be specifically allocated to the railway, or (2) a guarantee by His Majesty's Government or other foreign Government controlling the line or any given section of the line. In either case, the river steamers serving the same regions would be most unfairly handicapped by competition with a subsidised railway line. If the State guarantee for the railway be found through increased customs duties, we trust that His Majesty's Government realise the extent of the increased burden which would thus be placed upon British trade. The duties would add to the cost of the staple article of export from Great Britain, namely, piece goods, a sum many times greater than the saving which might be effected by possible reductions in the cost of carriage. The value of a ton of Manchester goods is on the average 100*l.*, and 4 per cent. increase in the customs duties, which are levied *ad valorem*, would mean an increase in the selling price of this ton of goods of 80*s.* The present cost of conveying this ton of goods by river from Bussorah to Bagdad is only 25*s.* If, therefore, the railway were to carry them for nothing, they would still be penalised, through the increased duty, to the extent of 55*s.* a ton.

It seems evident that any railway between Bagdad and Bussorah built at the expense of an increase in the customs duties will be an hindrance rather than an advantage to British and Indian trade with the country. The bulk of the Indian trade consists, like that from Great Britain, of valuable goods such as textiles, indigo,

coffee, tea and spices. As for the export trade of Mesopotamia, whether with India or with Great Britain, it consists of such articles as grain, hides and wool, which are carried by the river steamers at very low rates, amounting on the average to 12*s.* a ton. These are prohibitive rates for a railway in Mesopotamia.

We would not wish to be considered as opposed to a railway between Bagdad and Bussorah. But such a railway should not be a subsidised railway, and should only be built when the development of the country requires it. We may point out that for strategical purposes Government troops and stores could always be conveyed cheaper and more safely between Bagdad and the Gulf by means of steamers, as at present, than by a railway.

Under these circumstances, we feel that His Majesty's Government would be well advised in making strong effort to obtain the further development by British capital of the river navigation, and that the railway question provides a favourable opportunity for reopening that of the navigation.

In our letter of the 13th October last we pointed out that we had spent a sum of over 3,600*l.* in negotiations with the Turkish Government for a fusion of the navigation interests on the rivers of Mesopotamia. These negotiations had progressed steadily until the middle of December 1909, when the Turkish Chamber passed a resolution by a large majority, authorising the Cabinet to conclude the matter, subject to its imposing no fresh burdens upon the Turkish budget. The proposals from us at that time before the Turkish Cabinet could not readily bear this construction; but as the Cabinet took exception to them on this ground, we altered our proposals in such a way that, in the opinion of a high legal authority, Mr. Hamilton, K.C., to whom we referred the matter, it could not properly be maintained that they involved any obligation upon the Turkish budget. In this new form they were again submitted to the Turkish Cabinet, with a request that they should fulfil their promise to conclude the business. There the matter rested. The Turkish Government for some time refused to give any answer whatever, and ultimately attached wholly new conditions to their acceptance—conditions which destroyed the entire basis of the agreement. They refused to hand over to the proposed new company their own exclusive rights, but failed to indicate how under these circumstances we should be able to comply with their stipulation for an equal share in the enterprise. Moreover, they had stipulated that the new company should undertake various duties, such as the conveyance of Imperial mails, and the transport of material, troops, and stores at special rates, which obviously could not be imposed upon a company subjected to free competition.

Hilmi Pasha, when Grand Vizier, had very carefully considered the question of transferring these exclusive rights of navigation, and had come to the conclusion, on the merits of the question, that the new company must enjoy such rights. He had the case of the steamers on the Bosphorus under consideration at the time, and recognised that the absence of exclusive rights would give rise to such a conflict of interests and consequent uncertainty of reward as would render an efficient service impossible.

This is how the matter stands at present, and we should of course be pleased if any plan can be devised, which would reconcile the different points of view, to give it careful consideration.

I have, &c.
H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[4908] No. 113.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, February 25, 1911.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant relative to the proposal to approach the German Government with a view to effect a compromise in the matter of the concession to work the mines of red oxide on the island of Abu Musa.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey agrees with the Earl of Crewe in concurring in the view of the Government of India, that it would be preferable not to propose a compromise till the last note of the German Government can be answered in detail, since to adopt the contrary course might make it appear that His Majesty's Government were disposed to offer terms only because they were unable to find an answer to the German arguments, and might in consequence indispose the German Government to adopt a conciliatory attitude. If, on the other hand, the compromise is offered when

the reply of His Majesty's Government is presented the friendly intention by which the offer is dictated will be clear, since it will be seen that it is made in spite of the fact that good arguments have been found to rebut the German contentions.

Sir E. Grey further agrees that it would be well that the precise terms of the proposed compromise should be settled forthwith by consultation between this Office and your department, and he would suggest that a small interdepartmental conference between one or two members of each department should take place here at some time in the near future convenient to the representatives of your Office, at which these details could be arranged. The suggestions of the Government of India on the results of these deliberations could then be invited, and, as proposed in your letter, a settlement arrived at of the question whether or not the German Government should be approached before those suggestions are received.

Sir E. Grey shares Lord Crewe's opinion that the new concession should, in justice to the Sheikh of Sharga, contain a provision for the payment to him of a royalty on the oxide mined, and has no objection to offer to the designation of the High Court of Bombay as the tribunal which should be approached with a view to the deputation of a judge to assess the damages to be awarded to Messrs. Wönckhaus.

The question whether the clause in the contract between the concessionnaires and Messrs. Wönckhaus, whereby a monopoly of the output of the oxide deposits on Abu Musa is assured to the latter, ought to be eliminated, and that of the source from which the sum required to compensate the German firm should be derived, might also be settled at the proposed interdepartmental conference.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[7140] No. 114.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 110.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 19, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 52 of the 18th, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, reporting the purchase of a stern-wheel steamer by Aga Jaffer, for use on the River Euphrates. Messrs. Lynch might usefully adopt similar methods to those of the German firm, who are evidently employing Aga Jaffer for the extension of their navigation upon the river.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 114.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 3. Confidential.)

Sir, *Bussorah, January* 28, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 30 of the 27th May, 1910, I have the honour to report that Aga Jaffer, who holds a concession for the navigation of the Euphrates, lately purchased a stern-wheel steamer at Glasgow, which was brought out here in pieces and is now being put together here on the premises of Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co., the German firm at Bussorah.

I understand the vessel is likely to be well adapted for the navigation of the Euphrates, and will carry about 40 tons of cargo. The fact of its being built on the stocks of the German firm seems to point to the Germans being financially interested in the undertaking.

By the terms of the concession or permission given to Aga Jaffer all the shareholders in the concern must be of Ottoman nationality, but there seems to be no reason why the Germans should not work through Aga Jaffer, who has, I am informed, not much capital at his disposal, and thus secure a considerable share in the development of the Euphrates traffic. I hear that Aga Jaffer proposes to bring out a larger stern-wheeler when this one is completed.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[7145] No. 115

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 115.)

Sir, *Pera, February 19, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Izzet Pasha, chief of the staff, who has been appointed military commander of the operations in the Yemen, left yesterday in the cruiser "Hamidie" for his new post.

The Grand Vizier and most of the Ministry and high military officials went on board to take leave of the new commander, who, it is said, is to receive double pay, as well as 10,000 piasters for travelling expenses, and takes with him a number of decorations to be distributed among the friendly Arab tribes.

It is worthy of note that the Ottoman Government should have on this occasion employed one of their largest cruisers for the purpose of conveying the general, as it naturally entails a considerable unnecessary expense.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[7146] No. 116.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 116.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 20, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 115 of yesterday, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy reporting on the preparations being made for the Yemen expedition and the departure of Izzet Pasha to command the troops.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 116.

Major Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 18, 1911.*

ON my return from Greece I have the honour to submit the following report, showing, as far as possible, the stage reached in the dispatch of a military force to cope with the situation in the Yemen:—

From the first the conduct of the Government has been marked, first, by a reluctance to admit that anything was seriously wrong there, and by the usual attempts to prevent the true state of affairs from being known, and secondly, by the extreme leisureliness of the military preparations.

Though the expedition was announced early in January, though various fanciful estimates of the size and composition of the expeditionary force appeared in the press, and though the papers reported the wholesale summoning of redifs, and, on several occasions, the actual dispatches of reinforcements, yet very little was in fact done, and the first troops to be sent were shipped from Constantinople on the 21st January, after which there were practically no shipments till the beginning of February. In the same way the papers have from an early stage been announcing the appointments of various commanders-in-chief, whereas really nothing was settled on this subject till a week ago, when Izzet Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff, was selected to command the expedition.

In the meantime there had, however, been a certain movement of nizam troops from the district of the IInd Ordu to be shipped at Constantinople and Dedeagach, and arrangements for the formation of batteries and for the calling up of redifs were being made.

From the 1st to the 14th February movements were brisker, and roughly half the force is now under way.

A fairly plausible reason for the delay was the difficulty of providing transports. It is true that negotiations for chartering three large steamers of the Russian Volunteer Fleet fell through, as the authorities could not come to an agreement with

the company about the price. They also made a point of not using any ship of Greek ownership, several of which could have been had. But if the Government had considered the matter urgent, or been really anxious to get troops to the Yemen quickly, such considerations would not have been allowed to interfere with their dispatch.

The real reasons of the delay were that the expedition is not popular, that the Government was itself divided on the question of its advisability, and that there was a want of money. None of these are admitted.

Service in the Yemen is unpopular, and the country and climate have earned in the past a bad reputation among the people. Further, the idea of fighting against his co-religionists, especially Arabs, does not appeal to the average Anatolian, which may account for the large proportion of the force which is being drawn from Roumelia and Macedonia, which, for many reasons, one would have supposed would have been the last places to be denuded of their garrisons. Except for this theory that the men of Roumelia, with their more modern ideas, have fewer scruples on this subject than those of Anatolia, it is not easy to understand why the Government does not make more use of the large body of Anatolian reserves at its disposal. Their transport would cost less, and take less time, than that of the European troops, while policy and strategy would also seem to make their employment preferable. The selection of the IInd Ordu to supply so many troops in proportion to the rest is certainly rather remarkable, and I hear that Abdullah Pasha, the General Officer Commanding the IInd Ordu, has protested against the weakening of the forces on the Bulgarian frontier by the withdrawal even of these few battalions, and has sent in his resignation.

The summoning of the redifs has met with unusual difficulty; desertions and endeavours to escape service by payment have been reported, and sometimes the nizams have been hard to move. In at least one case the men were only persuaded to start by being told that they were going to fight the English.

The strengths of the battalions of the expeditionary force are brought up to 550 by drafts and by calling up the ihtiyats. But the actual number of men under arms in Europe will not be seriously diminished, as the places of men drafted from nizam battalions will soon be taken by ihtiyats and redifs, and complete redif battalions will be called out to replace the nizam battalions which have left.

The Minister of War, himself an Arab, is said to have been very much against the expedition, and he was not alone in the views he held. I think the delay was due in some measure to a hope that a compromise might be arrived at, or means found to avoid a punitive expedition altogether without loss of prestige. Though military opinion deplores the necessity of the expedition and blames the policy which has led up to it, yet a similar opinion did not prevent the carrying out of the Albanian expedition last year, and I think that the present expedition will may be carried out with equal thoroughness and achieve similar results.

As regards the composition of the expeditionary force, the usual policy of mystification is being pursued, and such details as I give are all subject to correction when further and more accurate news has been received. The original intention seems to have been for thirty-four battalions, as under, three field batteries, six mountain batteries, three machine-gun companies, one company of engineers, and two sanitary companies:—

	Battalions.		Batteries.		Machine-gun Companies.
	Nizam.	Redif.	Field.	Mountain.	
From Ist Ordu	8	..	..	..	..
„ IInd Ordu	6	6	3	6	3
„ IIIrd Ordu	5	7	..	..	..
„ IVth Ordu	4	..	..	..	..
Total	21	13	3	6	3
	34				

But, as usual, the execution of the plan differs widely from the intention, it is altered from day to day to fit unforeseen circumstances, and its final shape will

probably differ considerably from the above. So far nine nizam battalions have been embarked at Constantinople and three at Dedeagach. Three redif battalions from the IIIrd Ordu have left Salonica, and I am told that one redif battalion of the same ordu has been dispatched from Mersina, but in the absence of any news from the vice-consul at that place this last is doubtful. Of the nizam battalions, three only have left the Ist Ordu district (and these are, properly speaking, IInd Ordu battalions, although under the new organisation they were being transferred to the Constantinople Army Corps), and the nine others are all from the IInd Ordu.

The redifs called out are :—

		Battalions.	
37th Regiment	(Uskub)	4	(of which 3 dispatched).
30th „	(Karaman)	3	(of which 1 dispatched, probably).
31st „	(Adalia)	3	
Total		10	

The order for three battalions of the 47th (Aidin) Regiment is said to have been cancelled.

Nizam battalions still under orders and not yet dispatched are :—

4 of the 7th Regiment	From the Ist Ordu.
2 (II/10 and II/13)	„ IInd Ordu (actually in the Smyrna vilayet).
3 (II/23, III, IV/34)	„ IIIrd Ordu.
3 from Erzinjan	„ IVth Ordu.

Of the artillery, the 1st Battalion of the 10th Regiment from Adrianople was under orders, but is not likely to be sent. Three mountain batteries complete have been sent from the IInd Ordu, viz., two from the 3rd Battalion (Kirk Kilisse) and one from the 2nd Battalion (Kirjali). Three more batteries will be made up with old-pattern guns from Salonica, the personnel for these being supplied from various places; 280 men of the field artillery have been sent down from Adrianople, probably towards the formation of these batteries.

The engineer company has been provided from the IInd Ordu. It was divided into three sections, one of which was sent to Dedeagach, and the other two to Constantinople.

So that the composition of the force, judged by the troops that have been so far dispatched (see table annexed) and by those under orders, is as follows :—

—	Battalions.		Mountain Batteries.	Machine-Gun Companies.
	Nizam.	Redif.		
From Ist Ordu	7	..	..	..
„ IInd Ordu	11	6	3	2
„ IIIrd Ordu	3	4	3 (guns only)	..
„ IVth Ordu	3	..	..	..
Total	24	10	6	3
	34			

Advices from the IVth Ordu state that the dispatch of troops to the Yemen has been provisionally countermanded. I think it has been found impracticable to transport the battalions from Erzinjan to the coast during the severe weather now prevailing, but I also think that redifs from the coast will be sent in their place, as two large transports have recently left Constantinople to ship troops at the Black Sea ports.

I have, &c.

G. E. TYRRELL, *Major*,
Military Attaché.

Enclosure 2 in No. 116.

TABLE of Troops of the Yemen Expeditionary Force dispatched between January 21 and February 14, 1911

Left—	Battalions.		Mountain Batteries.	Machine-Gun Companies.	Probable Units	From which Ordu.
	Nizam.	Redif.				
Constantinople Jan. 21 ..	2	..	..	..	II, IV/31	I
„ „ 27 ..	1	..	..	..	II/34	I
Dedeagach Feb. 1 ..	1	..	1	..	I/16 and a battery of 2nd Battalion from Kirjali	II
Constantinople „ 2 ..	..	..	..	1	5th Mountain-Gun Company	II
„ „ 3 ..	2	..	..	1	I, II/77, and 10th Mountain-Gun Company	II
Salonica „ 3 ..	..	1	..	..	1/37 (R)	III
Constantinople „ 4 ..	..	..	2	..	Of 3rd Battalion (from Kirk Kilisse)	II
„ „ 7 ..	1	..	..	..	III/77	II
Mersina „ 7 ..	..	1*	..	..	IV/30 (R)	II
Salonica „ 8 ..	..	2	..	..	II, IV/37 (R)	III
Constantinople „ 11 ..	2	..	..	..	I/III/79	II
Dedeagach „ 12 ..	2	..	..	..	I, II/15	II
Constantinople „ 14 ..	1	..	..	1	II/79 and 1st Mountain-Gun Company	II
Total	12	4	3	3		

* This dispatch doubtful.

Enclosure 3 in No. 116.

Major Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 18, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Ferik Izzet Pasha, who has been appointed to the command of the Yemen expedition, left for Hodeidah to-day accompanied by his staff and other officers.

They went in the Armstrong cruiser "Hamidieh." It is as unusual for a Turkish man-of-war to be used as a passenger-ship as it is adventurous for her to undertake so long a voyage without foreign assistance, and the fact of this vessel being used for the conveyance of Izzet Pasha and his staff is in itself interesting. The idea is to mark the importance of the occasion as well as to make an impression in the Red Sea and demonstrate the fact that Turkey has now a fleet in being. The "Hamidieh" is commanded by Raouf Bey, an English-speaking officer, and one of the best in the Turkish navy.

Izzet Pasha had a farewell audience of the Sultan yesterday, and the usual crowd was on board the "Hamidieh" to give him a send-off, including the Ministers of War and Marine, both of whom embraced him warmly on parting.

Izzet Pasha, who is Chief of the General Staff, is a capable and level-headed man, and one of the best of the Turkish generals, at least so far as education and theoretical knowledge go. He has spent some years in Germany, and was for some time banished to Syria under the old régime. He has already had experience of the Yemen, having served there as chief of the staff to Ahmed Feizi Pasha. He is very highly thought of, and as Chief of the General Staff here had considerable influence in purely military matters, so that his present appointment shows the importance attached by the Government to the successful conclusion of the Yemen affair.

Mir Alai Avni Bey, who commanded the Samsun Redif Brigade during the Albanian operations last year, and who was recently appointed to the command of the new 9th Division at Baba Eski, goes as Izzet's chief of the staff.

Izzet Pasha told me that he intended to operate with three divisions, the commanders of which would probably be Mir Alai Hamdi Bey (formerly Hamdi Pasha,

commandant on the Bulgarian frontier), Mir Alai Riza Bey, and Liva Ibrahim Pasha, General Officer Commanding 4th Division at Dedeagach.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Major*,
Military Attaché.

[7162] No. 117.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 45.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 21, 1911.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 40 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to state that I spoke to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon on the subject of the Samsun–Sivas Railway.

M. Sazonow told me in confidence, and on the understanding that I should not communicate what he said to the British syndicate, that he had been approached on the matter a few days ago by the French Minister, who had told him that the French group were extremely anxious to obtain the contract for this railway. M. Sazonow added that the Banque internationale de Commerce de Saint-Pétersbourg and other Russian banks were interested in M. Lamornaix's group, though they kept as far as possible in the background, and that consequently M. Lamornaix was being supported by the Russian Government. His Excellency further explained that it was not a question of a concession, but of the contract for the construction of this railway.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[7562] No. 118.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, February 28, 1911.*

MUNTEFIK Arabs.

The "Tanin," which is usually officially inspired, recently reported fighting between the Sheikh of Koweit and the Muntefik Arabs. In reply to an enquiry which I thereupon addressed to Bussorah, His Majesty's consul informs me that the political agent at Koweit reported on the 11th February that the troubles between the two parties had ceased, that the vali had sent two Arabs from Bussorah to assist them in coming to an arrangement, and that the sheikh was disbanding his forces.

Six hundred men and ten guns from Bagdad were also, according to Mr. Crow, landed at Kut-el-Amara on the 25th February, with the object, it is believed, of preventing the Arabs from interfering with the vali's project of closing the Hai canal, in preparation for a campaign against the Muntefik Arabs.

[8095] No. 119.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 124.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 23, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an article from the "Yeni Gazeta" giving an account of recent events in the Yemen, together with a sketch map * of the country prepared by Mr. Hony, to illustrate the article.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 119.

Extract from the "Yeni Gazeta" of February 20, 1911.

AFFAIRS IN THE YEMEN.

(From our Special Correspondent.)

YEMEN is divided into two parts—Jebel and Tehama. Jebel is occupied by tribes of the Zeidi sect, Tehama by the Shafis.

In Jebel, Imam Yahia, who has assumed the title of "The Commander of the Faithful who trusts in God the Lord of the two Worlds, Imam Yahia Hamid-ud-Din," lays claim to the Khalifate; and in Tehama Seyyid Idris desires independence, and the two have united and have for some time caused much trouble to the sovereign power, and are now causing it.

The people of Jebel, being Zeidis, obey the Imam unconditionally, and are his faithful friends. The people of Tehama, on the other hand, although they obey Idris, do not do so with the blind affection of the others, but from fear, and unwillingly. When Idris's power begins to wane, or when they see the futility of his pretensions, they will turn from him and will join the strongest side. Moreover, in Tehama there are Mansabis and Sadats. These will not waver in their service and allegiance to the sovereign State, even under adverse circumstances, and will recoil from no self-sacrifice. They show the tribes the right way, they advise the ignorant and reconcile them with the Government. The Mansabis and Sadats are the great barrier to the success of Idris, and the only cause of his failure to extend his sphere of influence.

Of the Mansabis, the most prominent, influential, and respectable are those at Mansourieh, Marawa'a, Dar Yahni, Kutai, Manireh, and Mafki.

For four or five months past Idris has been sending his supporters northwards, and has besieged and oppressed Assyr; and in another direction he has sent them to Jizan, Lohcia, and Midi, to attack the Wa'idat tribe, who have undertaken to convoy military stores to Zohra, Hajur, and Hajje, and other friendly tribes in those regions. But though Idris's party has fought for some time with the Wa'idat, and has destroyed a great number of them, his main object is to hold the southern districts with a small force, and to extend the rebellion northwards. He is assembling a strong force in the north, and is only reserving the Tuk rebels for attacks in the south.

The mutessarif and commandant of Assyr is a firm and energetic man. He is defending Assyr successfully, and will continue to do so. The news from those parts is good. It is said that they can hold out for a year. But this resistance is defensive only and limited, and will not be capable of subduing or expelling the rebels. If a small force could be got through from the landing-places at El Wasm or Shukik, between Kunfida and Jizan, it would be of the greatest assistance.

The partisans of Imam Yahia, under the command of "The Sword of the Khalifate, Ahmed-bin-Kassim-el-Jemani," who is "a relation of one of the deputies," marched on Sana'a on the 20th Kianoun Avval, 1326 (2nd January, 1911). On the 9th January Sana'a was besieged. On the 11th January telegraphic communication with Sana'a was cut off. On that date neither Sana'a nor Hodeidah could communicate with Constantinople, for the lines connecting Taiz and Hodeidah with the cable were broken. Despite all efforts, the repair of them was prevented by the Zeranik rebels. After two or three months, the united efforts of the Mulnssebeji Zahid Bey, who was acting mutessarif, and Sherai Pasha, succeeded in repairing the line, and communication between Hodeidah and Constantinople was assured.

The Imam's rebels after laying siege to Sana'a did the same to all the towns in the Jebel. They spread all over the country and pressed on the important places of Amran, Kukban, Jihran, Anis, Ridah, and Yerim. They attacked Sinan Pasha, which is the next place after Sana'a on the Hodeidah–Sana'a road, and then Suk-el-Khamis, and then Mafhaka; and then after occupying the neighbourhood of Menakha, the half-way place between Sana'a and Hodeidah and a position commanding the roads, they came straight down to the border of Hajjileh. The commandant of Menakha rendered a great service in bombarding Hujra, a stronghold of the rebels. He is still defending Menakha.

The kaza of Raimah is also threatened. The kaimakam is one of the loyal sheikhs,

and is an energetic and bold man. He is defending the kaza with the help of the tribes and what soldiers there are. Besides this Obal is being hardly pressed; it is an important place from a military point of view, as it contains a quantity of stores of every kind. Obal is only fifteen or twenty hours from Hodeidah, and if it falls the material loss will be very great.

The kaïmakam, of Bajil, is pre-eminent for his intelligence and knowledge of local conditions and for his influence with the sheikhs. His name is Elias, and he is one of the notable Sadats; he has joined Seyyid Hussein, a loyal and most experienced and patriotic man, and together they have gone to defend Obal with 3,000 or 4,000 of their tribes. It is confidently expected that they will defend the roads to Obal and Hajjileh until the arrival of the regular troops.

The cursed Zeidis are committing great cruelties on the Shafis that fall into their hands. They kill the men, outrage the women, and cut the children to pieces, and practice other barbarities. The rebels have burnt the country of the Beni Naoum, a peaceful and friendly tribe. In those districts the friendly tribe of the Matuh in conjunction with the troops have driven off the Zeidis with great loss. The moral force of the Zeidis has been broken before the troops arrive.

The necessary help is being sent by the Government to those tribes that are bearing the brunt of the rebels' attacks. The new mutessarif and the commander of the division are showing extraordinary energy. According to the latest news the number of rebels besieging Sana'a is not great, only about 5,000.

The Imam has directed practically the whole of his force to Menakha. His object is to capture that, so as to render the passage of troops exceedingly difficult.

There is no cause for anxiety regarding Taiz; the loyal sheikhs there are capable of defending themselves, and the intrigues and threats of the Imam are of no avail.

The troops in Yerim in their guardhouse at the top of a hill are making a stubborn defence of the capital of the kaza.

On the whole there is no cause for anxiety. Two battalions that have just arrived have been landed at Jebbana, two hours from Hodeidah, on account of the cholera; but the disease is decreasing, thanks to the energy of the army doctors, who are working day and night to prevent the spread of the disease.

It is to be hoped that this time we shall achieve a real success in the Yemen. Mere punishment is not enough. We hope that serious and consistent reforms will be made, that the nation may at last have rest from the worry of the Yemen. But thirty to forty battalions are not enough. Formerly Feizi Pasha with 100 battalions did not succeed in carrying out reforms. We must have sufficient troops.

[8100] No. 120.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 130.)

Sir, *Pera, February 28, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a long Grand Vizieral teskereh, addressed to the Minister of War, was published in the "Sabah" of the 25th instant, to the effect that the inhabitants of Cyprus and Egypt, countries considered as parts of the Ottoman Empire, are Ottoman subjects, and can consequently be enlisted unconditionally as volunteers in the Ottoman army.

As regards Algerians, the teskereh states that the negotiations with the French Embassy are not yet concluded, and that consequently Algerians desirous of enlisting should in the first instance address themselves to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

As to Tunis, the teskereh says that the Ottoman Government have never accepted the Treaty of Bardo, and consequently consider Tunisians as Ottoman subjects; and since the present pourparlers between the Sublime Porte and the French Embassy only relate to Algerians, there is nothing to prevent Tunisians from being received as volunteers in the Ottoman regiments.

The teskereh terminates by referring to Morocco, and states that being an independent country, and no other Power having the right to protect Moorish subjects in Turkey, these latter will be treated in accordance with international law.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[8101] No. 121.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 131.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 28, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 36, of the 14th January, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van giving some account of his journey from Van to Erzingan.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 121.

Notes on Journey from Van to Erzingan.

Van to Bitlis.—Everywhere the villagers testified to their improved condition since the constitution. They have ceased to dread being massacred by their neighbours the Kurds, they are not arrested on political grounds, and officials, gendarmes, &c., passing through or staying temporarily in their villages no longer demand free board and lodging. The Armenians complain much, however, of the apathy of the Government with regard to the question of the restoration of their lands seized by the Kurd Aghas.

The sense of personal security which the Armenian villagers now feel has led them into an unfortunate attitude of insolence towards Government officials, officers, &c., who may pass through their villages.

The inhabitants of the Armenian villages of Engil, Norkeugh, Nainigantz, and Vanek are all Taschnakists by political creed, and are well supplied with such fire-arms as Martinis, a few Mausers, Russian rifles ("surmeli"), and Mauser pistols.

Mush.—Since his return from exile Moussa Bey, it appears, has recommenced his career of brigandage which the half-hearted efforts of the authorities have been unable to suppress.

At the time of my visit this band had recently killed three shepherds at Noshen and two Armenians at Huskeui. Apart from the injuries suffered from Moussa Bey, the inhabitants of the Mush plain are experiencing the same benefits of the constitution as elsewhere.

The question of the restoration of the Armenian lands exists here also, but is not so prominent as the more difficult question of the settlement of the claims of the Raya Kurds who demand the restoration of the lands taken from them by their chiefs and Aghas.

It appears that at the time of the formation of the Hamidie cavalry the power and influence of the Kurd chiefs and Aghas became greatly increased through the favour shown them by Abdul Hamid. These chiefs then began gradually to appropriate the land and property of the Raya Kurds and to reduce them to a state of serfdom. The Kurds, taking example from the Armenians, have now commenced to demand the restitution of their lands.

In Mush itself the relations between Turks and Armenians are anything but cordial. I was informed by an Armenian of high standing in the town that on Sunday evening the Armenians, intoxicated by the wine of the country (which is very plentiful) were in the habit of parading the streets shouting out that they would never forget the massacres, and that they remained the eternal enemies of the Turks. On the other hand, the Moslem population of Kurd origin is extremely fanatical, and more ignorant even than in other parts of Kurdistan. Thus every element of discord is present.

The mutessarif, Hassan Bey, makes no effort to ameliorate the conditions, and is by all accounts quite incompetent. He avoids responsibility and trouble by referring matters which might well be settled administratively to an equally incompetent court.

The superior of the monastery of Surp Garabet related the following, which illustrates the manner affairs are dealt with by this mutessarif.

The sheep of a certain village belonging to the monastery had been carried off by Kurds. The superior went to Mush, related the circumstances, giving the names of the thieves, and begged the mutessarif to send some gendarmes to pursue and arrest them. The mutessarif declined to take any action until the case had been tried in the court. The villagers have no grounds for supposing that the proceedings of the courts

are more expeditious than formerly, and those who are old enough remember that it took eighteen years to finally settle the case of assault by Moussa Bey on Dr. Reynolds, the American missionary at Van.

The existing personal of the courts of justice is composed almost entirely of local men, who are accused of being without exception unscrupulous robbers.

I have never been in a Turkish town which, by its absolute filthy condition, conveyed such a strong impression of a lack of good government as did Mush.

Azdvapert.—Four hours from Khigi is the village of Azdvapert, the chief of a group of a prosperous villages lying in the valley of Khigi Su and several tributaries. It has about 100 houses, twenty-five being Kurd and the remainder Armenian. I was surprised to find that a number of the villagers spoke English. On inquiry I was told that it had become a custom among its inhabitants, including the Kurd section, to emigrate to Canada, work there for a time, return and possibly go abroad again. I mention this chiefly as showing the enterprise of these particular Kurds.

Khigi is a town of 500 houses, the majority of which are Armenian. It is the seat of a kaïmakam. The Armenians have a considerable voice in the affairs of this kaïmakamlik, and their relations with the Turks are good.

A few weeks before my arrival the following incident had occurred and aroused a considerable amount of feeling. One of the soldiers of the garrison had beaten an Armenian who had come to him to claim the price of some fruit purchased a day or two previously. The Armenians complained to the officer in command of the garrison, and not receiving satisfaction forwarded their complaints by telegram to Erzeroum and Constantinople, with the result that after a few days the troops and the officer in command were replaced by others from Erzeroum. While awaiting the result of the petition the Armenians closed their shops by way of protestation. This method of making direct application over the head of the local authority seems to be resorted to a good deal, and to meet with considerable success, but it is obviously open to serious objections from the point of view of good government.

Agha Shentiqi, half-way between Khigi and Palomur, is the residence of the Kezelbash chief, Mustafa Bey. He succeeded to the estate of his brother, the influential and cultured Hyder Bey, who, accused of organising a reactionary movement in Dersim, was imprisoned, and died six months ago shortly after his release. The present bey, although very rich and the owner of some sixty villages, possesses no political influence whatever.

The late Hyder Bey received the rents of 200 villages, and as his influence extended over practically the whole of the Dersim, the Government are no doubt freed from a certain amount of anxiety by his death; though it is at least open to doubt whether, as some say, he was not unjustly imprisoned with a view to extracting money from him in exchange for his release.

Law and order is said to have been completely established now in the Dersim, but the Kezelbash Kurds have not yet begun to render military service; in fact, the civil administration has yet to be organised.

Erzingan, the head-quarters of a sanjak of the same name, is a town of about 20,000 inhabitants, of whom 13,000 are Turks, 6,500 Armenians, and 500 Greeks.

Thirty-three years ago it was but a large village owned and governed absolutely by local beys. On the head-quarters of the IVth Army Corps being transferred thither from Erzeroum, Zekki Pasha, the mushir, while leaving to the beys their titles and their lands, succeeding in getting the entire powers of Government into his hands. From his arrival dates the history of Erzingan as a town. By means of soldier labour he constructed barracks, public buildings, a handsome mosque, roads, and stone bridges across the River Frat. He is remembered now as an autocratic governor, and his name is mentioned with something approaching awe.

Since the constitution, the beys, finding themselves deprived of their moral ascendancy and of the pecuniary advantages which proceed from it, have never ceased to manifest, at least covertly, their discontent with the new régime. And in this they have the full sympathy of the pious and fanatic Moslem population of the town.

Erzingan, though small, can boast of a commercial development far in advance of Van. The following are the principal industries:—

Weaving.—From Manchester cotton thread. Materials to the annual value of 50,000*l.* are exported to other vilayets or sold locally. This is a prosperous industry although the methods of manufacture are rather primitive. Towels to the value of about 2,000*l.* are manufactured annually.

Tanning.—The military tannery has introduced improved methods in this industry, which has given it a considerable impulse. Yearly about 10,000 skins are tanned, the surplus above what is required for military purposes being sold locally.

Copper Ware is another manufacture. The copper is imported from England.

Silk Industry.—The introduction of the silkworm dates from about fifteen years ago, and the industry has since been increasing annually. Many large gardens devoted entirely to the cultivation of mulberry trees are now to be seen at the foot of the hills in the neighbourhood of the town. Last year more than 10,000*l.* worth of raw silk was exported to France.

Raki ("native brandy") is manufactured from the mulberry and finds a market in Erzeroum. Thither also are sent large quantities of local wine.

The soil of Erzingan plain is very fertile and well watered. The chief grains grown are wheat, barley, and millet, and among vegetables the haricot-bean is the most important, large quantities of which are exported annually to the vilayet of Trebizond and to Russia. The villages in the plain appear to be in a flourishing condition.

The Armenians of Erzingan, though in the past they have been practically immune from massacres, are extremely pessimistic as regards the future. Their fears are based on the statements of certain officials who are said to have declared that in view of the Armenians having become so insolent the Government was unable to answer for the consequences which might arise.

No Armenian political organisations exist at Erzingan.

Speaking generally from the information gathered during my journey to and from Erzingan, the educated Armenians are unable to understand the attitude of the Government towards the Kurds. This attitude is one of humouring and pampering, and has the natural effect of encouraging their predatory instincts. On the one hand, the explanation is offered that the Central Government, being badly informed as to the character of the Kurds, fears that energetic repressive measures would provoke a general rising; on the other hand, it is said that the Government (rather the local governments, I presume), having doubts as to the permanence of the constitution wishes to avoid alienating itself from the sympathy of the Kurds, so that they may have them at their beck and call when the occasion should arise.

As regards the first explanation, if the central Government has, in fact, been misinformed in this respect, such erroneous information must have been intentional. Anyone who has any local knowledge of Kurds such as Turkish officers of Ashiret regiments will tell one that the Kurds are a docile race and readily amenable to such disciplinary measures as are necessary for the good government of the country. My own humble opinion is that if every act of lawlessness committed by Kurds were rigorously pursued, and the offenders severely punished without delay, such acts would, in a very short time entirely cease, and that the Kurds would become the conspicuously law-abiding subjects that they are in Russia. Further, I do not think that there would be the remotest danger of any general rising of the Kurds without their receiving in the first instance the "office" from the Turks.

As regards the second sinister explanation offered by the Armenians, I can only say that their forming such a belief is not unnatural. At Van there are now about 200 Armenian soldiers, recruited mostly from the Bitlis and Akhlat neighbourhoods. These soldiers are not given arms, but are employed in various kinds of menial duties and also in building barracks. They say among themselves that their officers, knowing that the constitution will only be of short duration, do not think it worth while to instruct them in their military duties.

Probably what has caused more disappointment as regards the working of the new régime than anything else is the lack of improvement manifested in the tribunals as a means of obtaining justice. Apparently it was hoped that a constitutional Government would have the effect of changing corrupt men into honest ones, and apathetic, incapable officials into energetic and incapable administrators, or at least open up a source of supply of such necessary persons.

In fact, however, no improvement whatever has yet taken place in regard to the tribunals. Everywhere are complaints and accusations against the personnel—accusations of bribery, favouritism, apathy, and the like. Cases which come up for trial continue to last indefinitely. Villagers are summoned from distant villages as witnesses, detained several days, and sent back without their evidence being heard. Speaking of the courts of Van, of which I have a more exact knowledge, I can say that the apathy, laziness, and incapacity of the officials are really astounding.

The only persons who can remedy this state of affairs are the valis and other

governors. However, their attitude towards the courts is, for the most part, one of complete detachment. They do not appear to consider it any part of their duty to examine into the working of the tribunals or to use their influence and authority for their improvement. At the same time the authority of a governor remains paramount, and it rests with him to use the tribunals either as a screen for personal responsibility or for furthering his personal wishes. Many instances have brought this home to me. Thus, should some one approach the governor with the view to the redress of a grievance, the former is reminded that these are the days of a constitution, and that he (the governor) has no more power to redress his grievance than the applicant himself, and refers him to the tribunal or to a department. On the other hand, when it coincides with the wish of a governor, the tribunals can show marvellous alacrity, and put through a trial in a few days which has made no progress during, perhaps, years.

Thus it remains with the valis and other high officials to bring about the urgently needed improvement in the personnel of the courts, who are more to be blamed, I think, for their constitutional apathy and torpidity than for intentional injustice.

L. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

Van, February 6, 1911.

[8102] No. 122.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 132.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 28, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul reporting on the Turkish military movements in his district, with observations on the presence in Mosul of Mahmoud Pasha, chief of the Jaff tribe.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 122.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1. Confidential.)

Sir, *Mosul, January* 12, 1911.

ON the 29th December I had the honour to address to your Excellency a cypher telegram, the purport of which was as follows:—

"I am in receipt of information, despatched from Kerkuk on the 21st instant, stating that 1,250 soldiers, representing four battalions, had then left for the frontier region. A mountain battery had also left. There were three battalions at Suleimania and three at Ravanduz on that date. If this information, which is the best obtainable here, is correct, it is probable that some of the troops mentioned in my telegram of the 19th instant stopped short at Ravanduz instead of proceeding to Passova, and that the battalions are even weaker than the estimate in my despatch No. 37 of the 15th November. The ammunition mentioned in my telegram of the 23rd instant did not, according to information now received, proceed to Kerkuk, but on reaching Erbil took the Ravanduz road. The sending of troops to Suleimania would seem to indicate an intention either to reinforce the post at Bana or—and this is more probable—to advance towards the Merivan, Aoroman, and Guran districts. The recent arrival here of Mahmoud Pasha, chief of the Jaff tribe, may be significant if such further encroachment is contemplated. It is true his visit is known to be due partly, at least, to a dispute over taxes, but in their attempts to win over tribes with Persian sympathies the Turkish authorities have used him as a go-between on other occasions.

"It is, I regret to say, impossible in Mosul to obtain entirely punctual and reliable information about the frontier region. Kerkuk would be a better centre temporarily."

The above information regarding military movements has been corroborated by more recent news.

As regards the second hypothesis suggested as an explanation of the despatch of troops to Suleimania, the Turkish occupation and administration of Shehr-i-Zor, now of long standing, and the more recent seizure of Bana—both within the frontier zone as

laid down in 1869—seem natural precursors of an attempt to eliminate, should opportunity occur, the loop of traditionally Persian territory of Ardalan between them, through which the Suleimania–Merivan road passes to Sina and Hamadan. Such an ambition is spoken of on page 33 of a confidential report on the "Suleimania district of Kurdistan" (by Mr. Soane), printed by the Government of India, in the following passage:—

"For several years they (the Turks) have followed the policy of endeavouring to win over the tribespeople by bribes and threats, and with the Sunnis, such as the Mukri, have succeeded. The Shi'ah tribes have resisted, up to the present, despite the anarchy and ruin effected in their territories under the incitement of Turkish agents.

"Merivan and Persian Aoroman, though Sunnis and torn by petty warfare, still refuse to open negotiations with the Turks, and further south the would-be invaders are confronted by the 'Aliullahi Guran and Shi'ah Kalhur Kurds, both powerful tribes, and the latter, distinctly pro-Persian, under a clever and brave chief, Daud Khan, whose authority now extends up to the Perso-Turkish frontier at Kasr-i-Shirin, since Samsam-ul-Mamalek, of the Sinjabi tribe, was deprived of his frontier government.

"Nevertheless, the Turks have tried, unsuccessfully, to seduce the Guran Sultans (through Mahmoud Pasha Jaf), Daud Khan, and Samsam-ul-Mamalek."

As for Mahmoud Pasha's visit to Mosul, further information received argues that his presence here is more closely connected with questions of taxation and submission to Turkish authority, and is less likely to be connected with frontier intrigue than was at first thought. A movement inspired by Nazim Pasha is evidently on foot in this district to destroy the power of certain chiefs hitherto intolerant of Turkish control. Such are Mohammed "Kutcha" Pasha and Ibrahim Baiz, chiefs of the Dizheh tribe, who were recently summoned to Mosul and arrested on their arrival, and Mohammed Khurshid, chief of the Daoudich tribe, who has been surprised and overpowered near Tuz-Khormatu, and thrown into prison at Kerkuk, after refusing to negotiate with the mutessarif of that district. These chiefs, who were alternately pampered and persecuted by the old régime, were little better than highway robbers and cut-throats. Mahmoud Pasha belongs to a higher category than they, but his unlawful profits have far exceeded theirs. The contributions which, as chief of the largest section of the Jaff tribe, he has paid to the authorities, have been but a fraction of his extortions. Wealth and power have hitherto safeguarded him from serious molestation, and when he came to Mosul in response to his recent summons, he thought they would, as usual, secure him advantageous terms. But attempts to arrive at an understanding, which—on the part of the authorities—were perhaps never sincere, have apparently failed, and his relations with them are becoming less friendly. His personal liberty has not been interfered with yet, but it is understood he is to be detained here whilst the experiment is made of collecting this year's taxes without his help. To that end an officer and fifty gendarmes have proceeded to the Jaff district.

In 1906 a force of tribal auxiliaries, raised by Mahmoud Pasha from amongst the Jaff and its allied tribes, accompanied Mohammed Pasha when he advanced to Saouk-Bulak, occupying Serdesht and Dana, and it remains to be seen whether Nazim Pasha is serving his country wisely in choosing the present moment for a fiscal experiment in the case of a tribe which possesses great influence on both sides of the frontier, and is largely migratory.

In conclusion, it is hoped the observations may not be taken to imply that exaggerated importance has been attached to military movements in themselves on a small scale, and any immediate activity is improbable, as the roads east of Suleimania are reported to be almost closed in winter.

Interesting notes on the Jaff and other frontier tribes are given on pages 39–41 of the report by Mr. Soane above-mentioned.

I have, &c.

C. A. GREIG.

[8103] No. 123.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 133.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 28, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 18 of the 8th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum in regard to the

apathetic attitude of the authorities towards the lawlessness of certain Kurdish tribes, and the apparent abandonment for the present of the policy of intimidation towards the Kurdish beys.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 123.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, February* 12, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 100 of the 26th December last, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the acting vice-consul at Bitlis, reporting on the passive attitude of the authorities with regard to the anarchical conditions prevailing in the Kurdish district of Khuyt.

To judge from the reports received from the consular officers throughout this district, and from the language of the Vali of Erzeroum, who talks of making a tour in summer in order to come into personal contact with all the Kurdish tribes, it would appear that the policy of intimidation is for the present abandoned, and that the ascendency of the Kurdish beys, which has hitherto constituted the chief danger for the Christian population, is no longer considered incompatible with the constitutional régime.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

Enclosure 2 in No. 123.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Bitlis, January* 30, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows upon the affair of Khuyt, in which Kurds of the district killed three zaptiehs and wounded two others on the 11th December last:—

The local authorities seem to have dropped at present the idea of any undertaking against those rebels, and though I have stated in my despatch of the 16th ultimo that two companies of soldiers had been ordered to Khuyt from Mush, they were apparently countermanded from Erzindjan before reaching their destination.

I had a private interview a few days ago with Ismail Hakki Bey, the acting vali, about the state of affairs in Khuyt. His Excellency gave me to understand indirectly that in his proposals with regard to the reforms to be carried out in this province he is invariably meeting strong resistance on the part of the Central Government. After relating his winter experience in combating Bulgarian bands in Macedonia under the old Government, he added that he liked certainly to lead himself a punitive expedition into Khuyt to capture the culprits, but he did not think that the time was quite propitious for such a military movement.

On my remarking that, as far as I knew the Belekli Kurds and their country, the winter was the best season which should render the task easy, while in spring the criminals would hide themselves in unaccessible rocks and forests, he brought forth a series of reasons for his preference of a summer expedition, which seemed to me to be tantamount to his saying that he is not authorised for the time being to raise a "Kurdish question."

He asked me further to assure His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on his part that he, as a provincial Governor, would do all in his power to improve the condition of things throughout this vilayet. He showed me a report of ninety pages which he had lately submitted to the Porte pointing out all the indispensable reforms, the execution of which, he thought, could not be delayed any further. "He could not do everything himself, he added, and it was materially impossible for him to be everywhere in the vilayet to watch the corrupt officials. The Kaimakam of Khizan, appointed by Tahir Pasha, his predecessor, was just being brought to trial for a very shameful case of bribe-taking. Complaints of the same nature were raised against the Kaimakam of Varto, and he had almost no trustworthy official at his disposal to send for an enquiry into the case. He absolutely lacked honest and capable officials," &c.

I am informed from another good source that as long as the state in Yemen, Hauran, and the European vilayets is not improved, and those disturbed regions are not quieted, the Central Government will not permit Ismail Hakki Bey to undertake a military expedition against the Kurds of Khuyt. The notorious Musa Bey-ou-Khevner seems to be now the powerful master of the situation. It is understood that he is again agitating amongst the Kurds of Khuyt and Modky to arm themselves, and is doing his best to drive these Kurds to further violence.

In any case, it seems now to be quite evident that before May or June next no measure will be taken by the authorities to combat the rebellion in Khuyt, and therefore the present state of semi-anarchy prevailing in the district will be allowed to continue for another period.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

[8110]

No. 124.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 140. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February* 28, 1911.

DESPITE the preoccupations arising out of the present Cabinet crisis and the general internal situation in the capital, the gravity of the Yemen revolt is causing official and other circles to consider seriously schemes for some solution of a problem which threatens to become, under the new régime as under the old, a permanent drain of men and money.

The "Sabah," which has connections with the present Government, recently published an article inviting the new Minister of the Interior to study the problem and suggesting that Yemen and Assir should be governed through the local chiefs, *i.e.*, the imam in the Yemen highlands and Seyyid Idris in Assir. It says the present campaign is the most difficult the Ottoman Government has had to face since the original conquest of the country in the sixteenth century and advocates making a military display, which presumably means the relief of the beleagured garrisons at Ibha, Sana'a, Taiz, &c., and then introducing administrative reforms on the basis of an autonomous system by which the local chiefs would govern the province in the name of the Ottoman Government. The writer adds that there is less danger in adopting such a course in that the population is divided by the religious antagonism between the Zeidi and Shafi. With the exception of the first proposal of autonomy by Khamil Pasha in 1908, it is to be feared that most of these schemes are not the outcome of sincerity and that their authors trust that under autonomous conditions rivalries between the Arab sects and tribes, from natural causes or fomented by the Turks, would result in anarchy and an eventual request of the tribesmen for the return of Turkish rule. It is not impossible, however, that, under such circumstances, the tribes might invite the British from Aden, rather than the Turks, to come in and administer the country.

Lutfi Fikri Bey, the Opposition deputy for Dersim, has also presented to the Chamber a scheme of part self-government for Yemen, by which the Governor-General would administer the province with the assistance of a council of five members, each of whom would be at the head of a department on the Indian model. He would also create a Legislative Assembly composed partly of official and partly of elected deputies, with powers to legislate on matters financial, administrative, judicial and municipal, with the proviso that any decision contrary to the Ottoman constitution or existing treaties may be vetoed by the Council of State at Constantinople. He further proposes that the central Government should grant an annual subvention up to £T. 100,000 to the Yemen Treasury, while any surplus in the local budget should be remitted to the capital. I beg to enclose a criticism of the project by Jelal Nouri in the "Jeune Turc." This and other such schemes are distinctly crude, but they point to the conviction that Yemen cannot be directly administered from Constantinople. The cardinal factor, however, in the Yemen situation is that the imam has historical and other claims to become the independent ruler of the province and that any scheme which does not admit this principle, under the guise, perhaps, of Ottoman suzerainty, is doomed to failure.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

P.S. Hussein Jahid Bey, in a leader in to-day's "Tanin," copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith, sharply criticises Lutfi Fikri Bey's proposals mainly on the ground that they fail to suggest a remedy for the imam's separatist claims. As usual he does not favour the broad liberal view of conciliation and working through the imam, but advocates military repression and reducing the Zeidi this time by force to such a state that they will never again be in a condition to start a movement. This is the policy that was applied to Albania and, if persisted in in the case of Yemen, will prove exceedingly costly and will leave moral wounds that may take long to heal. It certainly will not endear the "constitutional" régime to Zeidi and other tribesmen of the Yemen highlands.

G. L.

Enclosure 1 in No. 124.

Extract from the "Tanin" of March 1, 1911.

(Translation.)

YESTERDAY we discussed the Bill for reforming the Yemen, which was hastily drawn up by Lutfi Fikri Bey, deputy for Dersim, in about fifteen days. We return to the subject because the Bill is useful as showing what would probably happen if the administration of the country passed into the hands of those who are always criticising the Government.

The honourable member invites us to settle, by some means or other, this problem which has demanded such sacrifices for thirty or forty years, and the remedies he suggests are such as we should expect from a man who begins in that way. Nothing is said, however, about the revolts of Imam Yahya and Seyyid Idris, which constitute the Yemen question of to-day; or rather it is said that it is not thought necessary to settle Imam Yahya's claims by this law. According to the member for Dersim, what the Government has to do is to allow this man's influence in the Yemen to increase by means of reforms.

Imam Yahya has surrounded Sana'a and cut off Hodeidah, and Seyyid Idris has besieged many places in Assir. And the advice given us is to carry out serious reforms and to allow their influence to increase! Where are we to carry out reforms? What are we to begin on? No thought has been given to these points.

What is the good of this law then? So long as Imam Yahya's claim is not settled, how can the Yemen problem be solved? Since the Government is bound first of all to settle Imam Yahya's claim and to quell Seyyid Idris' revolt, what word but "self-advertisement" can be applied to this jewel of a production, which was written, like a fairy-story, in fifteen days?

With regard to revolts in parts of the Yemen not inhabited by the Zeidis, one may discuss such causes and economic influences as to the maladministration and tyranny of the old Government: to remove such causes it is of course necessary to establish a form of government suitable to the needs of the Yemen. But that is not what we can call the Yemen question: the real Yemen problem for us is constituted by the Zeidis. According to the Zeidis' religion, the imam of the Zeidis considers himself Khalif, and cannot be in subjection to anyone. He is bound by his religion to proclaim a holy war. While this fact stands, it is a proof of the greatest ignorance to think that the matter can be ended by setting up a sort of chamber of deputies in the Yemen.

The Government has not failed to attempt reforms to win the hearts of the population of the Yemen. Has it not abolished some local taxes that annoyed the people? Have the Sheri laws not begun to be applied to the Yemen? Has not the vali been given wide powers to take measures in accordance with local needs? Has it not been decided to build railways in the Yemen?

Although these measures are not sufficient, they are a step towards straightening out affairs. Yet Imam Yahya has revolted, besieged Sana'a and raised other tribes.

This means that in order to carry out reforms in the Yemen, or even to apply the law drawn up by the Lutfi Fikri Bey, it is necessary to settle the Imam Yahya question and put an end to Seyyid Idris' rebellion. What shall we do with Imam Yahya? Repeated events have shown him to be a plague, the harmful effects of which will not be got under until it is destroyed. Will a special sphere, or certain limits be accepted for Imam Yahya? How can one imagine that there is a possibility of becoming reconciled with Imam Yahya, whose aim is to gather all the Zeidis, who want Sana'a, under his administration? The member for Dersim's plan of making Sana'a the chief town of the Yemen shows that he also would be unable to come to an agreement with Imam

Yahya; so even if Lutfi Fikri's Bill is passed into law, there will be military expeditions to the Yemen from time to time, and the Yemen problem will keep on cropping up, until Imam Yahya is cleared out of the way. Indeed, it is doubtful whether even that would be sufficient; for even if Imam Yahya disappears, the Zeidis will of course choose another imam, who will consider it a religious duty to make war on us.

If, therefore, one desires to grapple seriously with the Yemen question, one must put aside the settlement of Imam Yahya's claim, and give up fantastic ideas unsuited to the place, the time, and possibilities. The first phase of the Yemen problem is a military question. The Zeidis ought to be brought into such a state that they will not be able to stir again: then we can look about us, and if we think of anything we can carry it out; for whatever reforms we carry out, Imam Yahya, or the imam of the Zeidis, whoever he may be, will continue his attacks. It must not be forgotten that these attacks have no connection whatever with good or bad government. While Imam Yahya wants independence, while he meets with encouragement and backing from certain quarters, and while, in order to maintain his position, he proclaims the holy war in accordance with the precepts of his religion, it is more than childish to be taken in with the idea of solving the Yemen difficulty in a hurry by a Bill which has no connection with it—which indeed ignors it entirely.

Enclosure 2 in No. 124.

Newspaper Extract.

CE QU'ON DOIT FAIRE DU YÉMEN.

NOUS n'avons pas cessé de préconiser dans ces colonnes la fixation du statut administratif du Yémen. Nous recevons l'exemplaire imprimé du projet de loi élaboré par Loutfi Fikri Bey, député de Dersim, sur l'administration de la province en question. C'est un projet fort intéressant mais incomplet. Puisse la Chambre des Députés le prendre en sérieuse considération et le compléter.

Analysons et critiquons le document avant d'indiquer les points qui nous paraissent omis dans le projet.

Le vilayet du Yémen, d'après l'honorable député, est, comme les autres, un vilayet inséparable des autres parties de l'Empire. Il a une tout autre organisation administrative, parce qu'il est loin de la métropole, parce que les voies de communications y font défaut, et enfin, parce qu'il y a lieu de prendre en considération le milieu qui est tout différent du nôtre.

Toutes les lois ottomanes y seraient en vigueur, à la condition que d'autres lois, élaborées par le conseil général de la province, n'aient pas apporté des modifications à leurs stipulations.

Ceux qui n'obéissent pas au Yémen aux ordres du Gouvernement seront déclarés rebelles et le gouverneur les punira, ou les graciera après avoir obtenu au préalable l'autorisation du Sultan.

Les langues officielles du pays sont le turc et l'arabe, toutefois la correspondance avec la capitale se fera en turc.

La contrée est administrée par un vali, qui habitera la ville de Sanâa; il aura un adjoint. Les hauts fonctionnaires du vilayet sont les directeurs des Départements de l'Intérieur, de l'Instruction publique, de la Justice, de l'Agriculture, des Travaux publics et le conseiller légiste. Ils forment un conseil consultatif.

Loutfi Bey ne dit pas de quelle manière et par qui, c'est-à-dire sur la présentation de qui, ces hauts fonctionnaires seront nommés. C'est là une lacune.

Le vali sera-t-il libre de choisir sa suite ou non; dans ce dernier cas le vali peut-il assumer toute la responsabilité? Il y a bien lieu d'étudier, pour être édifié là-dessus, les systèmes appliqués aux Indes britanniques, aux Indes orientales, aux diverses colonies françaises dans certaines nouvelles sociétés anglo-saxonnes.

Le vali dépend du Grand Vizirat.

Nous désirerions attacher ce haut dignitaire directement, comme du reste le vali d'aujourd'hui, au Ministère de l'Intérieur et avoir dans ce Ministère un bureau et un sous-secrétaire d'État spéciaux pour les affaires du Yémen.

Le Grand Vizir n'est, par sa nature, guère qualifié pour être le chef hiérarchique du Gouvernement du Yémen.

Le Grand Vizir peut envoyer sur place un haut inspecteur pour contrôler la gestion du vali. Nous voudrions avoir plus de détails sur ce point très délicat.

Le vali est révocable par le Sultan, par mesure administrative. Cela est très vague. Dans ces conditions on ne trouvera pas un véritable vice-roi pour pacifier et pour mettre en valeur ce beau et véritable royaume.

Que fera un bon vali, si un ou plusieurs députés agissent, à Constantinople, contre lui?

Le vali ne peut être jugé que par la Haute Cour. Cela nous paraît excessif.

Les émoluments du vali sont de £T. 400 par mois. Ne peut-on pas élever ce chiffre à 500?

Voici ceux des autres dignitaires: adjoint, 150; directeur, 100.

A l'exception des commandants des troupes, nulle autorité ne pourra correspondre avec celles de la capitale.

Les fonctionnaires seront nommés par le Grand Vizir sur la présentation du vali. Qui sont ces fonctionnaires—sont-ce les directeurs, ou les autres?

Les douanes, les postes et télégraphes dépendront de la métropole.

La partie la plus essentielle et la plus critiquable du projet Loutfi Fikri Bey, c'est, sans contredit, le conseil général.

D'après le député de Dersim, il y aura au Yémen un conseil général, une sorte de diète pour statuer sur les affaires administratives, financières et sociales de la contrée. Voici de quelle manière cette diète se compose:

Tous les chéikhs des Kabyles, ainsi que les chefs des communes de toutes les parties du pays se réunissent sur la convocation du vali, le premier jour de mois de janvier, à Sanaa. Les villes y envoient un député pour chaque 5,000 indigènes et pour trois ans.

Nous trouvons opportun de dire que le Yémen ne peut point, dans les circonstances données, supporter un conseil élu. Certes, nous sommes des partisans acharnés de la souveraineté du peuple, mais cela ne veut pas dire qu'on doit aussi laisser libres ceux qui doivent être encore sous la tutelle. Le Yémen est un pays trop arriéré, trop attardé. Les Anglais même n'ont pas doté certaines colonies (habitées par des Anglais) d'institutions similaires. Tout ce qu'il faut, aujourd'hui, pour le Yémen, c'est un conseil législatif nommé et pas plus que ça. Espérons qu'on puisse, dans le cours du siècle, changer un pareil conseil en une diète régulière.

Puis, permettons-nous de le dire que, si on venait à adopter le projet Loutfi Fikri, ce conseil se composerait d'au moins 750 membres! En effet, il y a 250 Kabyles et autres au Yémen, soit 250 chefs ou chéikhs; puis, supposons qu'il y a dans le vilayet 50 pour cent de citadins, soit au bas mot 2,500,000 habitants de villes, ce qui fait 500 députés. Ce nombre me paraît excessif. Il ne faut, selon nous, qu'un conseil de trente membres pour le Yémen, composé de hauts fonctionnaires, de chefs et de chéiks influents, de chérifs, de notabilités, d'ulémas.

Pour le Yémen, il faut adopter la méthode néerlandaise: combler les chéikhs de grades, de décorations, de costumes de parade, d'hommes pour les mieux rattacher au Gouvernement. On doit aussi payer d'une façon très convenable ces dignitaires. L'auteur du projet préconise la publicité des débats, &c.; tout cela nous semble superflu.

Le vali a aussi le droit de nommer, pour trois ans, des membres pour ce conseil. Si nous ajoutons au nombre ci-haut indiqué de 750 membres, encore les membres nommés et les hauts fonctionnaires qui sont membres de droit, alors nous aurons facilement un nombre de 800 ou même de 850 députés! Ainsi le budget du Yémen ne suffirait même pour payer ses députés.

Tous les projets de loi seront votés par le conseil, agréés par le vali et sanctionnés par iradé de Sa Majesté le Sultan. N'y a-t-il pas lieu aussi de les faire examiner avant de les promulguer par Conseil d'État et celui des Ministres?

Le déficit du vilayet sera comblé jusqu'à concurrence de £T. 100,000 par la métropole; s'il y a excédent, cela sera envoyé à la capitale. N'y a-t-il pas lieu d'avancer les sommes destinées à combler le déficit à la province, au lieu de les perdre pour toujours?

Tous les impôts arriérés sont graciés. Cela est fort bien.

On tâchera de remplacer les anciens dollars de Marie-Thérèse, qui ont cours actuellement au Yémen, par des pièces ottomanes. Nous voudrions voir remplacer le mot de "on tâchera" par "on remplacera" tout court.

Le vali, de concert avec le commandant, fixera le nombre des troupes destinées à assurer la sécurité générale dans le vilayet.

Pour ce qui concerne l'ordre public le commandant ne dépend que du vali; néanmoins, il peut correspondre aussi avec ses chefs hiérarchiques pour les affaires qui ont trait à la discipline, &c.

Les frais des troupes ainsi que ceux des navires de guerre stationnant aux eaux du Yémen seront supportés par la métropole.

Les navires de guerre, les "gun-boats" envoyés au Yémen sont mis sous les ordres du Gouvernement. Nous jugeons bon de mettre sous les yeux de nos lecteurs certaines considérations sur les campagnes du Yémen.

Comme l'on sait, ces campagnes sont chez nous très impopulaires. Trois cent mille enfants de la patrie ont péri dans les déserts du Yémen. Par là nous ne voulons pas dire que nos soldats ne veulent pas aller au Yémen. Non! mille fois non! Le soldat ottoman va avec bravoure, avec abnégation, voire avec fierté au Yémen pour battre les rebelles, pour sauver l'honneur du drapeau. Mais, n'y a-t-il pas lieu d'épargner à nos troupes régulières ces dérangements continuels en créant une milice *ad hoc* recrutée parmi les volontaires? Cela a été étudié, semble-t-il, par le Cabinet Kiamil Pacha. N'y a-t-il pas lieu de revenir là-dessus et de créer une légion spéciale, comme les légions étrangères et hollandaises, en Algérie et aux Iles de la Sonde? Comme le préconisait notre ami Gasztowtt, il est vraiment possible de former des bataillons arabes, composés de volontaires, de gens de l'Irac, de Syriens d'Égyptiens, de Tunisiens, d'Algériens, &c., qui peuvent mieux supporter le climat de l'Arabie heureuse que les autres.

Je prie les autorités compétentes et l'auteur du projet, Loufti Fikri Bey, d'étudier ce point des plus intéressants.

Dans le projet on parle aussi d'une gendarmerie spéciale. Eh bien! ne pourrait-on pas combiner les deux choses?

Les lois judiciaires à élaborer par le conseil général seront conformes à la loi révélée et aux exigences de notre civilisation actuelle. Ne peut-on pas mettre, dans ce projet, des dispositions nécessaires sur ce qui a trait au système civilisateur à appliquer dans ce beau pays?

Conclusion:

Le Gouvernement et le pouvoir législative ne doivent pas rejeter ce projet parce qu'il émane d'un membre de l'Opposition. Certes, ce travail a besoin d'être développé, retouché, remanié, mais le principe ne doit point d'être rejeté.

A Halil Bey d'agir.—Djelal Noury.

[8368] No. 125.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 7.)

India Office, March 6, 1911.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th February on the subject of the red oxide mines on the island of Abu Musa, and, in reply, to say that the Earl of Crewe agrees to the appointment of a small inter-departmental committee to consider the terms of the proposed compromise and other connected matters. His Lordship has nominated Sir J. L. Mackay and Mr. J. E. Ferard to represent this Office.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[9019] No. 126.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers to Foreign Office.—(Received March 11.)

3, *Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, March 10, 1911.*

Sir,

WE have the honour to refer to previous correspondence regarding the expropriation by the Turkish authorities at Bagdad of a portion of our business premises in that city, and the destruction by them of the main wall forming the front of our offices. Our claim for compensation in respect of this expropriation was examined and approved by His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, and forwarded by him to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. We await settlement of this claim by the Turkish Government in order to enable us to commence rebuilding our premises.

Our agents write to us that the proper period to commence building operations is in the spring; also that it is almost essential to them to have the work well advanced

before wool pressing begins in May, when they will require the full use of the premises. Moreover, they represent that if they cannot soon reoccupy the premises they will be obliged to rent for the hot summer months better temporary premises than those they are at present occupying, thus incurring further expense. We have consulted eminent counsel, Mr. Hamilton, K.C., and he informs us that all this loss and expense must be defrayed by the Turkish Government. We enclose a copy of his opinion on this point.

Under these circumstances, if the Porte be not prepared to deal with this question immediately, and to pay at once the whole amount of our claim, we would suggest that a certain sum, say 1,000*l.*, should be paid to us now to enable us to commence rebuilding, leaving the definite settlement of the claim to be dealt with as soon as opportunity serves.

We hope that it may be possible to have this matter brought forward in Constantinople at an early date, as our agents lay great stress on the importance of beginning to rebuild at once.

We observe that, in writing to us on the subject of refund of duty on the steamship "Julnar," you informed us that the Turkish Government took the view that precedents established under the old régime could not validly be followed under the new régime, presumably because the new régime bases itself on the practice of constitutional countries. While entirely dissenting from this view as regards the past, we would point out that in this premises question the Turkish Government are seeking to establish a new precedent which is entirely at variance with the procedure of constitutional countries. We attach a memorandum on this aspect of the subject by Mr. Hamilton, K.C.

We have, &c.
LYNCH BROTHERS.

Enclosure in No. 126.

Copy of Memorandum by Mr. Hamilton, K.C., dated February 17, 1911, on the Subject of the Practice of Constitutional Countries in connection with Expropriation of Private Property.

AS I have already advised, no person can be deprived of his immovable property in a country having parliamentary institutions except on the ground of public utility and in pursuance of some general or special law passed by the Legislature. In countries having a federal form of Government a provision to this effect is usually inserted in the law of the constitution, so that even if a law were passed by the Legislature with the consent of the president, purporting to grant the right to the executive of expropriating without paying compensation, such law would be *ultra vires* and void. Moreover, in some countries, as in England, no person can have his immovable property taken from him against his will except in pursuance of a special Act of Parliament, and an opportunity being afforded him of being heard by himself or his counsel, with or without witnesses, asking that the law may not be passed, or that, if passed, proper provision may be made for his protection. In France, in all big schemes of public utility like railways, highways, canals, &c., a special law is required, and the party interested can be heard against the passing of the law. In other unimportant cases, however, a general law may be made in France sanctioning the executive expropriating property on the ground of public utility upon paying proper compensation. In most of the States of Germany, a general law is sufficient to empower the executive to expropriate on the ground of public utility. In all cases, however, the procedure required by the special or general law must be strictly followed, or the expropriation can be set aside upon appeal to the proper tribunals.

Re Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

Premises at Bagdad.

Opinion.

I have been requested to advise upon the question submitted to me in Mr. Lynch's letter to me of the 3rd February, 1911.

The general rule as to damages is that such damages are recoverable as are the

necessary or probable result of the wrong done. Assuming that the action of the municipal council in the matter has been illegal, the damages would be the sum necessary to reinstate the premises in their former condition, together with the amount paid for rent of temporary offices until Messrs. Lynch were able to reinstate the premises. If the premises cannot be reinstated because the municipal council are in possession of the land required for widening the road, then the rent would be recoverable until the matter was decided, provided that, in obtaining such decision, Messrs. Lynch proceeded without undue delay.

Under the circumstances mentioned, Messrs. Lynch are entitled to claim for rent of temporary offices until they have received from the Turkish authorities the sum which may be agreed upon as the award on account of compensation for disturbance.

WILLIAM F. HAMILTON.

Lincoln's Inn, February 17, 1911.

[9108] No. 127.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 149.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 7, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 53 of the 17th January last, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah reporting the arrival in that port of the delegates appointed by the Italian and Turkish Governments to inquire into the recent incident, which arose at Hodeidah in December last, owing to the seizure of an Italian dhow by an Ottoman gunboat in the Red Sea, as reported in my despatch No. 901 of the 14th December, 1910.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 127.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 9 E. Confidential.)

Sir, *Hodeidah, February 15, 1911.*

I HAVE to honour to report the arrival at this port from Suez, on the 11th instant, of the Italian gunboat "Aretusa," with Baron Eliotti, of the Italian Foreign Office, on board.

The "Aretusa" is ordinarily stationed at Massawa, but was dispatched to Suez to specially convey the above-mentioned official to Hodeidah.

Baron Eliotti has been deputed by the Italian Government to investigate, in co-operation with one Saleh Bey, of the Ottoman Foreign Office, as the outcome of an arrangement entered into between the Ottoman and Italian Governments respectively, an unpleasant incident that occurred at Hodeidah between the Italian consul-general here, Cavalier Sola, and the local authorities, owing to the seizure of an Italian dhow at Medi by an Ottoman gunboat.

I have to observe that I was absent on leave at the time, and that my *locum tenens* did not report on the subject.

It would appear that the gunboat in question seized a dhow called the "Genoa" at Medi in August last year in the act of landing goods in contraband on shore at that place, brought her to Hodeidah, and handed her over to the Customs. The latter, in consultation with the Vali and the Mutessarif of Hodeidah, decided to confiscate the cargo and to inflict the statutory fine on the dhow in question.

Cavalier Sola, the Italian consul-general, protested against the action of the Yemen authorities, and refused to accept the decision of the Customs.

Protracted correspondence on the subject of the seizure ensued between the local Italian consulate and the governor-general at Sana'a, without result, the latter insisting that the cargo would be confiscated and the dhow fined, and transmitted categorical instructions to the Hodeidah authorities to that effect.

The contention of the Italian consul-general throughout has been that the vessel put into Medi for repairs, and that it was found necessary to land the cargo for that purpose. They base their contention on a certificate averred to be issued to the above

effect by the Sheikh of Medi, whom they described as the acting mudir of the place, but whom the authorities decline to recognise.

Cavalier Sola apparently intended to retake possession of the seized dhow by force, and sent an armed cavass on board to resist any interference of the Turkish officials.

The mutessarif, under orders from the vali, then sent an officer and ten armed gendarmes to board the dhow and take possession of that craft, with instructions to fire if resistance were offered.

The Italian cavass refused to allow the armed party on board, stating that he was prepared to shoot if any of the party attempted to board the "Genoa." The officer in charge then returned on shore and reported to the mutessarif, who insisted that the orders issued be carried out, but declined to put the same on paper when requested by the officer of the guard to do so.

The consul-general himself in the meantime boarded the dhow and hoisted three flags—the Italian naval ensign, the consular, and the mercantile marine flags. He remained on board for four days and nights, without further attempt being made on the vessel, when the gunboat "Aretusa," that the consul-general had cabled for to Massawa, anchored off the port.

The case was then transferred to Constantinople, with the result that the Italian and Ottoman Governments decided to enquire into the affair by the appointment of a mixed commission.

Saleh Bey, the Ottoman Commissioner, arrived here by the steam-ship "Keneh" on the 11th instant.

It is expected that the commissioners will proceed to Medi in a few days to institute certain enquiries there.

The Italian commissioner, Baron Eliotti, on whom I called a few days ago, informed me that, in the event of a deadlock in the negotiations, both parties had agreed to refer the case to His Majesty's Government for arbitration.

It is needless for me to comment on the conduct of my Italian colleague in this matter, but I may say that his action in boarding the dhow and making a show of force has exposed him to ridicule in the eyes of the local townspeople who witnessed the proceedings.

I have, &c.
G. A. RICHARDSON.

[9100] No. 128.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 150.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 6, 1911.*

I HAVE, on different occasions during the past two years, had the honour to address you on the subject of the Samsoun-Sivas Railway and the interest which the Russian Embassy was taking in the concession for that line.

In my despatch No. 533 of the 10th July, 1909, I reported a conversation I had had with the Grand Vizier on the subject, in which he referred to the agreement made between the Russian and Ottoman Governments in 1900, and copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 57, Confidential, of the 27th January, 1909.

I have now ascertained that the Russian Ambassador last year again approached the Porte in regard to this question, but he was verbally informed that the agreement of 1900, containing a stipulation that railways "dans les provinces septentrionales de la Turquie d'Asie" would not be given to any foreign subjects except Russians, embraced another condition, namely, that the Russian Government would prevent the Armenian revolutionaries from returning to Turkey. As under the constitution this condition had no longer any *raison d'être*, the Turkish Government no longer felt itself bound by the conditions regarding railways laid down in the agreement.

M. Tcharykow, I understand, left the matter there, but recently general conversations have begun again on the subject, and he has suggested that some arrangement might be arrived at on the lines of the Russian Government, abandoning the rights to the Samsoun-Sivas line on condition that the Turkish Government should bind itself in the future to link up the lines with those to be eventually constructed in Russian territory on the Turkish frontier.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[9110] No. 129.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 151.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 8, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Damascus, informing me that three of the Druse rebels, of whom 190 are imprisoned at Damascus, were publicly executed in that town on the 5th instant, and that three more will in all probability be hanged shortly.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[10002] No. 130.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 153.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 9, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul Monahan, reporting that during this pilgrimage notices in nearly all the languages of Islam have been distributed to the pilgrims, inviting them to contribute to the Ottoman fleet.

I took occasion to-day to call Rifaat's attention to this in a friendly way, pointing out that while the pilgrims were merely invited to contribute, and that there was no obligation to do so, yet these pilgrims, who were already severely mulcted during the pilgrimage, would probably consider that it was a liability from which they could not escape.

The proceeding laid itself open to misconstruction.

His Excellency said he would make enquiries.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 130.

Consul Monahan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Jeddah, February 21, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that during this Haj, notices (of which I enclose one translated Arabic copy) in nearly all the languages of Islam, Turkish, Arabic, Persian, Hindustani, Bokhari, Malay, &c., were distributed among pilgrims, calling on them to contribute to the Ottoman fleet. Contributions of various amounts were generally made. I have one British Indian's receipt for 20 piastres contributed by him. The total realised, so far as is known, was about £T. 9,000.

I have, &c.
J. H. MONAHAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 130.

Notice.

(Translation.)

WHEREAS the refuge of the Caliphate (? who) is the servant of the two holy places which are the object of prayers of all Mussulmans, and the bond of union of all believers in the one God in our sublime Ottoman Empire strengthened with every defence, being the guardian Empire of the holy cities, the object of the prayers of all Islam, and that Empire requires to be equipped with an increased number of great ships of the new model, and the people of all the Ottoman provinces have shown zeal in assisting the Government to this good purpose, a purpose which is of obligation for all Mussulmans, and especially when they are all assured, and know of their own testimony and experience, that all that is contributed will be devoted to the proper purpose without any deception in the matter, and all those people have set about this with active co-operation, so all the pilgrims to the House of God, of whatever class or kind, who desire to help in this good work, a work of which the merit surpasses that of every

other good work, should repair to the Government House, and the proper place, and pay according to the generous prompting of their souls to the proper official, into his hand, and get a due receipt, the payment being entered in the register which is open to the inspection of every one who wishes it.

[10003] No. 131.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 155. Confidential.)

Sir, *Pera, March 10, 1911.*

WITH reference to Mr. Marling's despatch No. 944 of the 30th December last, I understand that the Grand Vizier has recently made it quite clear to the promoters of the Chester scheme that it did not have his support, and the Minister of War has also assumed a similar attitude, the latter having even openly stated that the granting of the concession would be regarded by Germany as an unfriendly act, and that Turkey was not disposed to take any step by which she might forfeit the friendship of that Power.

It has for the past year been understood that the scheme had the support of a majority of the Chamber, and the American Embassy has made no concealment of their opinion that the failure to conclude the business is the result of pressure brought to bear by the German Ambassador against the scheme.

This doubtless has been an influential factor in the adverse attitude adopted by the Ottoman Government towards the scheme, but I have reason to believe that what has specially influenced the Grand Vizier has been his disinclination to see the advent into Turkey of American capital on a large scale. His Highness believes that as regards other Great Powers active interference in support of their interests will always be held in check by the existing balance of power in Europe, but that America not being restrained by any considerations of this nature might at any moment even go so far as to dispatch a fleet here for the safeguard of what she considered to be her interests.

The matter is, however, not finally disposed of, and at the present moment is being used by the Armenian deputies in the parliamentary situation. These being in favour of the scheme threaten to withdraw their support from the Government if the latter do not change their attitude on the question.

Quite latterly it has been suggested that the Chester group might possibly come to terms with the Bagdad Railway Company.

Baron von Marschall mentioned the matter to me yesterday, and said that the failure to obtain the concession was by the Americans and their supporters laid at his door. This, he said, was quite untrue. The only observation he had made in official quarters was that there would be a difficulty about the Chester scheme finding an outlet for its line at Youmourtalik, but that this was a matter of arrangement between the two companies. Baron von Marschall must have forgotten that last year he confided to me the fact that he had entered a protest to the Grand Vizier against the scheme, as recorded in my despatch No. 357 of the 4th June, 1910.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[10008] No. 132.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 161.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 20, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 124 of the 23rd ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, reporting further on the state of affairs in the Yemen.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 132.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Hodeidah, February 16, 1911.*

EVER since my despatch of the 13th January was submitted to Mr. Marling, the situation in this province has gradually been getting worse.

I have from time to time reported to your Excellency, by telegraph, on the general progress of the revolt in the Yemen under the Imam Seyyid Yahya; but I have abstained from furnishing details in the form of a despatch owing to the contradictory and conflicting nature of the information that has reached Hodeidah, in spite of anything that may have been published at length in the various European and Turkish papers abroad.

Hodeidah has been more or less completely cut off from Sana'a and Menakha respectively on the western, and from the Turkish outposts on the south-eastern border; so much so that intelligence of what is actually going on is scanty here and most unreliable. I may mention that the authorities at Hodeidah are not very much better served in this respect than we are, and it often happens that the information contained in reports submitted by them to the Central Government is premature.

Sana'a, as I have already reported, has been completely invested by the rebels since about the 12th January.

The garrison is much smaller than I at first supposed it to be, having been markedly decreased since my visit to the capital last summer.

There cannot be more than four battalions of infantry at the outside, and seven batteries of field and mountain artillery.

A very good stock of food-stuffs, military stores, and ammunition was laid by the authorities last summer, and I think that the garrison can hold out for fully ten or twelve months as far as provisions are concerned.

A few days after the town of Sana'a was invested, the rebels appeared in great strength at its very walls, but were driven off by General Muhomed Ali Pasha, who, with two battalions of infantry and two batteries of artillery marched outside and stormed the town of Rauda, some 3 miles to the north, where the rebels had fortified themselves.

According to some accounts the Turks suffered a slight reverse from the insurgents a little distance to the west of Sana'a, at a mountainous place called Assir. The latter slopes command the entrance into Sana'a from the western side, and according to information received at the time and since confirmed, have fallen into the hands of the Arabs.

It would appear that the vali, General Mahomed Ali Pasha, fearing intrigues amongst the local Arab residents of Sana'a, who are naturally inclined towards the imam, and are in correspondence with him, imprisoned the principal merchants in the fortress and caused all the gates of the walled city to be closed.

This resulted in the cutting off of fresh supplies from outside and soon compelled the vali to change his tactics. He opened the gates of the town after having first bombarded and destroyed the numerous petty villages in the environs that gave shelter to the rebels investing the capital.

Heliographic communication with Hodeidah was at first maintained, but this was interrupted by the Arabs seizing Nabi Sheib, commanding the outpost at Senani Pasha at one point, and by sniping the Turkish heliograph station at Menakha at another.

During the past three weeks no news has been received from the capital, and the local authorities betray great concern regarding its pending fate.

The military garrisons at Senani Pasha, Bunn, Suk-el-Khamis, and Mefaq', lying between Sana'a and Menakha, have also been besieged by the insurgents, and contradictory intelligence has been received as regards their fate.

Seyyid Abdulla Ibrahim, the imam's principal lieutenant, is very active indeed in south-eastern Yemen and the towns of Mudhar, Wahan, Ibb, and Yerim, where the Turks have always maintained small garrisons have fallen to the onslaught of his armed bands.

It would appear that the civil officials and the garrisons there have surrendered without resistance, and have been permitted to retire to Sana'a; whereas the officials and troops who have attempted to oppose the rebels have been seized and sent to the Seyyid Yahya's stronghold at Shahara.

The town of Ibb, I am informed, is actively besieged by the rebels who propose to

divert their attention to Taiz later. The village of Hujjeria, which has always been hostile to Turkish administration, has declared in favour of the imam and has killed its kaimakam.

The imam's adherents who in former rebellions did not think of attacking positions as far south as Menakha, the real key to Sana'a and to the position in the Yemen in general are profiting by their experience in the past, and have lost no time in besieging Menakha, whose inhabitants are secretly decidedly hostile to the Turks.

Reports of several small brushes with the rebels in the mountains south of Menakha have been received between the 1st and 10th February, in which the Turks have been generally worsted and forced to abandon their untenable outposts and retire to Menakha.

The rebels have, moreover, appeared in the heights giving access to Menakha, and are in possession of positions lying between the latter place and the Tehama.

Their object is to cut off and stoutly oppose the Turkish advance on Sana'a viâ the Wadi Hujjeilla and Menakha.

The tribes of Beni Mukatil and Beni Mura inhabiting the Hujjeilla district and belonging to the Daiwoodia sect although not professing allegiance to the Turks, are at the same time no lovers of the imam or of his Zeidi followers.

Severe fighting has been reported between the tribesmen and the rebels whom the former are trying to dislodge from their district.

It might be as well to mention that in the present rebellion, from what one can judge here, the imam has not succeeded in obtaining the cooperation and support of all the tribesmen inhabiting the agricultural districts lying between Hujjeilla and Sana'a. The latter are fairly tired of internal strife, and are too busy attending to their fields that have received plentiful rains during the past year. Seyyid Yahya has therefore been obliged to have recourse to the predatory and warlike tribesmen hailing from the mountains to the north and north-west of Sana'a, viz., the Hashed-Bekeal, Dho-Mahomed, and Dho-Hussani, with whom he has overrun the country.

Various tribesmen, on the other hand, have been reluctantly compelled to take sides with the Pretender, owing to their having previously rendered up hostages as a guarantee for tendering him support in his cause against the Turks.

The attitude of the Beni Matar tribe in the present revolt is not quite clear, as they have had differences with Seyyid Yahya after the upheaval of 1905, chiefly owing to the assassination of their Sheikh Ramah whilst a guest of the imam at Sana'a.

The other route to Sana'a viâ the Sanfor Wadi, generally utilized for the passage of camels transporting Government stores and private merchandise, has also fallen into the hands of the insurgents and has caused the evacuation of the Turkish outposts at Bab Kohlan, Beit-el-Kabili, and Beit-el-Nejd respectively along that wadi-bed, rendered untenable owing to the hostility of the surrounding country, and the smallness of the garrisons stationed there.

On the 1st instant the kaimakam of Bajil, who is at Obal organising a force from amongst the Kohra tribesmen, caused the Sheikh of Hujjeilla to arrest a certain Seyyid Ali Ismail, who was on his way to the imam's head-quarters with two huge cases containing a considerable quantity of Martini caps. This man, who is under confinement here, declares that he purchased the caps from the Imperial arsenal at Constantinople, from which place he had just arrived.

About the same time Sheikh Mohamed Nasir of Mavia, a not unfamiliar name at His Britannic Majesty's Embassy in connection with the Aden boundary question, arrested two of the imam's emissaries, El Kadi Ahmed, El Mujjahid, and Seyyid Saleh, residents of Sana'a, on their way to Aden, and handed them over to the authorities at Taiz.

On the 14th instant a messenger managed to smuggle down to Obal, through the rebel lines, a letter from the acting kaimakam of Menakha, to the effect that the town was hard pressed and could only hold out for about a week longer, and requesting the dispatch of reinforcements to his relief.

Seyyid Hussani of Obal has collected a force of nearly 1,500 levies from the Kohra tribes to assist the Turks in establishing communication with Menakha, and for operations against the rebels at Lahab to the east of Hujjeilla.

Yesterday the three battalions of Nizam infantry, 1,250 strong, disembarked off the ships "Konch" and "Cambridge," were dispatched to Obal, and to-day two other battalions, 1,470 strong, that were landed last night from the transport "Mecca," will march in the same direction.

Colonel Riza Bey, who was stationed in the Yemen for many years, and has served in several expeditions in this province against the Arabs, arrived by the

steam-ship "Mecca" from Constantinople, and will command the troops advancing on Menakha. Colonel Riza Bey, who is still here, leaves for the front to-morrow.

The cholera that was reported to have broken out in an epidemic form amongst the Turkish recruits stationed at Hodeidah has now almost disappeared, after claiming some 200 or 300 victims.

I have, &c.
G. A. RICHARDSON.

[10019] No. 133.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 172.)

Sir, *Pera, March 15, 1911.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 60 of the 3rd March, 1911, asking for observations on the Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation Company's letter of the 22nd February last, I have the honour to observe that it may be true that the actual wording of the permit granted to Abdul Kader Pasha-el-Khedery does not contain any condition to the effect that all shareholders must be Ottoman subjects, though the acting vali of Bussorah in May last informed His Majesty's consul that the shareholders as well as the owners must be Ottoman subjects. Even if this were true, such arrangements can, as a rule, be evaded in Turkey, as Messrs. Lynch must know from their long experience of this country, and His Majesty's consul at Bussorah now informs me that five Persians, including the Sheikh of Mohammerah, have subscribed to the capital. As before pointed out by me there ought to be no difficulty in Messrs. Lynch, with their long-established position in Mesopotamia, similarly participating in such enterprises under Ottoman disguise.

With reference to my despatch No. 110 of the 19th February, Mr. Crow now informs me that the steamer mentioned in his despatch No. 3 of the 28th January has been launched, and that her preliminary trials have been satisfactory. He adds that it is not unlikely that the Germans have advanced money to Agh Djafer on loan or mortgage, and that he learns that another steamer of the same type, but larger, has been shipped to Bussorah in pieces.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER

[9019] No. 134.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 83.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 20, 1911.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a letter from Messrs. Lynch Bros. respecting the demolition of their property at Bagdad, and suggesting that the Turkish Government should pay immediately a part of their claim to enable them to erect new premises.* I also enclose a copy of my reply.†

Your Excellency should use every endeavour to obtain the immediate payment of an instalment, say 1,000*l.*, without prejudice to the rest of the firm's claim, pointing out to the Turkish Government that unless this is done more expense will be incurred by Lynch Bros., which will be charged to the Sublime Porte.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[9019] No. 135.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 20, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant respecting the demolition of part of your premises at Bagdad, and to inform you that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople

* No. 126. † No. 135.

has been instructed to endeavour to obtain from the Turkish Government the immediate payment of an instalment, without prejudice to the remainder of your claim.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[10941] No. 136.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 4. Commercial.)

Sir, *Bushire, March 6, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to submit for your consideration a memorandum drawn up by Mr. H. G. Chick, my commercial adviser, on the subject of the trade routes in Southern Persia, and particularly the prospects of a British concession for a motor transport service between Bushire and Shiraz, by the Firuzabad route.

The memorandum reaches my hands just as I am leaving headquarters for outside work at Abu Musa and elsewhere, and time does not admit of my commenting on it at length before my departure.

But *primâ facie* it seems to me that there is a good deal to be said for the suggestion that in the course of our efforts to bring about a state of security on the trade route between Bushire and Shiraz we should incidentally work in a concession for a British or Anglo-Persian wheeled transport service on the easier alignment viâ Firuzabad.

The acquisition of such a concession for British enterprise would not only assist materially towards maintaining our predominance in this zone, and help to keep foreign enterprise out, but would, I am sure, greatly stimulate the flagging spirits and energies of British firms trading or endeavouring to trade in this part of Southern Persia.

Before the project can be usefully examined, however, we must necessarily know the engineering possibilities and probable cost of the track per mile, and for this reason I have in the first instance ventured to send to His Majesty's Minister and the Government of India the telegram of which I append a paraphrase.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX,
British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.

Enclosure 1 in No. 136.

Memorandum on the Utility of a British Concession for a Motor Road from Bushire to Shiraz.

1. *Present Condition of the Bushire-Shiraz Road.*

THERE is at present a lull in the critical condition of affairs prevailing along the caravan route from Bushire to Shiraz. Constant and increasing anarchy in Fars, with all its consequent menaces to the stability and security of British commercial interests along the southern route, aggravated also by the indifference of the Central Persian Government and its ignorance of the true situation in the south, made the British note of the 14th October inevitable. That the last month of the period allowed to the Persian Government for compliance passed without robberies, and also this fourth month, has been a purely fortuitous circumstance due to the season of the year and the peculiar severity of that season. Corresponding to extraordinary rains in the coast-belt, there have been falls of snow on the mountain ranges south and west of Shiraz which pass the memory of Persians. During the whole of January and February caravans have ceased to circulate between Kazerun and Shiraz, and towards the end of the month the passes east of Kazerun were reported quite blocked with snow. Mr. G. G. Knox, proceeding to take charge of the consulate at Shiraz, was delayed five days in Kazerun and then had to cut his way up one kotal through several feet of snow, and his sepoy escort had to return temporarily to Kazerun, unable to make headway

It is an historical fact that during the two months forming the period of the winter's greatest severity caravan robberies are almost unknown at normal times and have been even in the past four years of anarchy. Added to this, between the 15th December and the 1st March the nomads are settled in their winter quarters and occupied with their flocks and agriculture.

Having regard, therefore, to the unwillingness of the British Government to embark on the policing of the road, with all its speculative results, until absolutely driven to do so, there could not have been any more fortunate moment for the issue of the ultimatum than October last; on the other hand, I do not think the public at large, in reading of the improved freedom of the road from disorder, have realised that the inclemency of the season is almost entirely, if not altogether, to be thanked for the lull which has ensued.

As matters stand to-day, I doubt—and I fancy most British and Persian opinion in the south is similarly sceptical—whether the real position has improved or will improve a jot from the results of measures taken by the Persian authorities. It is true that Nizam-es-Sultaneh has recently set out for Shiraz after many protestations to us of his desire to put the caravan road in order, and that the Kashgai Ilkhani has for the present accepted responsibility for its security (a quite easy thing to do considering the time of year); but, on the one hand, there are not wanting persons who are convinced that Nizam-es-Sultaneh's real object in coming to Fars was to place himself in a favourable position for getting in the outstanding revenues of his own large properties in the province (which, however, do not lie on the road), and that he contemplates resigning the Governor-Generalship directly he meets with opposition in Shiraz; while, on the other hand, it is quite on the cards that the Kashgai Ilkhani will quarrel with the Nizam and repudiate responsibility for the road.

The Central Persian Government have, it is true, received a fright, but it is to be feared they will soon get over it. The 2,800 soldiers whom they promised to send to Fars will dwindle to a few hundred useless northerners; almost certainly they will be underpaid. Soulet-ed-Dowleh is most unlikely to continue to pay for long the tufanghis, whom he now claims to have put to guard the road, especially if he is not compensated in return by levying heavy "rahdari" blackmail, or by subsidies from the Fars "Maliyat." As to the actual miranders of the past—Kuhgelus and others—I do not for a moment suppose that the threat implied in the British note has reached or disturbed them, nor that the Persian Government, with a make-believe force at Shiraz and an Ilkhani lacking its endeavours, could teach them a sufficient lesson to prevent the road being constantly subject to the raids of nomads on the migration.

The British note of the 21st January informed the Persian Government that, though they would defer insisting on the employment of British officers for a time longer to enable them to judge of the value of the measures which the Persian Government claim to have taken, they reserved the right to do so eventually if local measures proved unavailing. A period of seven to eight months from the beginning of the vernal migration (21st March) will probably be more than ample to show that the Persian Government and Nizam-es-Sultaneh have failed in their task. Then some British measure for the policing of the road must follow, unless our face is to be blackened in the eyes of all British interests in the south, and the eyes of most Persians also.

As to the limitations of the present policing scheme and its difficulties—in particular, the difficult nature of the route itself for the operations of a force covering the passage of caravans—they are perhaps hardly realised to the full; the cost will be heavy; the task, in the face of opposition from the various Persian elements, is likely to be beyond the powers of a few British officers; while the idea of Swedish officers, without any previous knowledge of the country, or the people, or the language, seems to me foredoomed to failure.

2. *Choice of Routes from the Gulf to the Interior.*

At the moment when we seem obliged to contemplate the ultimate necessity of supervising the security along what is on all hands admitted to be a very difficult route, which could only be made possible for wheeled vehicles at very great expense, the question of the future choice of routes to the interior has been brought into prominence by the discussion of various projects for railways, either of commercial or political importance.

I understand that alignments from Mohammerah northwards from Bunder Abbas

to Kerman, and from Bunder Abbas to Shiraz and Mohammerah, with a branch to Bushire, all have been or are under consideration. These include the three natural points of ingress and egress for foreign trade in southern Persia. Of these Bushire has certainly occupied for considerably more than a century a vastly predominant position, and even to-day, with the southern roads in disorder, it is the first port in Persia. The increased figures for Arabistan in 1909–1911 are traceable to two causes alone: imports of material by the oil company, valued at more than 600,000*l.*, and the 300,000*l.*–400,000*l.* transport trade, which has temporarily left the Bushire road for the Ahwaz route.

It is a remarkable fact that this Bushire–Shiraz caravan route, across an extraordinarily difficult series of precipitous mountains and passes, should yet have been adhered to tenaciously for so long a period, and preferred by importing and exporting traders to others apparently much easier. There must, I think, exist solid commercial reasons for this preference, beyond the comparative facilities which the route enjoys in the shape of telegraph line and caravanserais, and it will be worth while examining this question in detail now that the selection of alignments for projected railroads has become of lively importance. For the present it may be remarked that:

(i.) Shiraz (perhaps 60,000 inhabitants) is the wealthy centre of a populous and prosperous district, which needs to use the quicker route to the coast, which is viâ Bushire.

(ii.) Lying between the two towns are centres, such as Kazerun, Firuzabad, Borasjun, &c., which represent either settled inter-trade interests, or, like Fasa, Dashti, and Dashtistan, actually dispose of a large quantity and variety of agricultural produce, capable of very profitable development.

(iii.) The Kashgai tribe, one of the largest in Persia, numbering probably between 300,000 and 400,000 souls, has its habitat for six months of the year across the mountains between Shiraz and Bushire, and intermediate townships, and its consumption of imports from Europe is very (?), while export of produce by the tribe, once facility of transport were assured, would develop enormously.

(iv.) The trading association of Persian merchants in Bushire with European houses has been of long standing, and from their forwarding connection they are more in direct touch with European methods and enterprise than any other coast port, in addition to which there has been established in Bushire for years a nucleus of British commercial firms who have large vested interests in the prosperity of the port and its connection with the interior.

(v.) There is a great interdependence of trade between Bushire, Shiraz, Ispahan, and other large towns of the interior, import goods being exchanged against export goods, and as a result of years of credit, supplied by British capital, the British firms interested and indebted Persian importers require to keep a constant stream of imports coming in by this route, and a constant turnover of money.

(vi.) There being "vested" interests in the maintenance of the trading connection between Bushire, Shiraz, &c., the old-established British and Persian firms, with their long experience, would be so hit that they would be compelled to retire, were new trade routes pushed to the exclusion of that in present use.

In addition to this *raison d'être* for the present route, the following reflections occur to me in connection with the proposed railway scheme:

(*a.*) Supposing for a moment that we restricted our aspirations to obtaining concessions for lines from Bunder Abbas to Kerman, and Mohammerah to Burujird, and left the central portion of the neutral zone untouched, some other Power will surely appreciate the commercial opening afforded in the central portion of the neutral zone, and endeavour to secure it for themselves, and should that Power provide a Government guarantee, the British lines on each side might be placed at a disadvantage.

(*b.*) For the largest portion of the existing trade of southern Persia is settled along the Bushire Shiraz route. The revenue derived from transport is heavy, and besides the fact of the short distance, the prospect of an immediate return on money spent in laying down a line between Bushire and Shiraz presents attractions as a purely commercial proposition, while a relatively small Government guarantee, if any, should be required by the promoters.

(*c.*) The port of Bushire would, in the light of improved transport facilities to the

interior, probably have a much greater attraction as a possible site for improvement than most other spots along the coast.

(*d.*) From what passed in the first Medjliss when the question of the National Bank and railway communication was brought up, and the deputies of Firs protested that Fars would not subscribe unless the railway passed viâ Shiraz, and other reasons, I am inclined to think that Persian feeling in Fars, Shiraz and Bushire would be very strongly against any general scheme of railway communications which left out direct connection between Shiraz and Bushire.

3. *Need of Temporary Transport Improvements between Bushire and Shiraz.*

In the foregoing observations various aspects of both the imminent necessity of policing the present Bushire–Kazerun–Shiraz caravan route, and also the proposal to select certain alignments for railway construction in southern Persia, have been under consideration, because there is, to my mind, an important connection between the two subjects, and a possibility of making a combined solution of the two.

Why should the policing of a caravan route, incapable of being adapted to admit of mechanical traction of any considerable further development, be forced on the British Government, when all necessity for policing might be avoided by making, at a moderate cost, an improved route for mechanical transport in the direction of Firuzabad?

It is obvious that the actual laying down or completion of the various railroads suggested is still far distant: meanwhile there is no reason why a metalled road, adapted for the use of Renard road trains, should not be a profitable commercial venture, and afford at the same time a way out of the difficult position in which the British Government would be placed by a recrudescence of the insecurity on the old caravan route.

If His Majesty's Government concur in the utility of such a scheme, and give their strong support to it, it ought not to be difficult to find the necessary capital.

4. *Revenue derived from Traffic over Caravan Route.*

There are no statistics available in Persia to show the number of packages or number of pack-animals passing over the roads. From the Customs returns for the port of Bushire, I have, however, made a careful estimate of merchandise transported to Shiraz, or viâ Shiraz for further dispatch, by deducting the quantities which I consider likely to be consumed in the Bushire district or the coast plain, and then reckoned by the average value of mule-hire charged during the year in question. The results given show the quantities forwarded to Shiraz as being less than they probably are. Details of these quantities are given in the appendix. Taking the abstract of results thus obtained, I estimate:—

Year.	Weight carried.	Paid at average Rate Hire.	Total.	Equals at average Exchange.
March.	Cwt.	Krans.	Krans.	£
1907–8	176,586 (up)	3,260,040	3,957,790	At 51 = 77,603
	90,710 (down)	697,750		
1908–9	150,871 (up)	3,945,870	4,504,620	„ 55 = 81,902
	72,642 (down)	558,750		
1909–10.. ..	153,090 (up)	5,888,000	6,374,800	„ 56 = 115,621
	79,160 (down)	486,800		

For these three years rates of hire have been reckoned at 120 krans, 170 krans, and 250 krans per 6½ cwt. respectively on the upward journey from Bushire to Shiraz. On the downward journey, the average rates have been calculated at 50 krans, 50 krans, and 40 krans per 6½ cwt. The great difference between the rates of hire up and down country are of course occasioned by the vastly greater quantity of imports offering than of exports; this will not change until the agricultural and mineral produce of Persia is exploited.

All transport hire in the south has, however, risen abnormally during those years

owing to insecurity, and my estimate of the revenue which would have been derived from the same weights in normal times should be calculated at not more than 80 krans per 6½ cwt. for the upward journey, and 30 krans for the downward journey. These were the rates prevailing between 1900 and 1905:—

	1907–8.	1908–9.	1909–10.
	Krans.	Krans.	Krans.
At 80 krans (up) ..	2,173,360	1,856,880	1,884,160
„ 30 krans (down) ..	418,650	335,250	365,100
Total	2,592,010	2,192,130	2,249,260
	At 51 = 50,823*l.*	At 55 = 99,857*l.*	At 56 = 40,165*l.*

While remembering that 1908–9 and 1909–10 were years that showed a great falling-off of imported goods, it can be reasonably estimated that the average revenue derived from transport hire ought not to be less than 40,000*l.* per annum, and might well reach 55,000*l.* Mechanical transport should also result in exports increasing, and the revenue from that source mounting considerably.

An annual return of 40,000*l.* on money spent in levelling and metalling the road, and the purchase of rolling-stock, would appear to be an attractive enterprise on business grounds alone.

It may be mentioned here that at the above normal rates of hire the rate per ton per mile would be:—

Upward journey	240 krans per ton per 200 miles = say, 1¼ krans per mile, say, 5*d.*
Downward journey	92 krans per ton per 200 miles = say, ½ kran per mile, say, 2½*d.*

But there would be every reason to hope, after export trade began to grow, that these rates could be materially reduced.

5. *Route to be followed.*

The route suggested would be in the direction of No. 24 of the "Routes in Persia," section I, and would pass somewhere near the following places:—

	Miles.
Gurak (from Bushire)	14
Ahram	15
Kalimeh	20
Bushakun	16
Farashband	25
Firuzabad	40
Khajai	16
Kavar Bridge	19
Baba Hajl	16
Shiraz	20
Total	205

The first section of 30 miles is quite flat, almost on the sea-level, and the route generally is said to be very much easier from the point of view of gradient to that viâ Kazerun.

There is an alternative route between Ahram and Kalimeh some 10 miles longer by the Tang-i-Solidar, down which the Persians brought their wheeled artillery in 1856. This road could be easily improved. It may also be noted from a military point of view that Kalimeh is an important strategical point on the line of advance from Bushire to Shiraz.

As regards Firuzabad, it was noted by military intelligence officers ten years ago, that Firuzabad was "a small centre with about 5,000 inhabitants, mostly engaged in fruit farming and cultivation. Supplies here are good, far above the average. Rice, grain, and barley are exported into the surrounding country, and fruits and rose-water to Bushire. There is excellent camping ground for a very large force here, and abundance of good water for men and animals. Fire-wood in large quantities could

be produced from Maiman. The whole of the plain around the town is extremely fertile, and for Persia well inhabited. Altogether this is the best place along this route. Its chief importance from a military point of view would be that it is admirably suited for a halting place and supply depôt."

The agricultural resources of the plains of Fasa and Jahrum would also be probably developed considerably, if this route were followed, and the Kazerun plain with its agriculture is only 60 miles from Farashband.

6. *Engineering Survey of this Route Desirable.*

All questions of the actual alignment must, however, depend on a proper survey by someone acquainted with road-making in the East; more especially as the question of gradients would need to be carefully considered in the case of a road fit for the use of motor traction.

If the proposal that a concession for a motor road should be obtained by a British group, and, as soon as possible meets with the approval of Government, I would suggest that, inasmuch as the existence of mechanical transport over a made road should be of great assistance in solving the problem of the security of the trade-route in which Government is so interested, an engineer officer should be deputed from India to inspect the route this spring and report on it. Such a preliminary survey would have the object of making certain whether a motor road over the route suggested would be practicable, and the cost moderate from the financial point of view, and so permit of Government advising British financiers that such a concession would be feasible and worth while obtaining from the Persian Government. As the distance is short the survey should not occupy more than four to six weeks. Arrangements could be locally made with friendly tribal chieftains and the Ilkhani of the Kashgais, so that no guarding escort would be necessary, and an officer from the residency could accompany the survey party.

7. *Cost of Metalled Road for Motor Traction.*

Until this preliminary survey is carried out, it would be rash to make any guess as to the cost of a metalled road suited for motor-waggons along this route. We have been told that road making in Baluchistan has cost 400*l.* per mile, and at that rate the 200 miles between Bushire and Shiraz would cost 80,000*l.*; but the roads in question were perhaps not constructed for heavy motor traffic, and probably the engineering difficulties in this part of Persia would be much greater, for, besides the levelling of a long stretch through the mountain passes, there will be gradients to be overcome, numerous culverts to be built, and a hard raised track made across 20 miles of the salt marshy plain behind Bushire. The cost of those works might easily run to another 100,000*l.*

This is why I think that we could hardly expect financiers in London to apply for their concession before the engineering capabilities of this project are reported on, nor to undertake the expense of sending out a civil engineer from England or India to report on the probable cost, unless they have some sort of assurance from competent authorities that the project is within the range of practical possibilities. This can be provided by Government if an engineer officer were deputed to survey the route for an estimate of the cost.

The price of buildings for storage, garages, also control-houses might amount to 10,000*l.* At least six Renard trains would be required at first, and would cost with packing some 20,570*l.*

8. *Scheme to put forward to British Syndicate already interested in Motor Roads in Southern Persia.*

I have been led to examine the possibility of the success of a motor-road concession between Bushire and Shiraz, both commercially and as a way out of the "impasse" of guarding the Kazerun route from insecurity, after seeing in London the detailed project of the syndicate, who proposed to obtain a similar concession for the Bunder Abbas–Kerman road. Captain Rae, late His Majesty's Consul at Bunder Abbas, and myself agree that commercially the latter scheme would appear to be a profitable venture for any European financier, and could be effected at relatively small cost.

The Indo-European Telegraph Company's group, including Mr. J. H. Tritton,

Sir Francis Mowatt, and others, would seem admirably suited to take up the present proposal, if supported by Government and considered mechanically feasible. This syndicate would also have the advantage of bringing new blood into British commercial interests in southern Persia.

If the preliminary survey suggested be favourable, I venture to add that the present proposal might be brought to the notice of that group, with a promise of Government's support, unless the Board of Trade have other recommendations.

9. *Concession terms and Persian interests in the Scheme.*

It would go without saying that the agreement of the Persian Government to the suggested concession would have to be forced on them, as the only way to avoid the recurrence of disorders on the Kazerun route, and the interposition of Great Britain in the policing of that route.

Under cover of Mr. Marling's despatch No. 168 of the 14th July, 1908, was forwarded to the Foreign Office translation of the terms of a concession for running Renard road trains over nearly all the carriageable roads of Persia, which was granted to the following Persian notables:

	Shares.
His Highness Ain-ed-Dowleh	2
His Excellency Mushir-ed-Dowleh (dead)	1
His Highness Farman Farma	1
His Excellency Amir Bahadur Jang (in exile)	1
His Excellency Sipahdar	1
Aminuz-Zarb (bankrupt?)	1
His Excellency Haji Nassir-es-Sultaneh	1
Muinet-Punja	1

This concession has never been worked, I understand, beyond bringing out a road-train to run between Tehran and the summer camps in the Shimranat, which has ceased to run effectively. As the concession (article 11) stipulated that

"The concessionaires are to work in Persia at least ten trains within two years from the date below (the 22nd June, 1908). They will also begin making the roads within a year from this date; and after seven years all the roads above mentioned must be made carriageable, otherwise they will be cancelled from the conditions of this concession. For the Bushire road they must begin in one year, and it must be finished within five years from the date of this concession."

The concession must certainly have lapsed as far as regards the Bushire–Shiraz road.

No mention was made of the price paid for it, but the roads when made the trains were to be freed from taxation for 15 years, after which the Persian Government was to levy 10 per cent. of the net profits. On the other hand, the terms demanded by the Persian Government from the applicants for a concession for working the Kerman copper mine and a "tram line" from Kerman to the coast included the payment of 100,000*l.* as a loan, and a royalty.

In this instance there is no copper mine, and the road in question is less than half as long, and the Persian Government ought to make no more avaricious demand than an advance of some thousands of pounds, and an annual royalty, while the rights of the Persian Government to the ownership of the road could be recognised, however much the company leasing the road were under British protection.

In this connection I tentatively put forward the idea that it might be found easier by an applicant British syndicate, if from the start they enlisted Persian financial support in the enterprise. It might be a step in advance towards the approval of the Medjliss to such a concession, if one or more Persian notables with large influence in Tehran, and without anti-British bias, were associated with the British promoters on the directorate; and after the survey is made, one of the first steps of the promoters in London would be to dispatch a representative to Tehran to enlist such support with the consent of His Majesty's Legation.

In any case, with the route traversing the territory and tribal property of the Kashgai Ilkhani and the Khan of Dashti over a large part of the route, it would be imperative to conciliate the goodwill of those potentates by allotting them shares in the enterprises, and paying a small subsidy as well. We have found during the recent visit of the Kashgai Ilkhani that he is very wide awake to the value of his own territorial sphere as lying right across any road or railway from the coast to Shiraz, and at the same time he seemed evidently to expect that developments would occur.

It has long been patent that he desires the caravan road to pass through his own territory, from the point of view of revenue to be drawn from this source. His cupidity is undoubtedly strong. There would probably be not much difficulty in negotiating locally with the Kashgai Ilkhani to secure his support of the scheme.

10. *Importance of suggested Concession and Risks.*

Politically, the importance of securing this road concession at an early date seems to me very wide.

(*a.*) It appears to me the only alternative to managing ourselves the policing of the Kazerun route with all its difficulties.

(*b.*) If ever Great Britain needs to introduce a force into South Persia, in the event of the dissolution of Persia, or for making a demonstration, or for other purposes of safeguarding British interests, it can much more easily be done over a metalled road, and over a road in which we possess undoubted leased rights.

(*c.*) The route viâ the Firuzabad district will be distant from the country habitually raided by the Kuhgelu, and other nomads; it would pass almost entirely through the coast plain and Kashgai country; and thus there are not so many little khans to want a finger in the pie, and take toll as along the Kazerun route.

(*d.*) If a route for the use of motor traction be capable of construction, the same road could undoubtedly be adapted subsequently for a railway track.

(*e.*) The Bushire Shiraz route, whether by Firuzabad or Kazerun, is the favourite road for Persian and British merchants in all southern and central towns, and will reabsorb all merchandise recently transferred to the Ahwaz Ispahan road, directly security is assured. It has already the largest developed trade in southern Persia, and as such must offer attractions to capitalists seeking to introduce improved methods of traction. If this route goes neglected by Great Britain in any scheme for the future construction of railroad communication in Persia, I feel sure that other European Governments, with Persian support, will not be slow in taking advantage of our mistake.

In addition to the above reasons, which recommend the suggestion politically, I have already given reasons and statistics for assuming that the construction of a road for the passage of motor trains would be a very prosperous commercial venture and investment for British capital.

Everything, however, hinges on the possibility of the construction of such a road, and therefore I venture to hope that Government will depute an engineer officer for the survey at the earliest possible date.

H. G. CHICK,
Commercial Adviser.

Enclosure 2 in No. 136.

Return of Imports and Exports into and from Shiraz.

Imports Transported to Shiraz.

—	1907–8.	1908–9.	1909–10.
	Cwts.	Cwts.	Cwts.
Matches	1,554	1,635	1,200
Wool	2,250	2,342	2,020
Wood manufactures	1,100	227	1,860
Candles	2,142	2,700	180
Coffee	500	..	..
Fruits, preserved	200	160	160
Vegetables, dried and preserved ..	300	460	180
Sugar, loaf	66,000	44,000	65,320
,, crystal	15,000	30,000	29,320
Tea	10,400	9,000	5,500
Spices	3,738	3,108	1,800
Kerosene	5,400	5,200	4,800
Steel bars	3,250	2,670	1,190
Tin plates and sheets	815	828	760
Manufactures	650	293	290
Tin, lead, zinc, bars and sheets ..	945	912	820
Copper, nickel bars, &c.	5,100	4,624	3,580
Cotton yarns	6,000	3,912	3,720
Cotton tissues	45,000	39,702	28,140
Woollen yarns	350	266	140
Woollen tissues	500	180	260
Tissues of wool mixed with cotton	320	250	50
Jute tissues and yarns	836	780	840
Furniture	50	30	40
Paper	1,200	720	500
Skins	351	158	180
Pottery, chinaware, &c.	1,750	1,070	440
Chemical products	1,200	714	2,040
Dyes, indigo	2,000	800	1,200
Paints	50	28	40
Glassware, &c.	812	500	320
Total	177,756	151,798	154,110

Exports Transported from Shiraz.

—	1907–8.	1908–9.	1909–10.
	Cwts.	Cwts.	Cwts.
Almonds	10,000	7,500	11,000
Raisins	3,800	3,700	1,900
Fruits, dry	1,000	600	1,000
Rosewater	6,160	4,550	6,700
Assafœtida	900	800	1,300
Drugs, not specified	10,000	4,400	5,240
Spices	1,800	1,800	1,200
Gum, insoluble	7,000	11,592	11,420
,, tragacanth	11,000	12,200	11,160
Raw cotton	4,800	2,560	5,400
Carpets, woollen	2,000	2,300	3,600
Opium	4,100	3,390	1,600
Skins, raw	8,000	5,010	5,820
Tobacco	22,000	14,500	8,200
Vegetable substances	350	800	320
Total	90,710	72,612	79,100

Enclosure 3 in No. 136.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Bushire, March* 6, 1911.

TRADE routes in Southern Persia.

From Bushire as far as Shiraz the road is fairly passable, partly because the Governor-General, Nizam-es-Sultaneh, is halted half way, and partly because there is still much snow about. However, these aids to the security of the road will soon disappear. Heavy robberies have lately been reported on the Shiraz–Ispahan, Bunder Abbas–Kerman, and Bunder Abbas Lar routes, which are all most insecure. Nizam-es-Sultaneh seems to be making no serious progress, and reports of consuls at Shiraz, Kerman, Lingah, and Bunder Abbas regarding their spheres are most pessimistic. Consequently the possibility seems by no means remote that we shall have to make good the British note.

This Residency has hitherto, when it has only been the question of a choice of alternative mule-tracks between here and Shiraz, consistently pressed for adherence to the Kazerun route, because it is shorter and possesses advantages in caravansaries and the telegraph line, but this route is admittedly out of the question as a prospective alignment for a railway or a motor transport service. Mr. Chick, in the course of a memorandum on the road in question which he has just placed before me, urges that should it become necessary for us to participate in policing a route to Shiraz from the coast it may as well be a route which could be made practicable for a motor transport service, and with that idea he directs attention to the road via Firuzabad. If this road affords a feasible alignment for motor transport at all, the journey when the track was in working order would be performed in four days at the outside, and the task of policing it would be greatly simplified, if necessary at all.

Moreover, this road, unlike the route via Kazerun, would have the advantage of lying mainly in the sphere of one tribe, the Kashgai, whose chiefs might be expected to co-operate with us, as they are friendly and alive to their own interests.

In his memorandum Mr. Chick has gone into the figures, and these indicate that a motor transport service by this route would, *prima facie*, be commercially lucrative, but it would be necessary, before we could be sufficiently sure of this to recommend the project to any British or Anglo-Persian syndicate, that an expert in hill roads and railways should examine the road and give an opinion on the alignment, and an approximate estimate of the cost of construction per mile.

The matter seems to be of immediate interest, as it might even be worth while to stipulate, as a condition of abstention from placing British officers on the Kazerun route, for the grant of a concession for a transport service on the Firuzabad road.

Unless the examination is carried out this spring opportunity will not recur until autumn. Would it be possible for the Government of India to depute Captain L. Hopkins, R.E., who in 1903 surveyed the Ahwaz-Shiraz route, or another engineer expert if he is not available? It would be necessary for him to arrive here by the end of the month. The Kashgai chief, Soulet-ed-Dowleh, would then be starting up the road, and an engineer officer and one of my staff whom I could send with him would thus have the advantage of Soulet-ed-Dowleh's presence.

If, *prima facie*, the idea commends itself to the Government of India and His Majesty's Minister, and if it will probably be feasible to spare an engineer officer for this duty forthwith, I request that I may be informed as soon as possible, so that Soulet can be asked to delay his departure to give our officers time to join him.

[10917] No. 137.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 131.)
Sir, *Paris, March* 24, 1911.

A HAVAS telegram from Constantinople was published in the "Temps" last night relative to French railway concessions in Turkey to the following effect:

"The negotiations with the French Government for the construction of 3,500 kilom. of railways in European and Asiatic Turkey, in conjunction with a loan of £T. 25,000,000, appear to have entered on a decisive phase. The Anatolian lines will run from Samsun to Sivas, and from Sivas to Van and to Erzeroum. There will also be two branch lines.

In accordance with a previous convention with Russia, which confers on Russian capitalists privileges concerning the construction of railways in the basin of the Black Sea, these lines will be built directly by the Turkish Government, with the support of French capital. In the railway lines to be constructed in European Turkey, a junction line with the Bulgarian railways is included. The "Tanin" newspaper emphasises the importance of the negotiations begun with France immediately after the agreement respecting the Bagdad line, and declares that, as far as Turkey is concerned, there is nothing to prevent the treaty being submitted to the Chamber of Deputies during the present session."

I have reason to believe that the above information is authentic.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[11013] No. 138.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 66. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, March 25, 1911.*

NATIVES of Bahrein.

I have received the following telegram, dated the 22nd instant, from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah :—

"A complaint having been received from three Bahreinis that, on their refusal to take out passports as Ottoman subjects, they had been arrested by order of the vali, the dragoman of His Majesty's consulate went to enquire of the police the cause of this arbitrary action. The police, however, under orders from the vali, refused to reply. Thereupon I requested his Excellency to inform me on what charge the men had been arrested and to let me communicate with them, since natives of Bahrein are under our protection. At the same time I informed his Excellency that the men's Bahrein passports were in order and had been left in my care. To this communication I have received an official reply from the vali, stating that the Ottoman Government have no knowledge of the British protection of Bahreinis and do not admit it."

In reply to this telegram I have informed Mr. Crow that I have referred the matter home for instructions and will take no action pending their arrival.

The arrest and detention of these natives of Bahrein by the vali's orders in order to compel them to take out Ottoman papers has directly raised the question of the position of His Majesty's Government in Bahrein. As the two Governments are now endeavouring to arrive at a general settlement of the questions affecting the situation at the head of the Persian Gulf which formed the subject of my despatch No. 183 of the 22d instant, I think it would be well to seize this opportunity of insisting on an official and definite renunciation of the Turkish claims to Bahrein and its dependencies, as well as of settling similar questions in those parts. Otherwise troublesome cases of this nature will certainly occur again in the future when we shall no longer be in possession of the means, now afforded by the questions of the "temettu" and the customs increase, for exerting pressure on the Turks.

[11071] No. 139.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 173.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 19, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 15 of January 4th last, I have the honour to report that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, dated the 17th instant, stating that Nazim Pasha, Vali of Bagdad, has, under instructions from Constantinople, handed over the civil government and the military command of the province to Youssouf Pasha, Vali of Mosul. Mr. Lorimer adds that Nazim Pasha has apparently obeyed these orders and that no disturbance has occurred.

General Nazim Pasha became distasteful to the committee for a variety of reasons, but mainly on account of his anti-committee attitude in 1909 and owing to his

prestige and reputation with large sections of the army. When he was made vali of the distant province of Bagdad, it was commonly remarked that after a certain stay there he would be led into making blunders and then dismissed and recalled as a failure, with consequent impaired prestige. This forecast seems now to have come true. After the definite decision to dismiss him some ten days ago, telegrams deprecating his withdrawal from Bagdad rained into the Government departments from various sources, including some sections of the military at Bagdad, and the central authorities gave out that Nazim Pasha's failure to prevent these demonstrations in his favour amounted to insubordination. In view of the curious wire-pulling which has been in vogue in Turkey during the last few years, it is not perhaps unnatural that many of these telegrams should be attributed to the machinations of his political adversaries with the object of ruining him. It has also been set about that Nazim Pasha's dismissal was partly or mainly due to the complaints of this embassy, whereas, as a matter of fact, in our official representations the arbitrary proceedings in the matter of demolitions, &c., have invariably been ascribed to the local municipal authorities who actually carried them out rather than to the ex-vali personally.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[11073] No. 140.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 175.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 20, 1911.*

WITH reference to Mr. Marling's No. 30, Confidential, of the 11th January, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, commenting on the proclamation by Seyyid Idrisse to the Yemen tribes and reporting on the progress of affairs in the rebellious provinces.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 140.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 12 E.)
Sir, *Hodeidah, February 20, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a copy of Mr. Marling's despatch addressed to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which was enclosed a translation in French from the Arabic text of a proclamation said to be issued by Seyyid-el-Idrisse to the tribesmen of the Yemen.

It is needless to refer to the proclamation, as the rebellion in the province of Assyr, fostered by Seyyid-el-Idrisse, is a *fait accompli*, and there is hardly any doubt about such proclamation having been issued by the Seyyid.

Seyyid Ahmed-bin-Kharashan, referred to in that proclamation, is an influential Arab residing in the out-lying districts of Cumfuda, where he acts as the official agent of the Sabyeah Pretender.

The tribes addressed in it inhabit the country round about Cumfuda, and between that latter place and Abha, the capital of the sanjak.

I have, in my despatches Nos. 37 E. and 3 E. of the 15th December, 1910, and the 13th January, 1911, respectively, already reported on the outbreak at Assyr. No news has recently been received at Hodeidah about the progress of the revolt there.

It was reported here that on or about the 15th January last, Suleiman Pasha left Abha with three battalions and several guns, and encountered the rebels outside in great force under Seyyid Mustapha, the Idrisse's principal lieutenant in Assyr.

The local authorities give out that Suleiman Pasha at first fired blank charges from his guns to throw dust in the eyes of the Arabs, who had been informed by the Pretender that the Turkish cannon were harmless, and that their bullets would not penetrate their bodies.

At this the insurgents tried to rush the guns and were punished very severely in the attempt, losing several hundreds.

It would appear that this worsting disheartened the tribesmen, many of them retiring from the investment of Abha and returning to their homes.

The news of the above insurgent defeat, which was received at first with scepticism here, has now been confirmed.

No engagement has been reported since, but the garrison at Abha still appears to be under investment, and all communication with the coast continues to be completely cut off.

As far as I can ascertain, Seyyid Idrisse has the support of some 25,000 to 30,000 armed men in the country lying between Sabyeah, his head-quarters, and Abha, and between the former and El Hujjur in the west.

El Nakeeb Seyyid Mustapha, the Pretender's right-hand man, is supposed to have between 10,000 to 20,000 men surrounding Abha and between it and the coast.

The other rebel leaders are Shereef Nazir-ibn-Haidar-ibn-Ibrahim with 2,000 men, Shereef Monsoor-bin-Mahomed with 2,000, Shereef Mahomed-bin-Ali-ibn-Hussein with 1,500 riflemen, Shereef Haidar-ibn-Mahomed-el-Muhajjib with 700 rifles, and El Sheikh-ibn-Bakri with 1,800 followers.

The above armed bands are distributed over the disturbed area between Northern Yemen and the province of Assyr.

No news has been received lately of any marked activity on the part of the Idrisse's adherents in the Zaidyia and Beni Keis districts.

On or about the 15th instant, the tribesmen inhabiting the tract of country just above Zahra, that is, some 25 miles north-east of Loheia, who are favourable to the Idrisse's cause, captured a Turkish convoy with eighty camel loads of provisions and stores destined for the garrisons at El Hujjur.

The Kaimakam of Loheia set out with 200 troops to endeavour to re-capture the convoy, but was compelled to beat a hasty retreat after having about 50 casualties in a brush with the tribesmen.

The general opinion prevalent locally is that the Arabs in the Sabyeah district are suspicious of the intentions of Seyyid Mahomed Idrisse, and are, moreover, discontented with the treatment received at his hands.

It is freely rumoured that the Pretender has demanded for his own use from the tribesmen a third of the tithes due to the Ottoman Government instead of payment of any part of those dues to the latter.

It might be that Seyyid Mahomed and his followers, who are aware of the pouring in of Turkish reinforcements into Hodeidah and of the operations now being taken against the Imam Seyyid Yahya, are only playing a waiting game.

General Seyyid Pasha is still here, and has no immediate intention of proceeding to Assyr.

The local authorities expect that Suleiman Pasha will be retained in command at Abha owing to the success he has met with in his engagements with the insurgents.

General Seyyid Pasha, who, it will be recalled, reported favourably last year on the intentions of Seyyid Mahomed-el-Idrisse in the Sabyeah district, is now obliged to admit that he was hopelessly misled by Khoja Tewfik and others, referred to in my despatch of the 29th November, 1909. He however informed me that nothing has been lost by the postponement of the proposed operations against the Pretender till the present juncture, as this has given the ignorant tribesmen time to recognise the hopelessness of their cause, and also to discern the impostures practised by their leader.

It would appear that Seyyid Mahomed-el-Idrisse has quitted his head-quarters at Sabyeah since the beginning of this year and has moved further north to Djebel Farfar, where he has fortified himself against a sudden surprise from the Turks.

I have, &c.
G. A. RICHARDSON.

[11079] No. 141.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 182.)

Sir, *Pera, March 22, 1911.*

ON receiving your despatch No. 60 of the 3rd instant, relating to navigation enterprises in Mesopotamia, I asked His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, by telegram, if he could ascertain whether the permit granted to Abdul Kader Pasha el-Khadry definitely stated that all the shareholders in the enterprise must be Ottoman subjects.

Mr. Crow has replied that he has obtained a copy of the permit, which states that the vessels must carry the Turkish flag and that the owners must be Ottoman subjects. They must further submit to the present and future laws of the Ottoman Empire.

Moreover, the permit carries no sort of monopoly, and must not be transferred to foreigners, and there must further be no interference with other applicants for a similar privilege. (The last sentence of Mr. Crow's telegram is not very clearly worded, but this seems to be its meaning.)

It would therefore seem that the strictly legal interpretation of the permission prevents any scheme such as that suggested by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company in their letter of the 22nd February last, but, at the same time, Mr. Crow informs me that the local authorities have closed their eyes to the fact that five Persians, including the Sheikh of Mohammerah, are shareholders in Aga Jaffer's concession, and it would obviously be possible for Messrs. Lynch to acquire an interest in the concern by putting in natives as shareholders and holding the shares as security for mortgage, or by one of the many other devices which exist in this country for evading the strict letter of the law.

But these are questions which Messrs. Lynch, with their long experience of conditions in Turkey, are better qualified than anyone else to deal with.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[11083] No. 142.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 186.)

Sir, *Pera, March 22, 1911.*

THERE appeared yesterday in the local press an official communiqué, which I enclose herewith, of a conversation between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Boppe, the French chargé d'affaires, on the subject of the arrangement which has been arrived at with the Bagdad Railway Company. His Excellency declared that the arrangement was a purely economical one, and Turkey would now be able to appeal to foreign capital for the Bagdad–Bussorah (*sic*) branch. He informed M. Boppe that the Ottoman Government were anxious to see the negotiations which had begun with France for increasing the railway system in this country terminate satisfactorily, and expressed the hope generally that the financial interests of France here should cover a larger field.

The "Tanin," the mouthpiece of the Minister of Finance, to-day enlarges upon this subject, pointing out that the declaration in question should remove any bad humour or suspicion that might exist in France over the signature of the new conventions, Turkey being specially anxious to see French capital interested to an extent even greater than hitherto in the economic development of this country. The negotiations to this end, the article states, are at present connected with the Samsoun–Sivas–Erzeroum and Trebizond–Van lines—the two lines to be constructed in Albania and the line to the Bulgarian frontier. These lines will cover some 3,500 kilom. It adds that, as the Ottoman Government is bound under its engagements to construct these lines itself, a loan will be required, and an exchange of views as to the construction and working of the lines becomes necessary, and even expresses the hope that the negotiations may be concluded so expeditiously as to admit of Parliament being able to sanction them before the end of the session.

Finally, the article says that whether the French will conclude these arrangements with or without the financial assistance of Great Britain is a matter which concerns Great Britain and France more than the Ottoman Government, but, in view of the *entente* existing between the two countries, Turkey would only regard such co-operation with satisfaction.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 142.

Newspaper Extract.

LE CHEMIN DE FER DE BAGDAD ET LA FRANCE.

HIER, son Excellence Rifaat Pacha, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, a eu avec M. Boppe, chargé d'affaires de France, une entrevue au sujet de l'entente entervenue entre le Gouvernement ottoman et la Compagnie du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.

En déclarant qu'elle est purement économique, Rifaat Pacha a relevé ensuite que le Gouvernement, devant bénéficier de la majoration de la taxe douanière et du droit de patente et ayant obtenu sa liberté d'action sur le tronçon de la voie ferrée Bagdad–Bassora, tirera un grand profit de cette entente.

Le Gouvernement ottoman, étant libéré de ses engagements concernant la voie Bagdad–Bassora, pourra faire appel au concours des capitalistes des autres pays.

Au cours de la conversation, Rifaat Pacha a assuré au chargé d'affaires de France que le Gouvernement ottoman désirait voir aboutir prochainement les négociations entamées avec la France au sujet de l'augmentation des chemins de fer en Turquie et qu'il croyait de l'intérêt mutuel des deux pays que la France agrandit son champ d'action financière pour le progrès économique de la Turquie.

Le Ministre a ajouté que dès maintenant il exprimait son contentement de cette entente probable entre la Turquie et la France—entente de nature à fortifier les relations amicales des deux pays.

[11230] No. 143.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to Viceroy, dated the 19th March, relative to Abu Musa.

India Office, March 25, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 143.

Viscount Morley to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, March* 19, 1911.

PLEASE see your telegram dated the 14th January last regarding Abu Musa. I should be glad to know when receipt of material for reply to German note may be expected. It is desirable that our reply to note should, if possible, be made simultaneously with offer of compromise, terms of which are under consideration in consultation with Foreign Office.

[11013] No. 144.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 27, 1911.

VALI of Bussorah and Bahreinese. Your telegram No. 66 of the 25th instant.

Vali in asserting Turkish rights over Bahrein, and denying British protection, has committed flagrant violation of *status quo*. Incidents of this nature will render impossible the continuance of the negotiations, which the Turkish Government have suggested for general settlement of Gulf questions in connection with Bagdad Railway.

You should state this to Turkish Government, and say that instructions must be sent to vali to release Bahrein natives and accept Bahrein passports.

[11498] No. 145.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 28th March, 1911, relative to Abu Musa.

India Office, March 28, 1911.

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Enclosure in No. 145.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 28, 1911.

ABU MUSA. See your telegram dated the 18th March.

Necessary material has been collected by Resident, Persian Gulf, but drafting reply will take him some days.

[11579] No. 146.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, March* 29, 1911.

ARREST of Bahreinese at Bussorah.

In accordance with instructions contained in your telegram No. 74 of the 27th instant, I have seen the Minister for Foreign Affairs and spoken to him as you desired. I have given his Excellency to understand that, so long as no definite settlement is given to the matter, no advance can be hoped for in the general negotiations between the two Governments. Rifaat Pasha observed that he had no knowledge of the incident, and also expressed ignorance with regard to the general question of the status of Bahrein, which he said he would look into.

[11579] No. 147.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 30, 1911.

BAHREIN. Your telegram No. 73 of the 29th March.

Minister for Foreign Affairs should be pressed to send immediate instructions to vali to accept Bahrein passports and to release Barbein natives, and should be given to understand that His Majesty's Government cannot admit any delay in the settlement of this question.

[11498] No. 148.

Sir Edward Grey to Herr von Kühlmann.

HIS Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the German chargé d'affaires, and has the honour to refer him to his enquiry, made in the course of a conversation with Sir A. Nicolson on the 27th instant, as to when the German Government might expect a reply to their last communication on the subject of the claim of Messrs. Robert Wönckhaus and Co., in connection with the shipment of red oxide from Abu Musa.

In order to prepare the reply of His Majesty's Government, it has been necessary for His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire to undertake a further long and minute enquiry, and to collect additional evidence on the spot, and this task would have been completed at a much earlier date had more normal conditions prevailed in the Persian Gulf during the past year.

A telegram was, however, received on the 29th instant from the Government of India stating that the collection of the necessary material is now complete, and Sir E. Grey therefore hopes that the reply will be ready in a few weeks.

Foreign Office, March 31, 1911.

[11687] No. 149.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1911.

WITH reference to your letter of the 6th instant relative to the claim of Messrs. Wönckhaus in connection with the shipment of red oxide from Abu Musa, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith draft of a note which, subject to any modifications which Viscount Morley may suggest after consultation with the Government of India, he would propose to address to the German Ambassador, offering to compromise the matter on the lines laid down at the interdepartmental conference which met on the 18th March.

The note referred to in the first paragraph of this draft is that in which will be forwarded to Count Metternich the reply of His Majesty's Government to his Excellency's communication of the 4th December, 1909. This reply cannot, of course, be drawn up till the results of the further enquiry recently made by His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire have been received from the Government of India.

As regards the first condition of the compromise proposed in the note, Lord Morley will observe that, in conformity with the recommendation of the conference, allusion is made to Sir E. Grey's note of the 22nd August last, in which it was pointed out to Count Metternich that, by the admission of the German vice-consul at Bushire, the quantity of oxide shipped in April 1908 on board the steam-ship "Louise" was sufficient to enable Messrs. Wönckhaus to discharge all the obligations which they had contracted previous to the cancellation of the concession by the Sheikh of Sharga, and in which it was further stated that some of the mineral belonging to that shipment was then still lying unsold at Hamburg. This reference is included in order to forestall any possible claim for compensation put forward by the firm in connection with alleged inability to fulfil forward contracts by reason of the interruption of their shipments.

As regards the second condition, it would seem that if, as therein proposed, the unexpired portion of the interrupted contract is allowed to run out from a given date, a claim on account of losses incurred by the interruption, in so far as the capital sum is concerned, may be avoided, and payment be confined to the interest on that sum, which could be fixed at a reasonable rate.

It is recognised, however, that Messrs. Wönckhaus, by their contract with Hassan Samaiya, have the option of renewing it on its expiration, and that they may therefore be unwilling to accept the view indicated in the preceding paragraph, on the grounds that it is only tenable in the case of a non-renewable contract definitely terminable on a given date.

It has therefore been thought desirable to insert in this second condition a clause which, by annulling Messrs. Wönckhaus' right to renew the contract, makes it possible at once to rebut a claim for the payment of a capital sum on account of the period of interruption, and to ensure the elimination from any future agreement of the objectionable characteristic of a monopoly.

The third condition has been inserted in view of the paramount importance of maintaining the view consistently held and expressed by His Majesty's Government since the beginning of this controversy, that the Sheikh of Sharga acted within his rights, as the absolute Sovereign of his dominions, in cancelling the concession, thus insisting on his and their freedom from liability in the matter, and indicating Hassan Samaiya as the only person against whom Messrs. Wönckhaus' claim can lie.

The question whether the claim of Messrs. Wönckhaus should be verified, and the amount of the compensation which His Majesty's Government are willing to pay, fixed by a judicial tribunal, as proposed in your letter of the 9th ultimo, or merely by the departments interested, which is one of some difficulty, was not definitely decided by the conference.

The former course, though no doubt it would assure a more thorough examination, offers objections from the point of view of expense and delay, while, on the other hand, claims fixed by the latter method have, perhaps, in some cases been left at an unduly high figure.

I am accordingly to suggest that the solution of this question should be deferred till the sum claimed by Messrs. Wönckhaus is known, and that if manifestly moderate it should be paid after verification by the departments, and, if excessive, examined and reduced by a judge deputed by the High Court of Bombay.

The point, however, is not, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, one which need be alluded to

in correspondence with the German Government, at any rate, at the present stage of the discussion.

As for the persons to whom the new concession, mentioned above in the second condition, should be granted by the sheikh, Sir E. Grey adheres to the views expressed in the letter from this Office of the 8th November last, and considers that the matter is one with which, as a transaction between the sheikh and certain British subjects, the German Government have no concern.

He would also abstain from alluding in the note to the proposal to include in the new concession a clause guaranteeing to the sheikh the payment of a royalty on the oxide mined since; though the profits of the concessionnaires would thereby be reduced, the terms of their contract with Messrs. Wönckhaus and the profits of the latter would remain unaffected.

As regards the source from which the claim should be met, a point left undecided by the conference, a further communication will be addressed to you in due course.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

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